that *On the Athenian Demagogues* in the 10th book of the *Philippica,* containing a bitter attack on many of the chief Athenian statesmen, and generally recognized as having been freely used by Plutarch in several of the *Lives.* Another fault of Theopompus was his excessive fondness for romantic and incredible stories; a collection of some of these (θαυμάσια) was afterwards made and published under his name. He was also severely blamed in antiquity for his censoriousness, and throughout his fragments no feature is more striking than this. On the whole, however, he appears to have been fairly impartial. Philip himself he censures severely for drunkenness and immorality, while Demosthenes receives his warm praise.

Bibliography.—Fragments in C. Müller, *Frag. Hist. Graec.,* i.; monograph by A. J. Pflugk (1827), and a good account in W. Mure, *Language and Literature of Ancient Greece,* v. pp. 509-529. See also Greece: *Ancient History,* § Authorities. A complete edition of the fragments of Theopompus and of Cratippus has been published by the Clarendon Press, Oxford (1909), containing the fragment of the new historian. For a discussion of the authorship of this fragment sec *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* (1908), vol. v. pp. 110-242; G. Busolt, *Hermes* (1908), pp. 255-285 *{Der Neue Historiker und Xenophon);* E. Μ. Walker, *Klio* (1908.) (“Cratippus or Theo­pompus”); W. A. Goligher, *English. Historical Review,* vol. xxiii. pp. 277-282 (“The New Greek Historical Fragment”); A. von Mess, *Rheinisches Museum* (1908), pp. 370-391 (“ Die Hellenica von Oxyrhynchos ”). (E. Μ. W.)

**THEORBO** [Fr. *théorbe,* Ger. *Theorba,* Ital. *theorba,* Barbitone], the large double-necked bass lute much used during the 16th and 17th centuries as general bass in the orchestra. The body of the theorbo was constructed on the same principles as that of the lute but larger, and the same scheme of decoration was followed. The neck, instead of being bent back at an angle to form the head, was straight, having sufficient pegs set in the sides of the head for from 12 to 16 strings tuned in pairs of unisons; on the fingerboards were marked 8 or more frets for semitones. Above this neck was another without frets, curving forwards and slightly to one side to enable the long bass strings, stretched not over but at the side of the neck, to escape the pegs of the shorter strings. These free strings, known as diapason strings (Ger. *Begleitseiten)* were plucked *à vide* like those of the lyre, each giving but one note; the number of~these strings varied from 8 to 11.

The theorbo was made in tw,o sizes, the ordinary instrument measuring about 3 ft. 6 in., and the Paduan, also known as archlute, about 5 ft. The chitarrone, or Roman theorbo, was the largest of all, a contrabass lute in fact, and frequently stood over 6 ft. high. It differed slightly from the theorbo; the body was a little smaller than in the Paduan variety, the whole of the extra length being in the second neck. The strings over the fingerboard were of steel or brass, and the diapason strings of spun wire.

For the history of the theorbo, see Barbiton and Lute.

**THEOSOPHY** (from Gr. *θϵόs,* god, and *σοφία,* wisdom), a term used to denote those forms of philosophic and religious thought which claim a special insight into the Divine nature and its constitutive moments or processes. Sometimes this insight is claimed as the result of the operation of some higher faculty or some supernatural revelation to the individual; in other instances the theosophical theory is not based upon any special illumination, but is simply put forward as the deepest speculative wisdom of its author. But in any case it is char­acteristic of theosophy that it starts with an explication of the Divine essence, and endeavours to deduce the phenomenal universe from the play of forces within the Divine nature itself.

