to the simplest expression, in order to help out the unfold­ing of the system. Further, in Hofmann’s system of speculation, as in that of Rothe, we are asked to start from an assumption which is not, and cannot be, justi­fied—the assumption that Christianity in the Christian is independent of its objective grounds. Surely every ex­perience may reasonably be called upon to produce evi­dence of its legitimacy and validity; and, if so called upon, how can it avoid referring to its grounds*?* It is only by an examination of the grounds of an experience that we can know whether it is an experience of reality or a form or effect of illusion. The fact from which we are told by Hofmann that we must deduce all other facts is only itself intelligible in the light of many of these facts, and even of the Christian system as a whole ; it is a fact which has many conditions, and the right understanding of it requires its being viewed under its various conditions, not as ab­stracted from and independent of them.

In the forms indicated, then, speculation has failed to make good its claim to participate in the formation and development of theology. Does it follow that its claim is wholly unfounded*?* By no means. Speculation in the forms described pretends to an independence of reality and a creative power for which there is no warrant in reason or confirmation in fact. Hence the futility of such specula­tion is no disproof of the utility of a speculation which will fully recognize reality and directly endeavour to elucidate it. Speculation of this latter kind seems to be a necessary condition of true systematization and a neces­sary supplement to induction and to all the special methods of particular sciences. In a true philosophy, for instance, science and speculation must necessarily be combined. So far from claiming independence of the sciences, a true philosophy will base itself upon them, and seek to rise above them by means of them. It is only thus that it can hope to reach the ultimate universal and real principle of knowledge and being, without which there can be no rest for reason or unity in the universe. But, having ascended by an analytic and inductive course to the unity of an all-comprehensive ultimate principle, philosophy must en­deavour to descend from it in a synthetic and deductive manner, so as to exhibit the whole organism of existence, or to determine how the many laws of science and the many facts of experience are connected with the absolute in being and causation, and through it with one another. It is conceivable that the descent should be accomplished in various ways, and Plato and Plotinus, Descartes and Spinoza, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Krause, Gioberti, and others have attempted it each in a way of his own; but two things are obvious, namely, that philosophy cannot consistently decline the task, and that any method it may adopt in trying to perform it must be one essentially speculative. An inductive and analytic method is clearly inapplicable, for the highest and last results of induction and analysis are just what are to be elucidated through being viewed in relation to the one supreme truth or fact. And among the data with which philosophy must thus synthetically or speculatively deal are those of religion. It requires to show how what theology teaches as to God’s nature and operations comports with what itself affirms as to the absolute source and ground of existence, and this necessarily commits it to have recourse to a theologico- speculative use of reason. And to a very large use of it if, for example, theism be true ; since, in this case, the absolute principle of philosophy can be no other than God Himself, and its highest task no other than to show Him to be the essence of all existence, the light of all knowledge. In this case philosophy must inevitably become in the highest stage of its development a speculative theology.

Nor can positive theology dispense with speculation. It cannot, indeed, begin with it or confine itself to it,—cannot start with some single immediately certain religious fact, and then by mere force of logic evolve therefrom a whole theological system. Its data are all real facts of religion, and these it must deal with, in the first place, mainly by observation and induction. But observation and induction will not always alone lead to a satisfactory result. Obser­vation is confined to experience, which gives only the par­ticular. Induction, in so far as it effects a transition from the particular to the general, already involves the activity of speculative reason ; it makes discoveries only when guided by theory; it can never of itself reach ultimate truth ; and it is manifestly not its function to raise coherent comprehensive systems on their proper construc­tive principles. Then, the theologian who renounces speculation must deal most inefficiently with the chief ideas and doctrines of his science. Consider the greatest idea of all—the idea of God. Mere observation and in­duction do not yield the idea. Exclusively applied, they cannot take us beyond the contingent and conditioned, cannot take us beyond atheism and secularism. Waive, however, this objection, and grant that the idea of God may be given, say, through revelation. What sort of idea must it be in the mind of the theologian who refuses to speculate *?* Merely that of a complex of the attributes predicated of God in the Bible. Surely that is unworthy to be accounted an idea of God at all. The theologian who is in earnest with the idea of God, who would find order and light in the idea, who would think of Him as He is, Absolute Being, Harmonious Life, Infinite Personality, Perfect Spirit, Ultimate and only Complete Explanation of the Universe, must assuredly speculate, and speculate freely and largely, although he ought also to do so humbly and reverently. Even if he would maintain that we cannot have a knowledge of God as He is—that we must renounce the hope of a speculative knowledge of Him, and be con­tent with a merely regulative knowledge,—he will find that he needs, as Kant, Hamilton, Mansel, and Spencer have practically so fully acknowledged, speculation, and much speculation, to support his thesis. The mind is not necessarily relieved from the duty of exercising specula­tive thought on the nature of God by receiving a special revelation regarding God. Christianity is a proof that such revelation may only increase obligation in this re­spect. It brought with it a wondrous idea of God, one of marvellous practical efficacy, but one also which forced Christian reason into paths of speculation, which could only be formulated after lengthened and severe speculative labour, and which no intellectually or spiritually quickened soul can accept otherwise than with speculative exertion. And this may show that speculation is as legitimate and applicable within the sphere of Christianity as within that of general theology. The comprehension of Christianity requires that we penetrate to its distinctive and central principle, and view all its contents in the light of that principle. It is only so that we can hope to accomplish either a true systematization or a true elucidation of its contents. The procedure by which this is effected cannot be one of mere formal logic, of pure deduction, or strict demonstration ; it must be one which implies a constant reference to facts and inductive results ; but still it must be one which is essentially synthetic and speculative.

Theology is a unity, a whole, but a very complex unity, a whole of many dissimilar parts. It may be spoken of in a broad and general way as a science, but not less correctly as a department of sciences. It includes many studies or disciplines which may be cultivated in a scientific spirit and according to scientific methods, and these studies or disciplines, while closely connected, are also clearly distinct. They are by no means mere divisions of a special science. Natural theology and Christian dogmatics are as distinct from each other as physics is from chemistry or anatomy from physiology. Comparative theology and Biblical theology are as