troops being occupied with repelling a new inroad of Gabriel Bethlen. Then, like a *deus ex machina,* Wallenstein, duke of Friedland, came forward and offered to raise and maintain an army in the emperor’s service. It was an army like Mansfeld’s in that it lived on the country, but its exactions were systematic and the products economically used, so that it was possible to feed 50,000 men where Mansfeld and his like had barely subsisted 20,000. This method, the high wages which he paid, and his own princely habits and commanding personality gave it a cohesion that neither a free company nor an army of mere Lower Saxon contingents could ever hope to attain.

In 1625, in spite of Tilly’s appeals, Wallenstein did nothing but levy contributions about Magdeburg and Halberstadt, keeping his new army well away from the risks of battle until he could trust it to conquer. It was fortunate for Ferdinand that he did so. Christian 1V., who had been joined by Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick, had in 1626, 60,000 men. Wallenstein and Tilly together had only a very slight numerical superiority, and behind them was nothing. Even the hereditary provinces of Austria were threatening revolt owing to their having to maintain Maximilian's troops (the new elector thus recouping his expenses in the Palati­nate war) and Gabriel Bethlen was again in the field. But on the other side the English subsidies failed, and the Protestant armies soon began to suffer in consequence. Tilly opposed Christian IV., Wallenstein Mansfeld. The latter, having stood still about Lübeck and in the outskirts of Brandenburg till the food was exhausted, advanced upon Wallenstein, attacked him in an entrenched position at the Bridge of Dessau and was thoroughly defeated (15/25 April 1626). He then wandered across Germany into Silesia and joined Bethlen. Wallenstein followed up, and by taking up strong positions, compelled Mansfeld and Bethlen to choose between attacking him and starving. So, with­out a battle, he brought about a truce, whereby Bethlen was disarmed and Mansfeld was required to leave Hungary. Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick died soon afterwards, the one in Hungary, the other in Westphalia. King Christian, left alone and unable without English subsidies to carry on the war methodically, took the offensive, as Mansfeld had done, in order to live on the Thuringian countryside. But Tilly, with whom Wallenstein had left a part of his army, moved as quickly as the king, brought him to action at Lutter-am-Barcnbcrge in Brunswick and totally defeated him (17/27 August).

With this, armed opposition to Tilly and Wallenstein in the field practically ceased until 1630. But there was enough danger to prevent the disbandment of their armies, which con­tinued to live on the country. In the intervening years the balance of forces, political and military, was materially altered. France opposed Spain and the emperor in Italy with such vigour as Huguenot outbreaks permitted, England quarrelled with France, but yet like France sent subsidies to the North German Protestants. Gustavus held his hand, while Christian slowly gave up fortress after fortress to Tilly. Wallenstein, returning from the campaign against Gabriel Bethlen, subdued Silesia, where a small part of Mansfeld’s army had been left in 1626, and afterwards drove Christian’s army through Jutland (1627). But Wallenstein, with his dreams of a united Germany free in conscience ’and absolutely obedient to the emperor, drifted further and further away from the League. Ferdinand thought that he could fulfil the secular portion of Wallenstein’s policy while giving satisfaction to the bishops. The princes and bishops of the League continued to oppose any aggrandizement of the em­peror’s power at their expense and to insist upon the resumption of church lands. In this equilibrium the North German Pro­testant cities were strong enough to refuse to admit Wallen­stein’s garrisons. In 1628 Wallenstein, who had received the duchy of Mecklenburg on its rightful lord being put to the ban for his share in the Danish war, began to occupy his new towns, and also to spread along the coasts, for his united Germany could never be more than a dream until the possibility of Danish and Swedish invasions was removed. But the Hanse towns rejected his overtures, and Stralsund, second-rate seaport though it was, absolutely refused to admit a garrison of his wild soldiery. The result was the famous siege of Stralsund (February to August 1628), in which, with some slight help from oversea, the citizens com­pelled the hitherto unconquered Wallenstein army to retire. The siege was, as the result proved, a turning-point in German history.. The emperor’s policy of restoring order had practically universal support. But the instrument of the restoration was a plundering army. Even this might have been borne had Wallenstein been able to give them, as he wished, not only peace but religious freedom. But when Christian signed the peace of Lübeck, and the Edict of Restitution (1629) gave back one hundred and fifty northern ecclesiastical foundations to the Catholics, men were convinced that one ruler meant one religion. Rather than endure this the North Germans had called in Gustavus Adolphus, and, just as Gustavus landed, the resentment of the princes of the League against Wallenstein’s policy and Wallen­stein’s soldiers came to a head, and the emperor was forced to dismiss him. His soldiers were taken over by Tilly, and for the moment he disappeared from the scene.

