the enemy, without any one ſhip of that diviſion being expoſed to receive the fire of the enemy either ahead or aſtern, becauſe they are not to range in a line of battle unless the enemy runs large or before the wind ; and that, in the ſe­cond ſuppoſition, the only ſhips which are liable to be raked aſtern, while they change tack, are the headmoſt and ſtern- moſt of the diviſion in line of battle which cover the ſhips of the other two diviſions.

As it is of the utmoſt advantage to know, at firſt sight of the enemy, whether it be to windward or leeward of the fleet ranged lozenge-like, on what tack, and on what side the fleet muſt be formed, in order to defend itſelf or attack the enemy with advantage, it is to be obſerved, that in both the windward and leeward primitive orders of ſailing the direction or the wind always traverſes both the weathermoſt and leewardmoſt ſhips of the fleet (figs. 57. and 56.) ; that this leewardmoſt ſhip is always placed in the centre of an horizon, which is to be conſidered as the horizon of the whole fleet; and that it is from that ſhip you are to judge, by means of the rules which are known and practiſed in ſuch caſes, whether the lozenge-like fleet be to windward or to leeward of that of the enemy.

If you want to know, at sight of the enemy, ſeen either to windward or to leeward, on what side the line of battle is to be formed in order to be able to send one of the divi­ſions on that side of the lozenge where there is none, it is the poſition of the enemy, with reſpect to the direction of the wind, which is to determine it ; becauſe, if the enemy is to windward of the fleet ranged in the windward primitive order of ſailing, and if it bears down on that fleet, with the wind large or right aft, it belongs to its weathermoſt ſhip to obſerve what follows. If that ſhip, by ſetting the enemy, finds him to ſtarboard of the direction of the wind, the diviſion which is ſtarboard of that direction of the wind is to take the ſtarboard tack, and range in order of battle before the enemy is arrived within gunſhot : if, on the contrary, the above-mentioned ſhip finds the enemy to larboard, it belongs to the larboard diviſion to aſſume the order of battle, and to take that tack, before the enemy can come to action. The old rule for chooſing the proper tack is to be obſerved by a fleet in the leeward primitive order of ſailing; obſerving, that it is the buſineſs of that fleet’s leewardmoſt ſhip to de­termine it ; and the point of the horizon which is oppoſite to that whence the wind blows, is the point towards which the obſerver is to be turned to judge on what side, whether ſtarboard or larboard, the line of battle is to be formed ; becauſe, in that poſition, the ſtarboard side muſt always be on his right hand and the larboard on his left.

By following this general rule, the line of battle will ne­ver be expoſed to be too much lengthened either to wind­ward or to leeward, in order to oppoſe all the ſhips of the adverſe fleet formed in one single line, nor even to be ſurpriſed in diſorder by that fleet while you are forming in or­ders of battle natural or inverted.

Our author’s orders of chasing, of retreat, and of convoy, are very eaſily formed. We have already ſaid what they are ; and the ſeaman, or even the landſman, who has any tolerable conception of his orders of sailing and of battle, will not ſtand in need of any farther deſcription of them. It muſt, however, be obſerved, that in the order of chasing, the fleet in the lozenge-like poſition preſents the obtuſe angle of chasing, as when ranged according to the ordinary tactics ; with this difference, that, in order to form themſelves in order of battle, it is enough that, in this lo­zenge-like poſition, the ſhips of the ſecond diviſion ſhould all keep the wind on the ſame board they were ſtanding on, becauſe they would afterwards find themſelves in a line in the wake one of another ; but, according to the usual tactics the ſhips have a long ſpace to run before they can execute the ſame evolution.

We ſhall conclude this ſhort view of the Viſcount de Grenier’s tactics, with his directions for the most advanta­geous placing of the admiral’s ſhip, the frigates and tranſports, belonging to a lozenge-like fleet, whether it be ran­ged in the order of sailing or of battle, &c.

In the order of ſailing, the admiral A is to be placed ahead of the fleet, at a ſhort diſtance from the headmoſt of the ſecond diviſion, and in the direction of the wind with the headmoſt of the firſt diviſion (fig. 63.). Two of the frigates *ff* are to obſerve the ſame rule and the same position, with reſpect to the van ſhip of the third diviſion and the ſternmoſt of the firſt. In the order of battle, on the contrary, the admiral is to be in the centre of the lozenge, and two of the frigates on the fourth side of the lozenge, (fig. 64). As for the tranſports and ſtore-ſhips, when there are any, their ſtation is to be in one line on the side oppo­ſite to that of the enemy, when ranged in order of battle ; and, if in order of ſailing or convoy, they may occupy the ſpace circumſcribed by the lozenge. In any other circumſtances theſe ſhips are to occupy the different ſtations ap­pointed for them, that they may diſtinguiſh the signals and execute the commands of the admiral. Laſtly, when the fleet ſhall paſs from the order of battle to any other order whatever, or from any order to the order of battle, the admiral’s ſhip is to bring to, and not to take any of the positions above mentioned till after the complete execution of the movement.

Chap. II. *View of Mr Clerk's Tactics.*

Whether the Viſcount de Grenier’s order of battle and of ſailing would be attended with all the advantages which he hopes from them, experienced ſeamen alone can judge; but we are now to introduce to our readers part of a syſtem which has met with very great approbation from ſome of the ableſt officers in the Britiſh navy, and which to us ap­pears to be founded on principles self-evident. Mr Clerk, in the introduction to his Essay, informs us, that upon considering the great ſuperiority displayed in the three laſt wars by the Britiſh ſeamen over their enemies, when engaged in single ſhips, and comparing it with the very little that, pre­vious to Lord Rodney’s glorious action, they had achieved when engaged in fleets drawn up in line of battle, he was led to conclude, that there muſt be ſomething wrong in our mode of making the attack. He turned his thoughts to the ſubject, and in 1790 publiſhed part of a large work, comprehending, I. *A Theory of Attack from Windward ;* 2. *A Theory of Attack from Leeward ;* and, 3. *An Historical Sketch of Naval Tactics.* We think it not much to the ho­nour of our countrymen, that he has not yet had encourage­ment to publiſh more than the firſt part ; but in hopes of exciting their curioſity, we ſhall lay before them a diſtinct view of that part, beginning, as he begins, with

Observations on the present Method of bringing Ships to Action.

It has often, if not generally, been the practice, in the caſe of single ſhips, as well as in that of fleets, for the wea­ther ſhip or fleet, when it is wiſhed to bring the other to action, to ſteer directly down upon that ſhip or fleet, with­out reflecting that, by doing ſo, it gives the enemy an op­portunity of completely disabling it, before it can attain its wiſhed for ſtation. For each ſhip in the lee line can uſe all the guns upon one side ; whereas the ſhips in the wea­