in Spain had not been filled up since the fall of Oropesa, and the most influential man in the kingdom was Cardinal Portocarrero, archbishop of Toledo. He was a bitter opponent of the queen, who was extremely unpopular, and all his efforts were directed to thwart the schemes of Austria. To depress the cardinal, Maria Anna induced Charles II. to recall Oropesa, but the latter declined to return to the Austrian alliance which he had previously championed, and espoused the cause of the electoral prince. There was no semblance at this time of a French party in Madrid, but Louis XIV. availed himself of the cessation of hostilities to send thither an able diplomatist, Count Harcourt, who speedily contrived to exercise considerable influence over the course of events.

Too many European interests were involved in the succession to allow it to be settled as a mere question of domestic politics. The idea of the balance of power dominated European diplomacy at this time, and William III. of England was its avowed and recognized champion. England and Holland, the two countries with which William was connected, were vitally interested in the Spanish trade. The accession of a French prince in Spain would almost inevitably transfer to France all the advantages which they at present enjoyed. It was obvious that William III. must have a voice in the settle­ment of this succession, and Louis XIV., who had no desire for a new European war, was willing to recognize this. The negotiations between England and France resulted in the first treaty of partition (October 11, 1698). The electoral prince was to receive the bulk of the Spanish empire, viz., Spain itself, the Netherlands, Sardinia, and the colonies; the dauphin was to have Naples, Sicily, Finale, and Guipuzcoa ; while Lombardy was to go to the archduke Charles. This treaty had one fatal defect—that it was based solely on the interests of the contracting powers and took no account of the wishes of the Spaniards, who resented any proposal for the division of the empire. The first hint of the treaty irritated Charles II. into making a second will in November in favour of the electoral prince, and all parties in Spain agreed in its approval. But within three months both treaty and will were rendered null by the sudden death of the infant prince (February 1699), and the question, thus reopened, became more thorny than ever, as the choice now lay definitely between Austria and France. It seemed almost impossible to prevent the outbreak of a general war, but William III. patiently reunited the broken threads of his diplomacy, and arranged with France a second treaty of partition. The Spanish monarchy was to be divided into two parts. The larger, consisting of Spain, the Netherlands, Sardinia, and the colonies, was to go to the archduke Charles. The dauphin was to receive the share stipulated in the former treaty, with the material addition of Lorraine. The duke of Lorraine was to be compensated with the Milanese. This treaty, unlike the first, was communicated to Austria; but the emperor, who was now confident of securing the whole inheritance, refused to accept it.

Meanwhile the death of the electoral prince had de­stroyed the temporary unanimity at Madrid. Portocarrero and his partisans were gained over to the side of France by Harcourt. Oropesa fell back upon a scheme of his own for uniting the whole Peninsula under the king of Portugal The queen returned to her old allegiance to her brother-in-law, and formed a close alliance with Harrach for the advancement of the interests of the arch­duke Charles. A popular rising overthrew Oropesa and enabled Portocarrero to regain his ascendency. At this juncture came the news of the second partition treaty, which again irritated the tender susceptibility of the

Spaniards. The Austrian party hoped to utilize the popular feeling against Louis XIV. as a party to the hated treaty. But Harcourt adroitly contrived to suggest that the best way of annulling the partition project was to enlist Louis’s own interests against it. The view steadily gained ground that the house of Bourbon was the only power strong enough to secure the unity of the Spanish empire. Portocarrero succeeded in inducing Pope Innocent XII. to support the French claim. Charles II., feeble to the last, succumbed to this combination of influences, and signed a testament bequeathing the suc­cession to Philip of Anjou, the second grandson of Louis XIV., on condition that he would renounce all claims to the crown of France (October 3, 1700). Thus his last act was to disinherit his own family in favour of the enemy with whom he had been at war almost all his reign. He died on the 1st of November 1700.

Everything now depended upon the decision of Louis XIV. The treaty of partition offered substantial advant­ages to France ; Charles II.’s will would exalt the house of Bourbon above every other family in Europe. His hesitation, whether real or feigned, did not last long. On November 16 he introduced his grandson to the French court as Philip V. of Spain. The dynastic ambition of the king was also based upon sound policy. In the face of Spanish opinion and of the emperor’s refusal it was impossible to carry out the partition treaty. And for the moment it appeared that the accession of a Bourbon prince would be secured without difficulty. Philip V, was proclaimed in all parts of the Spanish monarchy amid popular acclamations. Leopold I. protested and prepared to attack Lombardy, but he could not hope to obtain the whole succession for his son without the assistance of the maritime powers. William III., who saw the aims of his life threatened with ruin, was eager for war, but his subjects, both in England and Holland, were resolute to maintain peace. In these circumstances Louis XIV. played into the hands of his enemies. He expelled the Dutch garrisons from the fortresses of the Netherlands which they had occupied since the treaty of Ryswick, and replaced them by French troops. He showed a cynical intention to regard Spain as a province of France, and he took measures to secure for the French the commercial advantages hitherto enjoyed by England and Holland. William III. was thus enabled to conclude the Grand Alliance (September 7, 1701), by which the contracting powers undertook to obtain the Netherlands and the Italian provinces of Spain for the archduke Charles and to preserve the mercantile monopoly of the English and Dutch. A few days afterwards James II. died at St Germains, and Louis XIV. was injudicious enough to acknowledge his son as king of England. This insult exasperated public opinion in that country; the Tory parliament was dissolved; and the last obstacle to William’s warlike policy was swept away. William him­self died in March 1702, but he left the continuance of his policy to the able hands of Marlborough and Heinsius. The war which the emperor had commenced single-handed in 1701 became general in the next year.

It is needless to follow the military operations of the War of the Spanish Succession, which have been rendered famous by the exploits of Eugene and Marlborough. The chief scenes of hostilities were the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy, in each of which the French suffered fatal and humiliating reverses. At first the peninsula of Spain was not directly concerned in the war. The Grand Alliance did not aim at excluding Philip from the Spanish monarchy as a whole, but only from those parts which the maritime powers wished to preserve from French influence. But in 1703 Pedro II. of Portugal deserted the cause of