A thoroughly trained army, recruited from good yeomen and good soldiers of fortune, paid good wages, and led by a great captain, was a novelty in war that more than compensated for Tilly’s numerical superiority. Gustavus, however, after landing at Peenemünde in June, spent the rest of the year in establishing himself firmly in Mecklenburg and Pomerania, partly for military reasons, partly in view of a future Swedish hegemony of the Baltic, and most of all in order to secure the active support of the more important Protestant princes, so as to appear as an auxiliary rather than a principal in the German conflict. First the old duke Bogislav of Pomerania, then George William of Brandenburg joined him, very unwillingly. He was soon afterwards allied with France, by the treaty of Bärwalde (January 1631). John George of Saxony, still attempting to stifle the war by his policy of neutrality, sent a last appeal to Vienna, praying for the revocation of the Edict of Restitution. Meanwhile Tilly had marched into north-eastern Germany. On the 19/29 March 1631, the old general of the League destroyed a Swedish garrison at New Brandenburg, and although Gustavus concentrated upon him with a swiftness that surprised the old-fashioned soldiers, Tilly wasted no time in manoeuvres but turned back to the Elbe, where his lieutenant Pappenheim was besieging Magdeburg. This city had twice defied Wallenstein’s attempts to introduce a garrison, and it was now in arms against the League. But John George, their prince, had not yet decided to join Gustavus. The latter, as yet without active allies, thought it impossible to go forward alone, and could only hope that his sudden and brilliant storm (3/13 April) of Frankfurt-on-Oder@@l would bring back Tilly from the Elbe. But the hope was vain. Tilly and Pappenheim pressed the siege of Magdeburg, and although the citizens, directed by Swedish officers, fought desperately the place was stormed, sacked and burnt on the night of the 10th of May 1631, amidst horrors that neither of the imperialist generals was able to check, or even to mitigate. The Catholics rejoiced as though for another St Bartholomew’s day, the Protestants were paralysed, and even Gustavus, accused on all hands of having allowed the Magde­burgers to perish without giving them a helping hand, sorrow­fully withdrew into Pomerania. But Tilly, in spite of Pappen- heim’s remonstrances, turned westward against Hesse-Cassel and other minor principalities whose rulers had declared for Gustavus. The king of Sweden, thereupon, clearing away the remaining League garrisons, on the Oder, advanced to Werben (at the junction of the Elbe and the Havel), where the army entrenched itself, and, in spite of sickness and famine, stoically awaited the attack. The desired result was achieved. At the end of July Tilly, returning from the west before he had accom­plished its reduction, made his appearance and was twice re­pulsed (13/23 and 18/28 July), losing 6000 men out of 22,000. Moreover, Ferdinand having in his moment of triumph flatly rejected John George’s appeal against the Edict, Saxony took up arms. Thereupon Tilly, turning away from Gustavus’s entrenchments, invaded Saxony, being reinforced *en route* by 20.000 men from Italy (the war there being left to the Spaniards). The elector at once made an alliance with the Swedes.

@@@1 In which he exacted life for life and plunder for plunder in return for the slaughter at New Brandenburg.