he muſt of neceſſity begin the attack, mix his ſhips, and come to a cloſe engagement, as in the former caſe.

Having ſhown the conſeqnences of an attempt to ſuccour the three ſternmoſt ſhips by tacking, let us alſo examine what may be expected from an attempt to do it by veering the fleet. Suppose the two fleets in the ſame poſition as in fig. 79. that is, the main body of the enemy extended in line of battle to leeward, his three ſternmoſt ſhips entangled with the fleet B, whoſe admiral, with the main body, keeps to windward to obſerve, with a rigid attention, the motions of the enemy. At the ſame time ſuppoſe that the admi­ral F has ordered his ſternmoſt ſhip G to veer (fig. 82.), and afterwards the whole line ; and that he is now running upon a contrary tack to leeward, as at H, wiſhing to ſupport or bring off his three ſhips. From inſpection, it will be evident that this attempt may be more dangerous than the attempt to windward ; for it will expoſe a number of his ſhips to a raking fire while in the act of veering ; and the ſquadron, by getting ſo far to leeward, will be unable to give the proper ſupport to the three ſhips; It will open a gap for the fleet of B (who will immediately veer also and follow him) to break in, as at A, and cut off the three ſhips without hope of recovery. And if F ſhall ſtill perſiſt in the endeavour to recover his three ſhips, he will be obliged to begin the attack under all the uſual diſadvantages.

Again, upon another ſuppoſition, that the headmoſt ſhip of the enemy H (fig. 83.), with the four or Eve next aſtern, have wore, and are running upon a contrary tack, wiſhing, as before, to support or bring off the three ſhips, the rest of the fleet intending to weer alſo, and follow in succeſſion ; it is evident that this movement, being more unſeaman-like, will be worſe than the laſt : It will expoſe an additional number of ſhips, particularly the laſt two, as at G ; and w∣ll at the ſame time make an opening for the main body of B’s fleet to fall in and cut off the three ſhips, as in the for­mer caſe.

Again, ſhould the enemy F veer and bear away with his whole ſhips at one and the ſame time, it is evident that this movement muſt have the conſequence of a downright flight, with the certainty of loſing the three ſhips.

From what has been ſaid, it will appear, that a fleet B, keeping connected in a body to windward, may come up with and entangle the three ſternmoſt ſhips of an enemy F, extended in line of battle and going off to leeward, and at the ſame time be able to overawe the remaining main body oftheir fleet ; and that, having forced the poſition, the whole conſequences, as already described, muſt follow; that is, F muſt ſubmit to the loſs of three ſhips.

What has been hitherto laid proceeds upon a ſuppoſition. that, the fleet F has kept on his courſe till the fleet B has come up with his rear. Let it then be examined what other attempts the enemy F can make to avoid coming to close engagement upon equal terms.

Suppoſe a fleet of ſhips of the enemy ſtanding on the lar­board tack to leeward, and going off as before at F, and a fleet of ſhips in a collected ſtate or poſition to windward, as at B (fig. 79.) ; and ſuppoſe that the enemy F, perceiving the fleet B pointing an attack againſt his rear, in place of keeping on his courſe upon the ſame tack, ſhould veer, and endeavour to paſs on contrary tacks to leeward (for it will not be admitted that he can get to windward) ; what will then be the effect?

Is it not evident, that the headmoſt ſhips of F muſt be forced to leeward by the fleet B obſtructing his line of di­rection, or the line of his courſe ? that they muſt be for­ced to begin an attack at any diſtance B may chooſe ? that they may receive ſuch damage as will ſtop their way ? that their way being stopped, will of courſe be an obſtruction to the next aſtern ; or that theſe ſubſequent ships, to prevent this ſtop, muſt bear away to leeward of their crippled ſhips, as at G (fig. 84.), which will not only prevent theſe ſhips from damaging the headmoſt ſhips of B, but will give time and opportunity to B to bring down his windward ſhips to fall in either ahead or aſtern, that is, to the right or left of his headmoſt ſhips A, and oppoſe ſhip for ſhip of the enemy upon equal terms ? But ſhould none of the headmoſt ſhips of the ſquadron F be crippled, that is, ſhould F paſs B without reach of cannon-ſhot, which undoubtedly he will do if he can ; ſtill, while bearing away, he may be forced to suffer a distant cannonade, ſhip with ſhip on equal terms, whether he veers and gets back upon his former tack, as at G in fig. 85. or continues to run before the wind, as at P in fig. 86. But if F perſiſts to paſs on a contrary tack to lee­ward, and without reach of cannon-ſhot, it is evident, whe­ther he put right before the wind, or run off ſhip by ſhip as he beſt can, that B muſt at some time or other come up with his rear.

So far the attack has proceeded with the wind fixed in one and the ſame quarter. To make the propriety of it the more apparent, it will be neceſſary to inquire, What might be the effect produced by a change of wind, ſhould that take place during the action ? For this purpoſe, let the opponent fleets be placed in ſome one of the prece­ding positions, repreſenting the attack upon the three ſtern­moſt ſhips of the enemy, as in fig. 87. ; in which the fleet desirous of making the attack is repreſented in four divisions, as at B, B, B, A, and F the fleet deſirous of avoid­ing the attack, at the hazard of abandoning his three ſtern­moſt ſhips at G.

In the commencement of the attack, let us ſuppoſe the wind to be N. and the ſhips going two points free on the larboard tack, or ſtanding E. ; and soon after the com­mencement let the wind be suppoſed to veer round to the W. ; then it is evident, by the diſpoſition of the two fleets, that the fleet F, by ſuch a change, will have acquired no advantage whatever ; on the contrary, it will thereby be thrown juſt ſo much the farther to leeward.

Again, if the wind, by taking an oppoſite courſe, ſhall ſhift ahead and come round by the eaſtern quarter to L, the admiral of the fleet F will not have it in his power to avail himſelf of this circumſtance, provided the commander of B, continuing carefully to watch his motions, and feel­ing the impulſe of the veering wind, ſhall ſtretch his ſhips, as at OO, to the windward of the three ſhips at G, ſeparated from F’s fleet, and at the ſame time to the leeward of the main body of that fleet. This will be apparent from figures 88. and 89. which exhibit the two fleets, after this manœuvre, both on the larboard and ſtarboard tack.

Let the wind be supposed to wear round gradually from the E. towards the S. and from thence to the W. and then quite round the compass. Then F being ſuppoſed to have gained the wind, it will be in his power to maintain it, and make a circular courſe to windward of B ; but as he can be attended all the while by the fleet B, who will cut him off to leeward, he never will be able to recover his three ſhips, ſuppoſed to be cut off. This is evident without the illuſtration of a figure.

Laſtly, if the wind in changing ſhall in one inſtant ſhift in direct oppoſition where it was when the attack began, that is, from north to ſouth ; then and in that case, before it can be judged whether ſuch change ſhall be favourable for F or not, it will be neceſſary that the relative ſituation of the two fleets ſhould be determined, ſuch as it was when the change took place. For example, if the headmoſt ſhips of the fleet F, that is, if his van and centre ſhall have ſeparated at any conſiderable diſtance from his rear, and ſhall, in