broken at the first encounter, and Gia Long once again ascended his throne. As a reward for the services thus rendered to him, he extended a liberal protection to the Roman Catholic missionaries and their converts, and engaged French officers to fortify his towns and to drill his troops. He soon found, however, that his new allies had more ambitious designs than could be satisfied by doing him service. He therefore withdrew his countenance from them, and emphasized his displeasure by leaving his throne away from his eldest son, who had pleaded his cause in Paris, and by giving it to his youngest son. This change of policy told, as was natural, with greatest force on the missionaries and their converts in the interior of the country. From 1833 to 1839 eleven missionaries were put to death, and thousands, it is said, of the native Christians suffered martyrdom. Neither change of sovereign nor varying circumstances brought any relief to the persecuted Christians, until in 1859 the French Government determined to intervene on their behalf. In that year Admiral Rigault de Genouilly took Saigon by assault, and was attempting to open negotiations with the king of Annam, when the outbreak of the China war compelled him to satisfy him­self with holding the captured town. So soon, however, as the Peking treaty was signed, the French resumed active operations in the neighbourhood of Saigon and took possession of the provinces of Mitto and Bienhoa in Cochin-China. These victories led to the conclusion of a treaty with the king, Tu Duc, which, however, did not prevent the French from adding the provinces of Kinh- luong, Chandoc, and Ha-tien to their acquired territory.

Having thus firmly established themselves in Annam, they began to turn their attention to Tong-king, attracted by the reported richness of its mineral wealth. They found a ready pretext for interfering in its affairs in the disturbances arising from the in­vasion of its northern provinces by the disbanded followers of the Tai-ping rebels. Acting on the protectorship which they professed to exercise over all the territories of Tu Duc, they proposed to him that a joint expedition composed of French and Annamese troops should be sent to quell the disturbances. On Tu Duc declin­ing to accede, the French admiral was on the point of starting “ to protect ” Tong-king, when as before the outbreak of war put an end to the enterprise. The events of 1870 forbade any advance in the direction of Tong-king, but the return of peace in Europe was once more the signal for the renewal of hostilities in the East. The appearance of Garnier’s work on his expedition up the Mekong aroused again an interest in Tong-king, and the reported wealth of the country added the powerful motive of self-interest to the yearn­ings of patriotism. Already Μ. Dupuis, a trader who in the pursuit of his calling had penetrated into Yun-nan, and had thus discovered that the higher waters of the Song-koi were navigable, had visited Hanoi with a small force of desperadoes, and was attempting to negotiate for the passage up the river of himself and a cargo of mili­tary stores for the Chinese authorities in Yun-nan. Meanwhile Captain Senez appeared from Saigon, having received instructions to open the route to French commerce. But to neither the trader nor the naval officer would the Tong-kingese lend a favourable ear, and in default of official permission Dupuis determined to force his way up the river. This he succeeded in doing, but arrived too late, for he found the rebellion crushed and the stores no longer wanted.

On his return to Hanoi, Dupuis found that the opposition of the authorities had gathered strength during his absence. His arrival served to restore the position of the French, and, not wishing to make an open attack upon them, the Tong-kingese general wrote to the king, begging him to induce the governor of Saigon to remove the intruder. An order was thereupon issued calling upon Dupuis to leave the country. This he declined to do, and, after some negotiations, Garnier with a detachment was sent to Hanoi to do the best he could in the difficult circumstances. Garnier threw himself heart and soul into Dupuis’s projects, and, when the Tong-kingese authorities refused to treat with him except on the subject of Dupuis’s expulsion, he attacked the citadel on November 20, 1873, and carried it by assault. Having thus secured his posi­tion, he sent to Saigon for reinforcements, and meanwhile sent small detachments against the five other important fortresses in the delta (Hung-yen, Phu-ly, Hai-Dzuong, Ninh-Binh, and Nam- Dinh), and captured them all. The Tong-kingese now called in the help of Liu Yung-fu, the leader of the “Black Flags,” who at once marched with a large force to the scene of action. Within a few days he recaptured several villages near Hanoi, and so threatening did his attitude appear that Garnier, who had hurried back after capturing Nam-Dinh, made a sortie from the citadel. The movement proved a disastrous one, and resulted in the death of Garnier and of his second in command, Balny d’Avricourt.

