an heroic struggle against overwhelming odds, is elsewhere recorded (see Finland: *History).* Its immediate consequence in Sweden proper was the deposition of Gustavus IV. (March 13, 1809), who was clearly incapable of governing. The nobility took advantage of this opportunity to pay off old scores against Gustavus III. by excluding not only his unhappy son but also that son’s whole family from the succession—an act of injustice which has never been adequately defended. Hut indeed the whole of this inter­mediate period is full of dark subterranean plots and counter-plots, still inexplicable, as, for instance, the hideous Fersen murder (June 20, 1810) (see Fersen, Hans Axel von) evidently intended to terrorize the Gustavians, whose loyalty to the ancient dynasty was notorious. As early as the 5th of June 1809 the duke regent was proclaimed king, under the title of Charles XIII. *(q.υ.),* after accepting the new liberal constitution, which was ratified by the Riksdag the same day.

The new king was, at best, a useful stopgap, in no way likely to interfere with the liberal revolution which had placed him on the throne. Peace was what the exhausted nation now required; and negotiations had already been opened at. Fredrikshamn. But the Russian demands were too humiliating, and the war was resumed. But the defeats of Sävarsbruk and Ratan (Aug. 19, 1809) broke the spiritof the Swedish army; and peace was obtained by the sacrifice of Finland, the Aland islands, “ the fore-posts of Stockholm,” as Napoleon rightly described them, and Vesterbotten as far as the rivers Torneå and Muonio (treaty of Fredrikshamn, Sept. 17, 1809).

The succession to the throne, for Charles XIII. was both infirm and childless, was settled, after the mysterious death (May 28, 1810) of the first elected candidate, Prince Charles Augustus of Augustenburg, by the selection of the French marshal, Bernadotte (see Charles XIV., king of Sweden), who was adopted by Charles XIII. and received the homage of the estates on the 5th of November 1810.

The new crown prince was very soon the most popular and the most powerful man in Sweden. The infirmity of the old king, and the dissensions in the council of state, placed the government and especially the control of foreign affairs almost entirely in his hands; and he boldly adopted a policy which was antagonistic indeed to the wishes and hopes of the old school of Swedish statesmen, but, perhaps, the best adapted to the circumstances. Finland he at once gave up for lost. He knew that Russia would never voluntarily relinquish the grand duchy, while Sweden could not hope to retain it permanently, even if she reconquered it. But the acquisition of Norway might make up for the loss of Finland; and Bernadotte, now known as the crown prince Charles John, argued that it might be an easy matter to persuade the anti- Napoleonic powers to punish Denmark for her loyalty to France by wresting Norway from her. Napoleon he rightly distrusted, though at first he was obliged to submit to the emperor's dicta­tion. Thus on the 13th of November 1810, the Swedish govern­ment was forced to declare war against Great Britain, though the British government was privately informed at the same time that Sweden was not a free agent and that the war would be a mere demonstration. But the pressure of Napoleon became more and more intolerable, culminating in the occupation of Pomerania by French troops in 1812. The Swedish government thereupon concluded a secret convention with Russia (treaty of Petersburg, April 5, 1812), undertaking to send 30,000 men to operate against Napoleon in Germany in return for a promise from Alexander guaranteeing to Sweden the possession of Norway. Too late Napoleon endeavoured to outbid Alexander by offering to Sweden Finland, all Pomerania and Mecklenburg, in return for Sweden’s active co-operation against Russia.

The Örebro Riksdag (April-August 1812), remarkable besides for its partial repudiation of Sweden’s national debt and its reactionary press laws, introduced general conscription into Sweden, and thereby enabled the crown prince to carry out his ambitious policy. In May 1812 he mediated a peace between Russia and Turkey, so as to enable Russia to use all her forces against France (peace of Bucharest); and on the 18th of July, at Örebro, peace was also concluded between Great Britain on one side and Russia and Sweden on the other. These two treaties were, in effect, the corner-stones of a fresh coalition against Napoleon, and were confirmed on the outbreak of the Franco- Russian War by a conference between Alexander and Charles John at Abo on the 30th of August 1812, when the tsar undertook to place an army corps of 35,000 men at the disposal of the Swedish crown prince for the conquest of Norway.

The treaty of Abo, and indeed the whole of Charles John’s foreign policy in 1812, provoked violent and justifiable criticism among the better class of politicians in Sweden. The immorality of indemnifying Sweden at the expense of a weaker friendly power was obvious; and, while Finland was now definitively sacrificed, Norway had still to be won. Moreover, Great Britain and Russia very properly insisted that Charles John’s first duty was to the anti-Napoleonic coalition, the former power vigorously objecting to the expenditure of her subsidies on the nefarious Norwegian adventure before the common enemy had been crushed. Only on his very ungracious compliance did Great Britian also promise to countenance the union of Norway and Sweden (treaty of Stockholm, March 3, 1813); and, on the 23rd of April, Russia gave her guarantee to the same effect. The Swedish crown prince rendered several important services to the allies during the campaign of 1813 (see Charles XIV., king of Sweden); but, after Leipzig, he went his own way, determined at all hazards to cripple Denmark and secure Norway.

How this “ job ” was managed contrary to the dearest wishes of the Norwegians themselves, and how, finally (Nov. 14, 1814), Norway as a free and independent kingdom was united to Sweden under a common king, is elsewhere described (see Denmark; Norway;

Charles XIV., king of Sweden; Christian VIII., king of Denmark).

Charles XIII. died on the 5th pf February 1818, and was succeeded by Bernadotte under the title of Charles XIV. John. The new king devoted himself to the promotion of the material development of the country, the Göta canal absorbing the greater portion of the twenty- four millions of dalers voted for the purpose. the external debt of Sweden was gradually extinguished, the internal debt consider­ably reduced, and the budget showed an average annual surplus of 700,000 dalers. With returning prosperity the necessity for internal reform became urgent in Sweden. The antiquated Riksdag, where the privileged estates predominated, while the cultivated middle class was practically unrepresented, had become an insuperable obstacle to all free development; but, though the Riksdag of 1840 itself raised the question, the king and the aristocracy refused to entertain it. Yet the reign of Charles XIV. was, on the whole, most beneficial to Sweden; and, if there was much just cause for complaint, his great services to his adopted country were generally acknowledged. Abroad he maintained a policy of peace based mainly on a good understanding with Russia. Charles XIV.’s son and successor King Oscar I. was much more liberally inclined. Shortly after his accession (March 4, 1844) he laid several projects of reform before the Riksdag; but the estates would do little more than abolish the obsolete marriage and inheritance laws and a few commercial monopolies. As the financial situation necessitated a large increase of taxation, there was much popular discontent, which culminated in riots in the streets of Stockholm (March 1848). Yet, when fresh proposals for parliamentary reform were laid before the Riksdag in 1849, they were again rejected by three out of the four estates. As regards foreign politics, Oscar I. was strongly anti-German. On the outbreak of the Dano-Prussian War of 1848-49, Sweden sympathized warmly with Denmark. Hundreds of Swedish volunteers hastened to Schleswig-Holstein. the Riksdag voted 2,000,000 dalers for additional armaments. It was Sweden, too, who mediated the truce of Malmö (Aug. 26, 1848), which