fore him, without attending to any thing elſe, or think­ing of its paradoxical author, or even of the Great Being who created the matter both of him and of it ; but he cannot for an instant contemplate the yellow colour of its vellum boards without thinking of triple extenſion, or, in other words, of body. The book therefore is a *ſubstance,* becauſe conceivable by itſelf ; the colour is an *attribute* or *quality,* becauſe it cannot be conceived by itſelf, but neceſſarily leads to the conception of ſomething elſe. But if Spinoza’s meaning be, that nothing is a ſubſtance but what is conceived as exiſting from eternity, independent of every thing as a cauſe, his de­finition cannot be admitted : for every man conceives that which in himſelf thinks, and wills, and is conscious, as a ſubſtance ; at the same time that he has the beſt evidence poſſible that he exiſted not as a conſcious, thinking, and active being, from eternity.

His fourth axiom is thus expreſſed : “ Effectus cog­nitio a cognitione causæ dependet, et eandem involvit;” and his fifth, "Quæ nihil commune cum se invicem habent, etiam per se invicem intelligi non poſſunt, live conceptus unius alterius conceptum non involvit.” The former of theſe propoſitions, ſo far from being ſelf-evident, is not even true ; and the latter is capable of two ſenſes very different from each other. That every ef­fect proceeds from *a cauſe,* is indeed an axiom ; but finely we may know the effect accurately, though we be ignorant of the *particular* cauſe from which it pro­ceeds (ſee Philosophy, n⁰ 36 ; and Physics, n⁰ 91, &C.) ; nor does the knowledge of the one by any means involve the knowledge of the other. If different things have nothing in common, it is indeed true that the knowledge of one of them will not give us an *adequate conception* of the other ; but it will in many cases com­pel us to believe, that the other *exists* or has exiſted. A parcel of gunpowder lying at rest has nothing in common with the velocity of a cannon-ball ; yet when we know that a ball has been driven with velocity from a cannon, we infer with certainty that there has been a parcel of powder at rest in the chamber of that cannon.

It is upon ſuch ambiguous definitions and axioms as theſe that Spinoza has raiſed his pretended demonstrations, that one ſubſtance cannot produce another ; that every ſubſtance muſt neceſſarily be infinite ; that no ſubſtance exiſts or can be conceived beſides God ; and that extended ſubſtance or body is one of the infinite *attributes* of God. We ſhall not waste our own time or the reader’s with a formal confutation of theſe im­pious abſurdities. We truſt they are sufficiently con­futed in other articles of this work (ſee Metaphysics, Part III. Providence, and Theology, Part I.) ; and whoever wiſhes for a more particular examination of the author’s principles, may find it in Dr Clarke’s Demonſtration of the Being and Attributes of God. The truth, however, is, that no man will need the aſſiſtance of that eminent metaphyſician to diſcover the fallacy of the reasoning by which they are attempted to be pro­ved, if he affix *any one preciſe meaning* to the definitions and axioms, and adhere to that meaning ſteadily thro’ the whole procels of the pretended demonſtrations.

By way of apology for this jargon, it has been late­ly ſaid, that “ Spinoza takes the word substa*nce* in its moſt ſimple and perfect ſenſe; which is necessary, as he writes mathematically, and propoſes a simple idea as the foundation oſ his theory. @@What is the proper ſignification of a ſubſtance? Is it not that which ſtands alone, which has the cauſe of its exiſtence within itſelf ? I wiſh that this ſimple meaning of the word could be univerſally admitted in philoſophy. Strictly ſpeaking, no worldly thing is a ſubſtance ; ſince all mutually depend on each other, and finally on God, who, in this exalted ſenſe, is the only *ſubstance.* The word *modification* founds harſh and improper, and therefore it cannot be expect­ed to gain a place in philoſophy ; but if the ſchool of Leibnitz may term matter the *appearance of ſubstances,* why may not Spinoza be allowed a bolder term? World­ly subſtances are kept in union by divine power, as it was by divine power that they had exiſtence. They repreſent also, if you pleaſe, *modified* appearances of di­vine power ; each according to the ſtation, the time, and the organs, in and with which it appears. The phraſe uſed by Spinoza is concise, and it gives an unity and simplicity to his whole ſyſtem, however ſtrange it may found in our ears.”

From this account of Spinoziſm, one who had never looked into the works of the author would be led to ſuppoſe that his ſyſtem is the same with that of Berke­ley ; which, denying the exiſtence of material ſubſtance, attributes all our perceptions of what we call the qua­lities of body to the immediate agency oſ the Deity on our minds (ſee Metaphysics, Part II. Chap. 3.) But Spinoza’s doctrine is very different. According to him, bodies are either attributes or affections of God; and as he ſays there is but one extended ſubſtance, he affirms that ſubſtance to be indivisible, and employs a long ſcholium @@\* to prove that thoſe are miſtaken who ſup­poſe it finite and not *esſential to the Deity.* That we do not miſrepreſent his ſentiments, the learned reader will be convinced by the two following definitions, with which he introduces that part of his ethics which treats of the nature and origin of mind. 1. “ Per corpus intelligo modum, qui Dei eſſentiam, quatenus, ut res extenſa conſideratur, certo et determinato modo expri­mit.” 2. “ Ad essentiam alicujus rei id pertinere dico, quo dato res neceſſario ponitur, et quo sublato res neceſſario tollitur ; vel id, fine quo res, et vice verſa quod fine re nec eſſe nec concipi poteſt.” In conformity with theſe definitions, he attempts to prove that God@@ is an extended as well as a thinking ſubſtance ; that as a thinking ſubſtance he is the cause of the idea of a circle, and as an extended ſubſtance of the *circle* itſelf ; and that the minds of men are not ſubſtances, but cer­tain modifications of the divine attributes ; or, as he sometimes expreſses it, “ Quod humanae mentis actuale conſtituit, eſt idea rei ſingularis actu exiſtentis.” Hence, he ſays, it follows that the human mind is a part of the intellect of the infinite God ; so that when we ſpeak of the human mind perceiving this or that, we can only mean that God, not as he is infinite, but as he appears in the human mind or conſtitutes its eſſence, has this or that idea ; and when we ſpeak of God’s having this or that idea, we muſt conceive of Him not only as conſtituting the human mind, but as, together with it, having the idea of something elſe @@(a). In another place he tells us, that the human mind is nothing but the *idea*

*@@@[mu] Herder's Dialogues concerning God.*

*@@@[m]\* See his Prop. xv. &c.*

*@@@[m] Prop. ii. vii. xi. Part 2.*

@@@(a) Hinc sequitur mentem humanam partem eſſe infiniti intellectus Dei ; ac proinde cum dicimus, mentem