atingly royalist that they were ready to welcome the Spaniards as deliverers. These advantages, however, were nullified by the shameful incompetence and carelessness of the Government. The troops were left without supplies ; no plan of combined action was imposed upon the com­manders ; and each regiment was left to act of its own will. The military action of Spain provoked the contempt of Europe. The two campaigns of 1793 and 1794 were one long catalogue of failures. The bravery of the soldiers was rendered useless by the incapacity of their officers, and the maladministration of the central Government excited such disgust that an outbreak of revolutionary disturbance in Spain itself seemed more than possible. Instead of reducing the southern provinces of France, the Spaniards were driven from the strong fortresses that guarded the Pyrenees, and the French advanced almost to the Ebro. And at the same time the English, the hated rivals of Spain, were utilizing the war to extend their colonial power and were establishing more firmly that maritime supremacy which the Spanish Government had been struggling for almost a century to overthrow. Under the circumstances it is no wonder that the queen and Godoy hastened to follow the example set by Prussia, and concluded the treaty of Basel with France. The terms were unexpectedly favourable. Spain purchased the evacuation of her territories and fortresses by the cession of her share of St Domingo, which had little but a sentimental value as the first discovery of Columbus, and which had already been occupied by the English. So great was the joy excited in Madrid that popular accla­mation greeted the bestowal upon Godoy of the title of “ Prince of the Peace.” But the moderation of the treaty was only a flimsy disguise of the disgrace that it involved. Spain found herself tied hand and foot to the French republic. Godoy had to satisfy his allies by the encourage­ment of reforms which both he and his mistress loathed, and in 1796 the veil was removed by the conclusion of the treaty of San Ildefonso. This was a virtual renewal of the Family Compact of 1761, but with far more dis­advantageous terms to Spain. Each power was pledged to assist the other in case of war with twenty-five ships, 18,000 infantry, and 6000 cavalry. The real object of the treaty, which was to involve Spain in the war against England, was cynically avowed in the eighteenth article, by which, during the present war, the Spanish obliga­tions were only to apply to the quarrel between England and France. A scheme was prepared for a joint attack on the English coast, but it was foiled by the battle of St Vincent, in which Jervis and Nelson forced the Spanish fleet to retire to Cadiz. This defeat was the more disastrous because it cut off the connexion with the colonies and thus deprived Spain of the revenues derived from that quarter. The finances, already exhausted by extravagance and maladministration, were in no con­dition to meet the expenses of a naval war. England seized the opportunity to punish Spain for its conduct in the American War by encouraging discontent in the Spanish colonies, and in the Peninsula itself both nobles and people were bitterly hostile to the queen and her favourite. It was in vain that Godoy sought to secure the friendship of the reforming party by giving office to two of its most prominent members, Jovellanos and Saavedra. Spanish pride and bigotry were offended by the French occupation of Rome and the erection of a republic in the place of the papal government. The treatment of the duke of Parma by the Directory was keenly resented by the queen. Godoy found himself between two parties, the liberals and the ultramontanes, who agreed only in hatred of himself. At the same time the Directory, whose mistrust was excited by his attitude

in the question of Parma, insisted upon his dismissal. Charles IV. could not venture to refuse a demand from France ; the queen was alienated by Godoy’s notorious infidelities; and in March 1798 he was compelled to resign his office. But he did not forfeit his hold on the king’s favour, and he only waited for a favourable opportunity to emerge from his retirement.

Godoy’s office was entrusted to Saavedra, but the reformers did not obtain the advantages which they expected from the change. Jovellanos was compelled in August to retire on account of ill-health,—the result, it was rumoured, of attempts on the part of his opponents to poison him. His place was taken by Caballero, an ardent opponent of reform, who restored all the abuses of the old bureaucratic administration and pandered to the most bigoted prejudices of the clergy and the court. The ministry was hopelessly divided, and the policy of the country was directed by the basest and most paltry intrigues. The only advantage which Spain enjoyed at this period was comparative independence of France. The military plans of the Directory were unsuccessful during the absence of their greatest general in Egypt, and the second coalition gained successes in 1799 which had seemed impossible since 1793. But the return of Bona­parte, followed as it was by the fall of the Directory and the establishment of the Consulate, commenced a new epoch for Spain. As soon as the First Consul had time to turn his attention to the Peninsula, he determined to restore Godoy, who had already regained the affection of the queen, and to make him the tool of his policy. Maria Louisa was easily gained over by playing on her devotion to the house of Parma, and on October 1, 1800, a secret treaty was concluded at San Ildefonso. Spain undertook to cede Louisiana and to aid France in all her wars, while Bonaparte promised to raise the duke of Parma to the rank of king and to increase his territories by the addition either of Tuscany or of the Roman Legations. This was followed by Godoy’s return to power, though he left the department of foreign affairs to a subordinate. Spain was now more servile to France than ever, and in 1801 was compelled to attack Portugal in the French interests. Bonaparte was indignant against Portugal, partly because its fleet had aided his enemies in Egypt, and partly because its harbours offered great naval advantages to the English. The Spanish invasion, which was commanded by Godoy in person, met with no resistance, and the prince ventured to conclude a peace on his own authority by which Portugal promised to observe a strict neutrality on condition that its territories were left undiminished. But Bonaparte resented this show of independence, and compelled Charles IV. to refuse his ratification of the treaty. Portugal had to submit to far harsher terms, and could only purchase peace by the cession of territory in Guiana, by a disadvantageous treaty of commerce, and by a payment of twenty-five millions of francs. This insult to his ally Bonaparte followed up by others. In the preliminary treaty with England he ceded the Spanish colony of Trinidad without even consulting the court of Madrid, while he sold Louisiana to the United States in spite of his promise not to alienate it except to Spain. For these humiliations Spain had to console itself with the empty honour of being the first signatory of the treaty of Amiens.

For nearly three years Spain was allowed to remain at peace. Its finances were partially revived by the restora­tion of free intercourse with the colonies and by the pay­ment of the supplies which had been withheld for the last six years. But the administration was as incompetent and misdirected as ever. Godoy, since his return to office, had abandoned all connexion with the reforming party