strong front and secure flanks ; the means of retreating must also be considered in case of defeat. Lloyd, in his “ Reflec­tions on the Battle of Kollin,” observes that a defeated army retires with greater facility by dividing itself into as many corps as the nature of the country will allow ; because, 1st, if the enemy form an equal number of divisions, he cannot operate vigorously upon any, and the retiring army having the facility of *reuniting,* may totally defeat one of the hostile corps; 2d, if the enemy operates *en masse,* it can be only towards one, and the others fall back unmolested: that di­vision, however, covered by a strong rear guard, avoids serious actions, and having the faculty of moving more ra­pidly, because it is less numerous, can escape likewise with­out great loss. Bulow, taking up this question mathematical­ly, advances the opinion that the columns should move out­wards or eccentrically, from a point towards the periphery ; but Jomini combats both so far victoriously. He observes, that Lloyd admits that the division of the pursuing forces exposes them to defeat ; why then recommend such a ma­nœuvre to a retreating army, which must be already inferior to the enemy ? He quotes the fine concentric retreat of the Archduke Charles, and might have added the Russian and both Lord Wellington’s. But in examining the me­chanism of these movements, it appears that none of them was the consequence of a defeat, and especially such de­feats as the modern system of attack inflicts ; they were merely armies manoeuvring back towards their base upon their own lines of operations, watching a favourable oppor­tunity to resume the offensive ; or retreats after battles where both parties had claims to the victory, as Benning- sen’s after Eylau, and Kutusoff's after Borodino. The dif­ference between Lloyd and Jomini is merely in words ; for the former points out the facility of uniting two corps, which, if he meant the eccentricity applied by Bulow, would be impossible.

But an army completely defeated is no longer in the hands of the general, whether he be the duke of Brunswick or Napoleon. A check, such as the Austrians suffered at Fleurus, and the allies at Lützen, Bautzen, and Dresden, does not prevent the commander from executing the best measures that circumstances will allow. Thus, in the three former, the armies retired in mass ; in the latter, they di­vided into several columns, and thereby not only covered themselves by the mountains of Bohemia, but also applied Lloyd’s maxim, in uniting two corps to destroy one of the pursuer’s at Kulm. Hence circumstances must govern the measure ; and if, after a real defeat, a broad river, chain of mountains, or range of fortresses, can be gained in two or three marches, the division of a routed army may be ap­plied as a safe rule.

A retiring army is not always obliged to fall back upon its own frontier ; it may sometimes change the direction of its operations, as Frederick did after the siege of Olmutz in 1758, when, instead of returning into Silesia, he changed his line, and marched into Bohemia. This measure was also proposed to Napoleon before the battle of Leipzig. He was advised to approach the Elbe, call in the corps of St Cyr from Dresden, cross the river about Wittemberg, and descend by the right bank towards Magdeburg. The Prus­sian and northern armies, being on the left of the Elbe, could not have prevented the destruction of Berlin, Pots­dam, and Brandenburg. And from Magdeburg, reinforced with its vast garrison, and connected with the Danes and the corps of Davoust at Hamburg, he could have operated by a new line, having his communications open by Wesel, Cassel, and all the fortresses of Holland ; the sterile coun­try to which the allies must have followed him could not have subsisted their vast cavalry ; and the sandy roads would hardly have allowed sufficient transport of provision to maintain the troops. There were however many, and probably superior reasons, which made him reject the pro­posal.

If the art of war consists in applying the superior force of a mass upon a weak point of the enemy, it follows that a defeated army should be pursued with the utmost viva­city. Never delay till to-morrow, is an ancient military maxim, applicable especially in pursuit; for the strength of an army consists in its organization, in the unity result­ing from the connection of all its parts with the main-spring which makes it move. After a defeat, this unity no longer exists. The harmony between the head which combines, and the body which executes, is broken ; their connection is suspended, often destroyed. To pursue and attack is to march to a certain triumph. All the late cam­paigns offer signal examples of this truth. Generals of me­diocrity often neglect this maxim, and their victories are scarcely more than a forcible removal of troops. The di­rection of the pursuit, though guided by circumstances, should always however aim at gaining the hostile line of communications, and cutting off the enemy from his base ; because, by so doing, he may be thrown upon such obstacles as to force him to surrender.

Sieges, according to Lloyd, should never be undertaken but with the following views : 1st, when fortresses are si­tuate upon the passages which lead to the enemy, so as to render it impossible to penetrate without capturing them; 2d, when they intercept the communications, and the country is unable to furnish the necessary subsistence ; 3d, when they are wanted to cover magazines formed in the country, and thereby to facilitate the operations ; 4th, when the enemy has considerable depots within the for­tress, of which he is absolutely in want ; 5th, when the capture of a fortress produces the conquest of a considerable tract of country, and enables the besiegers to winter in that vicinity. To these may be added, 6th, the recapture of a fortress essential in the defence of a frontier.

1. As victory is best secured by taking the lead in an operation, an army covering a siege should never wait to be attacked by the enemy, but endeavour to anticipate him ; for, by defeating the forces which aim at raising the siege, the place is sure to fall.

2. If the enemy approach the covering army with an im­posing mass, the siege should be raised, all the forces united, and an attack in force directed against him.

3. When the relieving army is defeated, the siege should be resumed, while the pursuit continues, and the enemy is not in a condition to return before the capture of the place.

4. When an army besieges a place, in consequence of offensive movements and anterior success, thc covering army should not remain in a position near the place, but drive the enemy as far as possible forward ; for the reliev­ing army will find the difficulty of raising the siege in­creased with the distance it is removed from the place ; but if at length that army should arrive so near as to fur­nish the probability of raising the siege, the besieging corps should then rapidly join the covering army, and make a united effort to defeat it.@@1

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