spect to the combinations, which a general could encoun­ter; because those were always liable to be disjointed by the uncertainty of the timely arrival of orders. Every convoy demanded a numerous and well-conducted escort, and every march was endangered by the want of real in­formation relative to the hostile positions. The duties, greatly multiplied, exhausted a great part of the army ; and the regular cavalry was soon rendered unserviceable by their excessive fatigue.

VII. It is not sufficient for a good operation of war to convey with ability the mass of forces upon the most im­portant points; they require moreover to be brought into action. If they remain inactive when arrived upon those points, the principle is forgotten, for the enemy may make counter-movements to defeat the project ; and it is there­fore indispensable that, from the moment his communica­tions or his flank are gained, the mass of forces must march up to him and attack. This is the moment when a simul­taneous employment of the troops must take place. Masses of troops present do not decide battles, but the acting masses alone have effect ; the former indeed produce that consequence in strategical movements, but the latter de­termine the success of the action.

To insure this result, a general of ability will seize the proper moment to force the decisive point of the field of battle, and combine the attack in such a manner that all his forces will be brought into action, with the exception always of the reserve. But if the efforts emanating from this principle fail of the desired success, no other combina­tion remains than a simultaneous general onset, in which the reserve is to be brought forward, to make a last and decisive effort.

VIII. We now come to battles proper, all the combina­tions of which are reducible to three systems.

The first includes defensive battles, where the enemy is expected in a strong position, with the simple object of maintaining the ground. Such were the positions of Tal- lard at Blenheim, Villeroy at Ramillies, Marsin at Turin, Daun at Torgau ; and the events are sufficient to show their general disadvantage.

The second is the opposite system, wholly offensive. It consists in manœuvres of attack wherever the enemy may be found, such as those of Marlborough at Blenheim, Ra­millies, and Oudenarde; Frederick at Leuthen, Zorndorff, and Torgau ; Napoleon at Jena and Ratisbon; Wellington at Vittoria, and the allies at Leipzig.

The third offers, in some measure, the middle term be­tween the other two. It consists in selecting a field of battle, carefully reconnoitred beforehand in its strategical applicabilities and advantages of ground ; then to wait the enemy’s attack, and to fix upon the proper moment of pass­ing from the defensive into offensive measures with the best chances of success. In this class must be reckoned the combinations of Napoleon at Rivoli and Austerlitz, of Blucher at the Katsbach and Laon, and of Wellington at Salamanca and Waterloo.

It is difficult to prescribe fixed rules by which the choice of any of these systems should be guided. The circum­stances of the moment, the moral character of the troops, considered as affecting their courage, discipline, and inclina­tions, their national temper, and the conformation of the ground, must be taken into account.

1. Under these general considerations, it may be fixed, that the best mode is to act offensively on all occasions, when the troops are inured to war, and the ground presents no extraordinary features.

2. Where the locality of the field of battle is difficult of access, either from natural or artificial causes, and the troops of different nations not having the same unity of feeling and of discipline, it will be preferable to receive the attack in a position previously selected, with the determi­nation of assuming the offensive when the enemy shall be exhausted by the first efforts.

3. When the strategical circumstances of the parties are such, that one is obliged to attack the other without con­sidering localities ; as, for instance, to prevent the junction of two hostile armies, or to crush an isolated corps, &c.

4. When particular circumstances, as the extreme infe­riority of numbers, forbid any other than strictly defensive measures ; such as Eugene took at Chiari, Abercromby on the Zyp, and Moore at Corunna.

Battles in general, whether offensive or defensive, not­withstanding all the varieties of ground and changes of po­sition, may be classed into three systems of disposition, or what are termed *orders,* each subject to some modifications.

First, the simple parallel order, or that in which hostile armies are drawn up in parallel lines, to advance or receive the attack. Jomini justly observes, that accident or supe­rior valour alone decides the contest in this class of orders, and that the soldier is entitled to all the credit ; because such a disposition being the fruit of ignorance and incapa­city, the general can have no part in it. Notwithstanding this censure, it is somewhat singular that the only battle in which a considerable British corps was severely handled was of this description, when Berwick defeated Lord Gal­way at Almanza. Accident, it must be owned, had a great share in this battle ; for it is asserted that the statue of St Antonio, the nominal commander-in-chief, was shattered by a cannon ball, which instantly caused the Portuguese to retreat, and leave the British and Dutch to their fate.

The second order is the parallel, reinforced upon one or several parts of the line. In this class, especially if dispo­sitions with an angle to the front or rear are included, most of the great victories of ancient and modern times may be reckoned. For although it is not the most perfect in theory, it is the most constantly applicable in practice, under almost every possible character of ground, or counter-disposition of the enemy.

The oblique order of battle is the third and the best class of tactical dispositions ; but in the application, great sim­plicity of combination is necessary, and great prudence in the execution. Against a manoeuvring army ably com­manded, it will always be very difficult to apply it ; but when produced, the effect is instantaneous and decisive : it is the triumph of discipline and of grand manœuvre.

IX. Orders of battle, or the most appropriate disposition for leading troops into action, should possess the inherent qualities of mobility and solidity. To attain these two ob­jects, troops which are to remain on the defensive should be partly deployed and partly in columns, as the allied army was at Waterloo, or the Russians at Eylau ; but the corps destined to attack a decisive point should be disposed into two lines of battalions, formed into columns of more or less density. Jomini proposes columns of grand divisions (ac­cording to the French formation of a battalion of six com­panies, making three grand divisions).

Three grand divisions would thus form three lines, and the second line three more. This order, according to his view, offers much more solidity than a deployed line, which waves too much, retards the impulse necessary for attack, and prevents the officers from managing their men. In or­der to facilitate the march, obviate the great density of the