Based on the Mitâksharâ, are the *Smriti-chandrikâ, @@1* a work of great common-sense, written by Devânda Bhatta, in the 13th cen­tury, and highly esteemed in Southern lndia; and the *Vîra- mitrodaya,* a compilation consisting of two chapters, on âchâra and vyavâhâra, made in the first half of the 17th century by Mitramiśra, for Râjâ Vîrasimha, or Bîrsinh Deo of Orchbâ, who murdered Abul Fazl, the minister of the emperor Akbar, and author of the *Âin i Akbarî.* There is no need here to enumerate any more of the vast number of treatises on special points of law, of greater or less merit, the more important of which will be found mentioned in English digests of Hindu law.

II. Philosophy.—The Indian mind shows at all times a strong disposition for metaphysical speculation. In the old religious lyrics this may be detected from the very first. Not to speak of the abstract nature of some even of the oldest Vedic deities, this propensity betrays itself in a certain mystic symbolism, tending to refine and spiritualize the original purely physical character and activity of some of the more prominent gods, and to impart a deep and subtle import to the rites of the sacrifice. The primitive worship of more or less isolated elementary forces and phenomena had evidently ceased to satisfy the religious wants of the more thoughtful minds. Various syncretist tendencies show the drift of religious thought to be towards some kind of unity of the divine powers, be it in the direction of the pantheistic idea, or in that of an organized polytheism, or even towards monotheism. In the latter age of the hymns the pantheistic idea is rapidly gaining ground, and finds vent in various cosmogonic speculations ; and in the Brahmana period we see it fully developed. The fundamental conception of this doctrine finds its expression in the two synonymous terms *brahman* (neutr.), originally “power of growth,” then “devotional impulse, prayer,” and *dtman* (masc.), “breath, self, soul.”

The recognition of the essential sameness of the individual souls, emanating all alike (whether really or imaginarily) from the ultimate spiritual essence *{parama-brahman}* “ as sparks issue from the fire,” and destined to return thither, involved some important problems. Considering the infinite diversity of individual souls of the animal and vegetable world, exhibiting various degrees of perfection, is it conceivable that each of them is the immediate efflux of the Supreme Being, the All-perfect, and that each, from the lowest to the highest, could re-unite therewith directly at the close of its mundane existence ? The difficulty implied in the latter question was at first met by the assumption of an inter- mediate state of expiation and purification, a kind of purgatory; but the whole problem found at last a more comprehensive solu­tion in the doctrine of transmigration *{samsdra}.* Some scholars have suggested @@2 that metempsychosis may have been the prevalent belief among the aboriginal tribes of India, and may have been taken over from them by the Indo-Aryans. This no doubt is quite possible ; but even in that case we can only assume that speculative minds seized upon it as offering the most satisfactory (if not the only possible) explanation of the great problem of phenomenal existence. It is certainly a significant fact that, once established in Indian thought, the doctrine of metempsychosis is never again called in question,—that, like the fundamental idea on which it rests, viz., the essential sameness of the immaterial element of all sentient beings, the notion of *samsdra* has become an axiom, a universally conceded principle of Indian philosophy. Thus the latter has never quite risen to the heights of pure thought; its object is indeed jijnâsâ, the search for knowledge ; but it is an inquiry (*mîmâmsâ)* into the nature of things undertaken not solely for the attainment of the truth, but with a view to a specific object,—the discontinuance of samsara, the cessation of mundane existence after the present life. Every sentient being, through ignorance, being liable to sin, and destined after each ex­istence to be born again in some new form, dependent on the actions committed during the immediately preceding life, all mundane existence thus is the source of ever-renewed suffering; and the task of the philosopher is to discover the means of attaining *moksha,* “release” from the bondage of material existence, and *yoga,* “union” with the Supreme Self,—in fact, salvation. It is with a view to this, and this only, that the Indian metaphysician takes up the great problems of life,—the origin of man and the universe, and the relation between mind and matter.

It is not likely that these speculations were viewed with much favour by the great body of Brahmans engaged in ritualistic practices. Not that the metaphysicians actually discountenanced the ceremonial worship of the old mythological gods as vain and nugatory. On the contrary, they expressly admitted the propriety of sacrifices, and commended them as the most meritorious of human acts, by which man could raise himself to the highest degrees of mundane existence, to the worlds of the Fathers and the Devas. Nevertheless, the fact that these were only higher grades from which the individual self would still be liable to relapse into the vortex of material existence,—that the final goal

