navy in the world except her own. Her foe, as regards naval forces, came the next in order. Yet so overwhelming was the strength of Great Britain and France on the sea that Russia never attempted to employ her navy against them. Not to mention other expeditions, considerable enough in themselves, military operations on the largest scale were undertaken, carried on for many months, and brought to a successful termination on a scene so remote that it was two thousand miles from the country of one, and three thousand from that of the other partner in the alliance.

“ The stream of supplies and reinforcements, which in terms of modern war is called 'communications,’ ” was kept free from even the threat of molestation, not by visible measures, but by the undisputed efficacy of a real, though imperceptible sea- power. At the close of the Russian War there were, even in influential positions, men who, undismayed by the consequences of mimicking in free England the cast-iron methods of Frederick the Great, began to measure British requirements by standards borrowed from abroad and altogether inapplicable to British conditions. Because other countries wisely abstained from relying on that which they did not possess, or had only imperfectly and with elaborate art created, the mistress of the seas was led to proclaim her disbelief in the very force that had made and kept her dominion, and was urged to defend herself with fortifications by advisers who, like Charles II. and the duke of York two centuries before, were “ not ashamed of it.” It was long before the peril into which this brought the empire was per­ceived; but at last, and in no small degree owing to the teachings of Mahan, the people themselves took the matter in hand and insisted that a great maritime empire should have adequate means of defending all that made its existence possible.

In forms differing in appearance, but identical in essentials, the efficacy of sea-power was proved again in the American Civil War. If ever there were hostilities in which, to the unobservant or short-sighted, naval operations might at first seem destined to count for little they were these. The sequel, however, made it clear that they constituted one of the leading factors of the success of the victorious side. The belligerents, the Northern or Federal states and the Southern or Confederate states, had a common land frontier of great length. \* The capital of each section was within easy distance of this frontier, and the two were not far apart. In wealth, population and resources the Federals were enormously superior. They alone possessed a navy, though at first it was a small one. The one advantage on the Confederate side was the large proportion of military officers which belonged to it and their rare excellence as soldiers. In *physique* as well as in *moral* the army of one side differed little from that of the other; perhaps the Federal army was slightly superior in the first, and the Confederate, as being recruited from a dominant white race, in the second. Outnumbered, less well equipped, and more scantily supplied, the Confederates nevertheless kept up the war, with many brilliant successes on land, for four years. Had they been able to maintain their trade with neutral states they could have carried on the war longer, and—not improbably—have succeeded in the end. The Federal navy, which was largely increased, took away all chance of this. It established effective blockades of the Confederate ports, and severed their communications with the outside world. Indispensable articles of equipment could not be obtained, and the armies, consequently, became less and less able to cope with their abundantly furnished antagonists. By dominating the rivers the Federals cut the Confederacy asunder; and, by the power they possessed of moving troops by sea at will, perplexed and harassed the defence, and facilitated the occupation of important points. Meanwhile the Confederates could make no reply on the water except by capturing merchant vessels, by which the contest was embittered, but the course of the war remained absolutely unaffected. The great numbers of men under arms on shore, the terrific slaughter in many battles of a war in which tactical ability, even in a moderate degree, was curiously uncommon on both sides, and the

varying fortunes of the belligerents, made the land campaigns far more interesting to the ordinary observer than the naval. It is not surprising, therefore, that peace had been re-established for several years before the American people could be made to see the great part taken by the navy in the restoration of the Union; and what the Americans had not seen was hidden from the sight of other nations.

In several momentous wars in Europe waged since France and Great Britain made peace with Russia sea-power manifested itself but little. In the Russo-Turkish War the naval superiority of the Turks in the Black Sea, where the Russians at the time had no fleet, governed the plans, if not the course, of the campaign. The water being denied to them, the Russians were compelled to execute their plan of invading Turkey by land. An advance to the Bosporus through the northern part of Asia Minor was impracticable without help from a navy on the right flank. Consequently the only route was a land one across the Danube and the Balkans. The advantages, though not fully utilized, which the enforce­ment of this line of advance put into the hands of the Turks, and the difficulties and losses which it caused the Russians, exhibited in a striking manner what sea-power can effect even when its operation is scarcely observable.

This was more conspicuous in a later series of hostilities. The civil war in Chile between Congressists and Balmacedists was specially interesting, because it threw into sharp relief the predominant influence, when a non-maritime enemy was to be attacked, of a navy followed up by an adequate land-force. At the beginning of the dispute the Balmacedists, or President’s party, had practically all the army, and the Congressists, or Opposition party, nearly all the Chilean navy. Unable to remain in the principal province of the republic, and expelled from the waters of Valparaiso by the Balmacedist garrisons of the forts—the only and doubtful service which those works rendered to their own side—the Congressists went off with the ships to the northern provinces, where they counted many adherents. There they formed an army, and having money at command, and open sea communications, they were able to import equipment from abroad, and eventually to transport their land-force, secured from molestation on the voyage by the sea-power at their disposal, to the neigh­bourhood of Valparaiso, where it was landed and triumphantly ended the campaign.

It will have been noticed that, in its main outlines, this story repeated that of many earlier struggles. It was itself repeated, as regards its general features, by the story of the war between China and Japan in 1894-95. Every aspect of the war, says Colomb, is interesting to Great Britain,

“ as Japan is to China in a position similar to that which the British Islands occupy to the European continent ” *(Naval Warfare,* 3rd ed. p. 436). It was additionally interesting because the sea-power of Japan was a novelty. Though a novelty, it was well known by British naval men to be superior in all essentials to that of China, a novelty itself. As is the rule when two belligerents are contending for something beyond a purely maritime object, the final decision was to be on land. Korea was the principal theatre of the land war; and, as far as access to it by sea was concerned, the chief bases of the two sides were about the same distance from it. It was possible for the Chinese to march there by land. The Japanese, coming from an island state, were obliged to cross the water. It will be seen at once that not only the success of the Japanese in the struggle, but also the possibility of its being carried on by them at all, depended on sea-power. The Japanese proved themselves decisively superior at sea. Their navy effectually cleared the way for one army which was landed in Korea, and for another which was landed in the Chinese province of Shan­tung. The Chinese land-forces were defeated. The navy of Japan being superior on the sea, was able to keep its sister service supplied or reinforced as required. It was not, however, the navy, but the army, which finally frustrated the Chinese efforts at defence, and really terminated the war. What the navy did