*General Theory.—*Theosophy is thus differentiated at once from all philosophic systems which attempt to rise from an analysis of phenomena to a knowledge, more or less adequate, of the existence and nature of God. In all such systems, God is the *terminus ad quern,* a direct knowledge of whom is not claimed, but who is, as it were, the hypothesis adopted, with varying degrees of certainty in different thinkers, for the ex­planation of the facts before them. The theosophist, on the other hand, is most at his ease when moving within the circle of the Divine essence, into which he seems to claim absolute insight. This, however, would be insufficient to distinguish theosophy from those systems of philosophy which are some­times called “ speculative ” and “ absolute,” and which also in many cases proceed deductively from the idea of God.

In a wide sense, the system of Hegel or the system of Spinoza may be cited as examples of what is meant. Both thinkers claim to exhibit the universe as the evolution of the Divine nature. They must believe, therefore, that they have grasped the inmost principles of that nature: so much is involved, indeed, in the construction of an absolute system. But it is to be noted that, though there is much talk of God in such systems, the [known universe—the world that now is—is no­where transcended; God is really no more than the principle of unity immanent in the whole. Hence, while the accusation of pantheism is frequently brought against these thinkers, the term theosophical is never used in their regard. A theosophical system may also be pantheistic, in tendency if not in intention; but the transcendent character of its Godhead definitely dis­tinguishes it from the speculative philosophies which might otherwise seem to fall under the same definition. God is re­garded as the transcendent source of being and purity, from which the individual in his natural state is alienated and afar off. An historical survey shows, indeed, that theosophy gene­rally arises in connexion with religious needs, and is the expres­sion of religious convictions or aspirations. Accepting the testimony of religion that the present world lies in wickedness and imperfection, theosophy faces the problem of speculatively accounting for this state of things from the nature of the God­head itself. It is thus in some sort a mystical philosophy of the existence of evil; or at least it assumes this form in some of its most typical representatives.

The term Mysticism (*q.v.)* has properly a practical rather than a speculative reference; but it is currently applied so as to include the systems of thought on which practical mysticism was based. Thus, to take only one prominent example, the pro­found speculations of Meister Eckhart *(q.v.)* are always treated under the head of Mysticism, but they might with equal right appear under the rubric Theosophy. In other words, while an emotional and practical mysticism may exist without attempt­ing philosophically to explain itself, speculative mysticism is almost another name for theosophy. There is still a certain difference observable, however, in so far as the speculative mystic remains primarily concerned with the theory of the soul’s relation to God, while the theosophist gives his thoughts a wider scope, and frequently devotes himself to the elaboration of a fantastic philosophy of nature. n

In the above acceptation of the term, the Neoplatonic doctrine of emanations from the supra-essential One, the fanciful emana­tion-doctrine of some of the Gnostics (the aeons of the Valen- tinian system might be mentioned), and the elaborate esoteric system of the Kabbalah, to which the two former in all pro­bability largely contributed, are generally included under the head of theosophy. In the two latter instances there may be noted the allegorical interpretation of traditional doctrines and sacred writings which is a common characteristic of theosophical writers. Still more typical examples of theosophy are furnished by the mystical system of Meister Eckhart and the doctrine of Jacob Boehme *(q.v.),* who is known as “ the theosophist ” *par excellence.* Eckhart’s doctrine asserts behind God a predicateless Godhead, which, though unknowable not only to man but also to itself, is, as it were, the essence or potentiality of all things. From it proceed, and in it, as their nature, exist, the three persons of the Trinity, conceived as stadia of an eternal self-revealing process. The eternal generation of the Son is equivalent to the eternal creation of the world. But the sensuous and pheno­menal, as such, so far as they seem to imply independence of God, are mere privation and nothingness; things exist only through the presence of God in them, and the goal of creation, like its outset, is the repose of the Godhead. The soul of man, which as a microcosmos resumes the nature of things, strives by self- abnegation or self-annihilation to attain this unspeakable reunion (which Eckhart calls being buried in God). Regarding evil simply as privation, Eckhart does not make it the pivot of his thought, as was afterwards done by Boehme; but his notion of the Godhead as a dark and formless essence is a favourite thesis of theosophy.