perceived by capacities limited like ours. And ſince we cannot, with the Epicureans of old, ſuppoſe the parts of mat­ter to have *contrived* among themſelves this wonderful form of a world, to have taken by agreement each its reſpective post, and then to have purſued in conjunction conſtant *ends* by certain methods and measures *concerted,* there muſt be ſome other Being, whose wiſdom and power are equal to ſuch a mighty work as is the st*ructure* and *preſervation* of the world. There muſt be ſome Almighty Mind who modelled and preſerves it ; lays the causes of things ſo deep ; preſcribes them ſuch uniform and ſteady laws ; deſtines and adapts them to certain purpoſes; and makes one thing to fit and anſwer another ſo as to produce one harmonious whole. Yes,

Theſe are thy glorious works, Parent of good !

Almighty, thine this univerſal frame,

Thus wondrous fair ; Thyself how wondrous then !

How wondrous in wiſdom and in power !”

But the goodness of God is not leſs conſpicuous in his works than His power or His wiſdom. Contrivance proves deſign, and the predominant tendency of the contrivances in­dicates the dispoſition of the deſigner. “ The world (says an elegant and judicious writer @@\*) abounds with contrivances, and all the contrivances in it with which we are acquainted are di­rected to beneficial purpoſes. Evil no doubt exiſts ; but it is ne­ver that we can perceive the object of contrivance. Teeth are contrived to eat, not to ache ; their aching now and then is incidental to the contrivance, perhaps inſeparable from it ; but it is not its object. This is a diſtinction which well de­serves to be attended to. In deſcribing implements of huſbandry, one would hardly ſay of a sickle that it is made to cut the reaper’s fingers, though from the construction of the inſtrument, and the manner of uſing it, this miſchief often happens. But if he had occaſion to deſcribe inſtruments of torture or execution, this, he would ſay, is to extend the ſinews ; this to diſlocate the joints ; this to break the bones ; this to ſcorch the ſoles of the feet. Here pain and miſery are the very objects of the contrivance. Now nothing of this sort is to be found in the works of nature. We never diſcover a train of contrivance to bring about an evil pur­poſe. No anatomiſt ever diſcovcred a ſyſtem of organi­zation calculated to produce pain and diſeaſe ; or, in explain­ing the parts of the human body, ever ſaid, this is to irri­tate, this to inflame, this duct is to convey the gravel to the kidneys, this gland to ſecrete the humour which forms the gout. If by chance he come to a part of which he knows not the uſe, the moſt that he can ſay is, that to him it appears to be uſeleſs : no one ever ſuspects that it is put there to incommode, to annoy, or to torment. If God had wiſhed our miſery, he might have made ſure of his purpose, by forming our lenſes to be as many sores and pains to us as they are now inſtruments of gratification and enjoyment; or, by placing us among objects ſo ill ſuited to our percep­tions as to have continually offended us, inſtead of miniſtering to our refreſhment and delight. He might have made, for inſtance, every thing we taſted bitter, every thing we ſaw loathſome, every thing we touched a ſting, every ſmell a flench, and every sound a diſcord.”

Inſtead of this, all our ſenſations, except ſuch as are ex­cited by what is dangerous to our health, are pleaſures to us : The view of a landſcape is pleaſant ; the taſte of nouriſhing food is pleaſant ; sounds not too loud are agreeable, while muſical sounds are exquiſite ; and hardly any ſmells, except ſuch are excited by effluvia obviously pernicious to the brain, are diſagreeable ; whilſt ſome of them, if not too long indulged, are delightful. Our lives are preſerved and the species is continued by obeying the impulſe of appetites; of which the gratification is exquiſite when not repeated too frequently, to anſwer the purpoſes of the Author of our being. Since, then, God has called forth his consummate wiſdom to contrive and provide for our happineſs, and has made thoſe things which are neceſſary to our exiſtence and the continuance of the race sources of our greateſt ſensual pleasures, who can doubt but that benevolence is one of his attributes ; and that, if it were not impious to draw a com­panion between them, it is the attribute in which he himſelf moſt delighteth ?

But it is not from ſenſation only that we may infer the benevolence of the Deity : He has formed us with minds capable of intellectual improvement, and he has implanted in the breaſt of every man a very ſtrong deſire of adding to his knowledge. This addition to be sure cannot be made without labour ; and at firſt the requiſite labour is to moſt people irkfome : but a very ſhort progreſs in any ſtudy con­verts what was irkſome into a pleaſure of the moſt exalted kind ; and he who by ſtudy, however intenſe, enlarges his ideas, and is conſcious that he is daily riſing in the ſcale of intelligence, experiences a complacency, which, though not ſo poignant perhaps as the pleaſures of the ſenſualiſt, is ſuch as endears him to himſelf, and is what he would not ex­change for any thing elſe which this world has to beſtow, except the ſtill ſweeter complacency ariſing from the coniciouſneſs of having diſcharged his duty.

That the practice of virtue is attended with a peculiar pleaſure of the pureſt kind, is a fact which no man has ever queſtioned, though the immediate source of that pleaſure has been the ſubject of many diſputes. He who attributes it to a moral ſenſe, which inſtinctively points out to every man his duty, and upon the performance of it rewards him with a ſentiment of ſelf-approbation, muſt of neceſſity acknowledge benevolence to be one of the attributes of that Being who has ſo conſtituted the human mind. That to protect the innocent, relieve the diſtreſſed, and do to others as we would in like circumſtances wiſh to be done by, fills the breaſt, previous to all reflection, with a holy joy, as the commiſſion of any crime tears it with remorſe, cannot in­deed be controverted. Many, however, contend, that this joy and this remorſe ſpring not from any moral inſtinct im­planted in the mind, but are the conſequence of early and deep-rooted aſſociations of the practice of virtue with the hope of future happineſs, and of vice with the dread of fu­ture miſery. On the reſpective merits of theſe two theo­ries we ſhall not now decide. We have ſaid enough on the ſubject in other articles (ſee Instinct, Moral Philoso­phy, and Passion) ; and ſhall here only obſerve, that they both lead with equal certainty to the benevolence of the Deity, who made us capable of forming aſſociations, and ſubjected thoſe aſſociations to fixed laws. This being the cale, the moral ſense, with all its inſtantaneous effects, af­fords not a clearer or more convincing proof of his goodneſs, than that principle in our nature by which remote circumſtances become ſo linked together, that, after the con­necting ideas have eſcaped from the mind, the one circumſtance never occurs without bringing the other alſo into view. It is thus that the pleasing complacency, which was perhaps firſt excited by the hopes of future happineſs, comes in time to be ſo aſſociated with the conſciouſneſs of virtu­ous conduct, the only thing entitled to reward, that a man never performs a meritorious action without experiencing the moſt exquiſite joy diffuſed over his mind, though his attention at that inſtant may not be directed either to hea­ven or futurity. Were we obliged, before we could expe­rience this joy, to eſtimate by reason the merit of every in­dividual action, and trace its connection to heaven and fu­ture happineſs through a long train of intermediate argu-

@@@[m]\* Dr Paley.