brigades AB of the columns HI be attacked, a deployment must take place according to the direction of the attack CD. This manœuvre having checked the enemy FG, the army in the rear being thus momentarily protected, should imme­diately change direction exteriorly, by filing the divisions into a new alignment IL; or by altering the direction of the columns in a similar manner, so as to produce a pro­longation beyond the enemy’s flank KK. It is however clear, that if the columns are left in front, the operation is according to rule ; but if the right be in front, a direction to the left would present the reverse flanks to the enemy. There would be no time for a countermarch, and still less for wheeling up in succession. It therefore appears that the columns should change the pivots of divisions, and wheel to the right into line ; for though this manœuvre would be against the letter of the regulations, no disorder would ensue, and it is actually practised, at least by cavalry, in some of the continental armies. There is no want of proofs of the oc­casional necessity of this manœuvre in every campaign ; but the battle of Laswaree will suffice for an illustration. The British infantry advanced in a single column by the right, and after crossing the Mahnus Nye, a deep sunken rivulet, found itself opposite the enemy’s right. To have prolonged the movement, was to produce a parallel order of battle ; advantage was therefore taken of a ravine which led to the hostile right flank, and could conceal the movement. The head of the column turned to the left, and gained the flank ; but when ordered to wheel into line, the pivots being re­versed, some of the Sepoy troops, adhering to the letter of the rules and regulations, wheeled with their backs to the enemy.

This method of converting a probable defeat into an of­fensive movement and oblique attack, will probably intimi­date the enemy, and check his pursuit of AB, from the moment he perceives the menaced attack against his own flank. As a manœuvre it is also more rapid and simple than a change of front, which would only tend to a parallel formation. Although the existing modifications in the structure of armies, as already observed, renders this kind of attack more rare, and the organization by corps and di­visions is advantageous to prevent them, it is nevertheless true, that the Prussians lost the battle of Auerstadt, and the French were placed in the most critical situations at Marengo, Eylau, and Lützen, because they were attacked on the march before they expected a general action.

The battle of Waterloo, unquestionably the most decisive event of the late awful contest, offers so many instructive circumstances, and so much matter for deep meditation, in the position and manœuvres, and in the exhibition of the soundest maxims of war, that it may be considered as a general illustration of the advanced state of the art of war at the present period. Without entering into details, the minutiæ of which are apt to confuse, we shall content our­selves with merely pointing out the principal dispositive features which it displays. As there are many plans more or less correct, and the ground is generally known, the re­marks which we are about to offer will be readily understood by those who have any elementary knowledge of war. When Blucher had retreated from Ligny, and the duke of Wellington had fallen back from Quatre Bras, he occupied the position of Mont St Jean, determined to risk a battle with the forces he could collect on that point. Exclusively of the Prussians, whose severe loss in killed, wounded, and strag­glers, could not immediately be reorganized or replaced, but by the expected arrival of the corps of Bulow, the duke’s army consisted of about eighty-one battalions and eighty- seven squadrons ; which, with the artillery, may have amounted to 66,700 men. Of these upwards of thirty bat­talions and as many squadrons had never been in action.