virtuous and apparently diſintereſted conduct ; but they think it degrading the dignity of man to ſuppoſe him actuated ſolely by motives which can be traced back to a deſire of his own happineſs. They obſerve, that the Author of our nature has not left the preſervation of the individual, or the continuance of the ſpecies, to the de­ductions of our reaſon, computing the ſum of happineſs which the actions neceſſary to theſe ends produce to ourſelves : on the contrary, He has taken care of both, by the surer impulſe of inſtinct planted in us for theſe very purpoſes. And is it conceivable, say they, that He would leave the care of our fellow-creatures a matter of indifference, till each man ſhould be able to diſcover or be taught that by loving his neighbour, and doing him all the good in his power, he would be moſt effec­tually promoting his own happineſs ? It is diſhonouring virtue, they continue, to make it proceed in any instance from a proſpect of happineſs, or a dread of mi­ſery ; and they appeal from theory to fact, as exhibited in the conduct of ſavage tribes, who deliberate little on the conſequences of their actions.

Their antagoniſts reply, that the conduct of ſavage tribes is to be conſidered as that of children in civilized nations, regulated entirely by the examples which they have before them ; that their actions cannot be the offspring of innate inſtincts, otherwise ſavage virtues would, under ſimilar circumſtances, everywhere be the same, which is contrary to fact ; that virtue proceeds from an intereſted motive on either ſuppoſition ; and that the motive which the inſtinctive ſcheme holds up is the moſt ſelfiſh of the two. The other theory ſuppoſes, that the governing motive is the hope of *future* happineſs and the dread of *future* miſery ; the inſtinc­tive ſcheme ſupply a *present* motive in the self-compla­cency ariſing in the heart from a conſciouſneſs of right conduct. The former is a rational motive, the latter has nothing more to do with reaſon than the enjoyment ariſing from eating or drinking, or from the intercourſe between the ſexes. But we mean not to purſue the ſubject farther, as we have ſaid enough on it in the articles Benevolence, Instinct, Passion, and Phi­lanthropy. We ſhall therefore conclude with observing, that there is certainly a virtuous as well as a vici­ous ſelſ-love, and that “ true ſelf-love and ſocial are the ſame.”

*SELF-Murder.* See Suicide.

*Self-Partiality,* is a phraſe employed by ſome philosophers @@\* to expreſs that weakneſs of human nature through which men overvalue themſelves when compa­red with others. It is distinguiſhed from general par­tiality, by thoſe who make use of the expreſſion, becauſe it is thought that a man is led to over-rate his own accompliſhments, either by a particular inſtinct, or by a proceſs of intellect different from that by which he over-rates the accompliſhments of his friends or chil­dren. 3 he former kind of partiality is wholly ſelfiſh ; the latter partakes much of benevolence.

This diſtinction may perhaps be deemed plauſible by thoſe who conſider the human mind as little more than a bundle of inſtincts ; but it must appear perfectly ridi­culous to ſuch as reſolve the greater part of apparent inſtincts into early and deep-rooted associations of ideas. If the partialities which moſt men have to their friends, their families, and themſelves, be inſtinctive, they are certainly inſtincts of different kinds ; but an inſtinctive partiality is a contradiction in terms. Partiality is founded on a compariſon between two or more objects; but genuine inſtincts form no companions. See In­stinct. No man can be ſaid to be partial to the late Dr Johnſon, merely for thinking highly of his intellec­tual-powers; nor was the Doctor partial to himſelf, tho’ he thought in this reſpect with the generality of his countrymen ; but if, upon a compariſon with Milton, he was deemed the greater poet of the two, ſuch a judgment will be allowed to be partial, whether formed by himſelf or by any of his admirers. We apprehend, however, that the proceſs of its formation, was the ſame in every mind by which it was held.

The origin of ſelf-partiality is not difficult to be found ; and our partialities to our friends may be tra­ced to a ſimilar ſource. By the conſtitution of our na­ture we are impelled to ſhun pain and to purſue pleaſure ; but rernorſe, the ſevereſt of all pains, is the never- failing conſequence of vicious conduct. Remorſe ariſes from the dread of that puniſhment which we believe will in a future ſtate be inflicted on vice unrepented of in this ; and therefore every vicious perſon endeavours by all poſſible means to baniſh that dread from his own mind. One way of effecting this is to compare his own life with the lives of others ; for he fancies that if numbers be as wicked as himſelf, the benevolent Lord of all things will not involve them in one common ruin. Hence, by magnifying to himſelf the tempta­tions which led him astray, and diminiſhing the injuries which his conduct has done in the world, and by adopt­ing a courſe diametrically the reverſe, when estimating the morality or immorality of the conduct of lus neigh­bours, he ſoon comes to believe that he is at least not more wicked than they. Thus is ſelf-partiality formed in the mind, and quickly blinds him who is under its influence ſo completely, as to hide from him the very faults which he sees and blames in others. Hence the coward thinks himſelf only cautious, the miſer frugal. Partiality is formed in the very ſame manner to natural or acquired accompliſhments, whether mental or corpo­real. Theſe always procure reſpect to him who is poſſeſsed of them ; and as respect is accompanied with ma­ny advantages, every man wiſhes to obtain it for him­ſelf. If he fail in his attempts, he conſoles himſelf with the perſuaſion that it is at leaſt due to his merits, and that it is only withheld by the envy of the public. He compares the particular branch of ſcience or bodily accompliſhment in which he himſelf moſt excels, with thoſe which have conferred ſplendor on his rival ; and easily finds that his own excellencies are of the higheſt order, and entitled to the greateſt ſhare of public eſteem. Hence the polite ſcholar deſpiſes the mathematician ; the reader of Ariſtotle and Plato all the modern diſcoveries in physical and moral ſcience ; and the mere experimentaliſt holds in the moſt sovereign contempt a cri­tical knowledge of the ancient languages. The pupil of the ancients denies the merits of the moderns, whilſt the mere modern allows nothing to the ancients ; and thus each becomes partial to his own acquisitions, and of courſe to himſelf, for having been at the trouble to make them.

Partiality to our friends and families is generated in the very ſame way. Whenever we acquire ſuch an af-

@@@[m]\* See Lord Kaimes's Art of Thinking.