lay beyond even those worlds, unattainable through aught but a perfect knowledge of the soul’s nature and its identity with the Supreme Self,—this fact of itself was sufficient to depreciate the merit of the sacrificial cult, and to undermine the authority of the sacred rituals. “Know ye that Self,” exhorts one of those old idealists, @@3 “and have done with other words ; for that (knowledge) is the bridge to immortality ! ” Intense self-contemplation being, moreover, the only way of attaining the all-important knowledge, this doctrine left little or no room for those mediatorial offices of the priest, so indispensable in ceremonial worship; and indeed we actually read of Brahman sages resorting to Kshatriya princes to hear them expound this, the true doctrine of salvation. But, in spite of their anti-hierarchical tendency, these speculations con­tinued to gain ground ; and in the end the body of treatises pro­pounding the pantheistic doctrine, the Upanishads, were admitted into the sacred canon, as appendages to the ceremonial writings, the Brahmanas. The Upanishads thus form literally “the end of the Veda,” the *Vedânta*; but their adherents claim this title for their doctrines in a metaphorical rather than in a material sense, as “the ultimate aim and consummation of the Veda.” In later times the radical distinction between these speculative appendages and the bulk of the Vedic writings was strongly accent­uated in a new classification of the sacred scriptures. According to this scheme they were supposed to consist of two great divisions, —the *Karma-kânda, i.e.,* “the work-section,” *or* practical cere­monial (exoteric) part, consisting of the Samhitas and Brahmanas (including the ritual portions of the Aranyakas), and the *Jnâna- kdnda,* “the knowledge-section,” or speculative (esoteric) part. These two divisions are also called respectively the *Pûrva-* (“former”) and *Uttara-* (“latter,” or higher @@4) *kdnda·,* and when the speculative tenets of the Upanishads came to be formulated into a regular system it was deemed desirable that there should also be a special system corresponding to the older and larger portion of the Vedic writings. Thus arose the two systems—the *Pûrva-* (or *Karma-) mîmâmsâ,* or “former (practical) speculation,” and the *Uttara-* (or *Brahma-) mimdmsd,* usually called the Vedanta philosophy.

It is not yet possible to determine, even approximately, the time when the so-called *Darsanas* (literally “demonstrations”), or systems of philosophy, were first formulated. And, though they have certainly developed from the tenets enunciated in the Upanishads, there is considerable doubt as to the exact order in which these systems succeeded each other. The authoritative *exposes* of the systems have apparently passed through several redactions; and, in their present form, these sutra-works @@5 evi- dently belong to a comparatively recent period, being probably not older than the early centuries of our era. By far the ablest general review of the philosophical systems (except the Vedanta) produced by a native scholar is the *Sarva-darśana-sangraha @@*6 (“summary of all the Darśanas”), composed in the 14th century, from a Vedântist point of view, by the great exegete Madhava Achârya.

Among the different systems, six are generally recognized as orthodox, as being (either wholly or for the most part) consistent with the Vedic religion,—two and two of which are again more closely related to each other than to the rest, viz. :—

(1) *Pûrva-mîmâmsâ (Mimâmsâ),* and (2) *Uttar a-mimâmsâ (Vedânta) ;*

(3) *Sânkhya,* and (4) *Yoga ;*

(5) *Nyâya,* and (6) *Vaiseshika.*

(1) The *(Pûrva) Mimâmsâ* is not a system of philosophy in the proper sense of the word, but rather a system of dogmatic criticism and scriptural interpretation. It maintains the eternal existence of the Veda, the different parts of which are minutely classified. Its principal object, however, is to ascertain the religious (chiefly ceremonial) duties enjoined in the Veda, and to show how these duties must be performed, and what are the special merits and rewards attached to them. Hence arises the necessity of determin­ing the principles for rightly interpreting the Vedic texts, as also of what forms its only claim to being classed among speculative systems, viz., a philosophical examination of the means of, and the proper method for arriving at, accurate knowledge. The founda­tion of this school, as well as the composition of the Sutras or aphorisms which constitute its chief doctrinal authority, is ascribed to Jaimini. The Sûtras were commented on by Sahara Svamin ; and further annotations *(vârttika)* thereon were supplied by the great theologian Kumarila Bhatta, who is supposed to have lived in the (6th or) 7th century, and to have worked hard for the re­establishment of Brahmanism. According to a popular tradition his self-immolation was witnessed by Sankaracharya. The most

@@@1 The section on inheritance has been transl. by T. Kristnasawmy Iyer, 1866.

@@@2 See, *e.g.,* A. E. Gough, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads,* p. 24.

@@@3 Mundaka-upanishad, ii. 2, 5.

*@@@*4 *Cf.* Mundaka-upanishad, i. 4, 5, where these two divisions are called “the lower *(apara)* and the higher *(para)* knowledge.”

@@@5 These works have all been printed with commentaries in India; and they have been partly translated by J. Ballantyne, and by K. M. Banerjea. The best general view of the systems is to be obtained from H. C. Colebrooke’s account, *Misc. Essays,* i., 2d ed., with Prof. Cowell’s notes. Compare also the brief abstract given in Goldstücker’s *Literary Remains,* vol*.* i. A very useful classified index of philosophical works was published by F. Hall, 1859.

@@@6 Edited in the *Bibl. Ind.*; translated by E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough, 1882.