embassy in Paris and was succeeded by Campomanes. The latter was not only a distinguished statesman but also one of the foremost representatives of Spanish litera­ture. He was one of the earliest students of political economy, and many of the most enlightened measures for the relief and encouragement of trade are to be assigned to him. But his administration, which aimed at educat­ing the people to a share in political life, was almost as alien to the wishes of Charles III. as the liberal and anti­clerical schemes of D’Aranda. A far more congenial minister was found in Florida Blanca, whose aim was to promote the material interests of Spain by the supervision of an internal despotism, who stopped the attack on the church when its subordination was secured, who supported the economic reforms of Campomanes, but would only carry them out by a rigid bureaucracy, and who conciliated the king by falling in with his foreign policy even when it conflicted with the national welfare.

Meritorious as Charles III.’s reforms were, it would give a false impression to represent them as completely successful. The regeneration of Spain was by no means accomplished, and many of the abuses which had been growing for centuries survived the attempt to effect their annihilation. One of the chief causes of this failure was the corruption and ignorance of the lower officials. The reforming impulse was confined to the educated classes, and made little impression upon the bulk of the people. It was of little use to devise the most enlightened measures when there was no efficient machinery to carry them out. Many of the most promising reforms remained mere paper schemes. The methods employed, too, were not always the best calculated to obtain their end. The state took too much upon itself, and attempted to dis­charge functions which would have been better left to local enterprise. Roads were constructed on a magnificent scale, but only too often in directions where they were not wanted, and they remained almost unused. Thus the debt was increased without any improvement of the revenue. The return of Charles III. to a military policy imposed serious burdens upon the country, and it would have been better to have prolonged the peace of Ferdi­nand VI.’s reign, inglorious as it appeared to an ambitious king. Undoubtedly a great advance was made, but equal exertions would have produced a greater result in any other country. The population of Spain remained to a great extent sunk in sloth and superstition. Much might be hoped from a steady persistence in ameliorative measures, but unfortunately the work of reform was interrupted just at the moment when success appeared to be within reach.

The death of Charles III. and the accession of Charles IV. were contemporary with the outbreak of the French Revolution, which was destined to exercise a decisive influence over the fortunes of the adjacent peninsula. Florida Blanca, who continued to hold office during the first three years of the new reign, found it impossible to continue his policy. The revival of Spain could only be effected by the restoration of its naval and colonial ascendency at the expense of England, and for the carry­ing out of this scheme the support of France was impera­tively necessary. But the French alliance rested upon the relationship between the two branches of the house of Bourbon, and the Family Compact ceased to exist when Louis XVI. was deprived of power by his subjects. Of this conclusive evidence was given in 1791. Some English merchants founded a settlement at Nootka Sound on the west coast of America, which provoked an indignant protest from Spain. But the French national assembly refused to send any assistance, and Florida Blanca was compelled to conclude a humiliating treaty and to give up

all hope of opposing the progress of England. This failure was attributed by the minister to the Revolution, of which he became the uncompromising opponent. The reforms of Charles III.’s reign were abandoned ; all liberal tend­encies in Spain were suppressed ; and the Government set itself to restore the old lethargy under absolute rule from which the country had been gradually awakened. The movement of reform had made so little progress among the mass of the people that reaction was really easier than progress. But Florida Blanca was not content with suppressing liberalism in Spain ; he was eager to avenge his disappointment by crushing the Revolution in France. He opened negotiations with the emigrants, urged the European powers to a crusade on behalf of legitimacy, and paraded the devotion of Charles IV. to the head of his family. This bellicose policy, however, brought him into collision with the queen. Maria Louisa of Parma, a woman whose real abilities were perverted to the gratification of sensual lusts, was unwilling to allow the minister to share her ascendency over the feeble mind of her husband, and she feared that the outbreak of war would diminish the revenues which she squandered in self-indulgence. She had already removed from the ministry Campomanes and other supporters of Florida Blanca, and had compelled the latter to restrict himself to the single department of foreign affairs. Early in 1792 she completed her task by inducing Charles IV. to banish Florida Blanca to Murcia, aud his place was entrusted to the veteran D’Aranda. But the new minister found that he held office only at the favour of the queen, and that this had to be purchased by a disgraceful servility to her paramour, Emanuel Godoy. Spain withdrew from the projected coalition against France, and sought to maintain an attitude of neutrality, which alienated the other powers, while it failed to conciliate the republic. The repressive measures of Florida Blanca were withdrawn; society and the press regained their freedom; and no opposition was offered to the propaganda of French ideas. D’Aranda’s policy might have been successful if it had been adopted earlier, but the time for temporizing was now past, and it was necessary for Spain to choose one side or the other. But the decision was not allowed to rest with the man who had always shown a sympathy with the revolutionary prin­ciples. In November 1792 the queen felt herself strong enough to carry out the scheme which she had been long maturing. D’Aranda was dismissed, and the office of first minister was entrusted to Godoy, who had recently received the title of duke of Alcudia. Godoy, who was at once the queen’s lover and the personal favourite of the king, had had no education for the part which he was called upon to play. Though endowed with a natural quickness of parts and a capacity for intrigue, he had no habits of application, no experience of the routine of office, and above all no settled policy. His appointment was regarded with jealousy by the grandees of Spain, while his undisguised relations with the queen outraged the moral feelings of the best part of the nation. Luckily for Godoy, the course to be pursued was decided for him. The execution of Louis XVI. (January 21, 1793) made a profound impression in a country where loyalty was a superstition. Charles IV. was roused to demand ven­geance for the insult to his family, and from one end of Spain to the other a cry resounded for immediate war with the impious rebels who had shed the blood of an anointed king. Godoy had nothing to do but to follow the national impulse, and Spain became a member of the first coalition against France. Everything seemed to promise a rapid and complete success. The number of volunteers who offered their services rendered conscription unnecessary; and the southern provinces of France were so preponder­