Meanwhile the news of Garnier’s hostilities had alarmed the governor of Saigon, who, having no desire to be plunged into a war, sent Philastre, an inspector of native affairs, to offer apologies to the king of Annam. When, however, on arriving in Tong­king Philastre heard of Garnier’s death, he took command of the French forces, and at once ordered the evacuation of Nam-Dinh, Ninh-Binh, and Hai-Dzuong,—a measure which, however advan­tageous it may have been to the French at the moment, was most disastrous to the native Christian population, the withdrawal of the French being the signal for a general massacre of the converts. In pursuance of the same policy Philastre made a convention with the authorities (February 6, 1874), by which he bound his country­men to withdraw from the occupation of the country, retaining only the right to trade at Hanoi and Hai-phong, and agreed to put an end to Dupuis’s aggressive action. On the 15th of March a treaty was signed at Saigon.

For a time affairs remained in statu quo, but in 1882 Le Myre de Villers, the governor of Saigon, sent Rivière with a small force to open up the route to Yun-nan by the Song-koi. With a curious similarity the events of Garnier’s campaign were repeated. Find­ing the authorities intractable, Rivière stormed and carried the citadel of Hanoi, and then, with very slight loss, he captured Nam-Dinh, Hai-Dzuong, and other towns in the delta. And once again these victories brought Liu Yung-fu and his Black Flags into the neighbourhood of Hanoi. As Garnier had done, so Rivière hurried back from Nam-Dinh on news of the threatened danger. Like Garnier also he headed a sortie against his enemies, and like Garnier he fell a victim to his own impetuosity.

In the meantime the Annamese court had been seeking to enlist the help of the Chinese in their contest with the French. The tie which bound the tributary nation to the sovereign state had been for many generations slackened or drawn closer as circumstances determined, but never had it been entirely dissevered, and from the Annamese point of view this was one of the occasions when it was of paramount importance that it should be acknowledged and acted upon. With much more than usual regularity, therefore, the king despatched presents and letters to the court of Peking, and in 1880 he sent a special embassy, loaded with unusually costly offer­ings, and with a letter in which his position of a tributary was emphatically asserted. Far from ignoring the responsibility thrust upon him, the emperor of China ordered the publication of the letter in the Peking Gazette. The death of Rivière and the defeat of his troops had meanwhile placed the French in a position of extreme difficulty. The outlying garrisons, with the exception of Nam-Dinh and Hai-phong, were at once withdrawn to Hanoi, and that citadel was made as secure as circumstances permitted. The Black Flags swarmed round its walls, and the reinforcements brought by Admiral Courbet and General Bouet were insufficient to do more than keep them at bay. So continued was the pressure on the garrison that Bouet determined to make an advance upon Sontay to relieve the blockade. After gaining some trifling suc­cesses, he attacked Vong, a fortified village, but he met with such resistance that, after suffering considerable loss, he was obliged to retreat to Hanoi. In the lower delta fortune sided with the French, and almost without a casualty Hai-Dzuong and Phu-Binh fell into their hands. These successes led to an ultimatum being sent to the king of Annam, in which were demanded the fulfilment of the treaty of 1874 and the acceptance of the protectorate of France over the whole of Annam, including Tong-king. This document met with no favourable reception, and, as at this moment a rein­forcement of 7000 men arrived from France, Courbet, determining to supersede diplomacy by arms, appeared with his fleet before Hué. He found that, though Tu Duc was dead, his policy of resistance was maintained, and he therefore stormed the city. After a feeble defence it was taken, and the admiral concluded a treaty with the king (August 25, 1883), in which the French pro­tectorate was fully recognized, the king further binding himself to recall the Annamese troops serving in Tong-king, and to con­struct a road from Saigon to Hanoi.

Though this treaty was exacted from the king under pressure, the French lost no time in carrying out that part of it which gave them the authority to protect the country, and on the 1st September Bouet again advanced in the direction of Sontay. But again the resistance he met with compelled him to retreat, after capturing the fortified post of Palan. The serious nature of the opposition experienced in these expeditions induced the French commanders to await reinforcements before again taking the field. Meanwhile, on the determination to attack Sontay becoming known in Paris, the Chinese ambassador warned the ministry that, since Chinese troops formed part of the garrison, he should consider it as tanta­mount to a declaration of war. But his protest met with no con­sideration. On the arrival of reinforcements an advance was again made ; and on the 16th December, after some desperate fighting, Sontay fell.

The immediate object of the French commanders was at this time to make themselves secure in the delta, and to inflict such chastisement on the Black Flags and their allies as would prevent their disturbing the peace of the garrisons. This could not be attained so long as Bac-Ninh remained in the hands of the enemy. Generals Négrier, Brière de l’Isle, and Millot accordingly marched against the town, and began to shell it. But it was already deserted, and Millot entered the gates without striking a blow. Thus, while one part of the programme was fulfilled to the letter, the other part, which was to have sealed the fate of the garrison, failed conspicuously. In these circumstances it was thought