He was accused of impiety for asserting that the souls of beasts are not material, for this was affirmed to be the same thing with asserting that they are immortal ; but he reject­ed this consequence, as he well might do.

SENONES, in *Ancient Geography,* a people of Gallia Cel­tica, situated on the Sequana, to the south of the Parisii, near the confluence of the Jeauna or Yonne with the above-men­tioned river. Their most considerable exploit was their in­vasion of Italy, and the taking and burning of Rome, as re­lated under that article. This was done by a colony of them long before transported into Italy, and settled on the Adri­atic. Their capital, Agendicum, in Gaul, was in the lower age called Senones, now Sens. In Italy the Senones ex­tended themselves as far as the river Æsis, but were after­wards driven beyond the Rubicon, which became the boun­dary of Gallia Cisalpina.

SENRAB, a town of Hindustan, in the province of Al­lahabad, and district of Callinger, on the east side of the river Cane, twenty-four miles north from the town of Callinger. Long. 80. 25. E. Lat. 25. 18. N.

SENS, an arrondissement in the department of the Yonne, in France, which extends over 422 square miles, and com­prehends six cantons, divided into ninety communes, with a population in 1836 of 61,036 inhabitants. The capital is the city of the same name, situated in a district rich in vines, on the river Yonne, where it is joined by the river Vannes. It has a cathcdral of great antiquity and beauty, and pleasing walks on the banks of the river ; and it con­tains 9095 inhabitants, who make cotton goods, hats, hosiery, and silks. Long. 3. 12. 16. E. Lat 48. 11. 55. N.

SENSATION, in *Philosophy,* is the perception of ex­ternal objects by means of the senses. See Metaphysics.

SENSE is a faculty of the soul, by which it perceives ex­ternal objects by means of the impressions they make upon certain organs of the body. Sec MetaPHysIcs.

*common Sense* is a term that has been variously used both by ancient and by modern writers. With some it has been synonymous with public sense ; with others it has de­noted prudence; in certain instances it has been confound­ed with some of the powers of taste ; and, accordingly, those who commit egregious blunders with regard to decorum, saying and doing what is offensive to their company, and inconsistent with their own character, have been charged with a defect in common sense. Some men are distinguish­ed by an uncommon acuteness in discovering the characters of others ; and this talent has been sometimes called common sense, similar to which is that use of the term which makes it to signify that experience and knowledge of life which is acquired by living in society. To this meaning Quintilian refers, when speaking of the advantages of a public education. “ Sensum ipsum qui communis dicitur, ubi discet, cum se a congressu, qui non hominibus solum, sed mutis quoque animalibus naturalis est, segregarit ? (Lib. i. cap. 2.)

But the term common sense has in modem times been employed to signify that power of the mind which perceives truth, or commands belief, not by progressive argumenta­tion, but by an instantaneous, instinctive, and irresistible impulse, derived neither from education nor from habit, but from nature, acting independently of our will, whenever its object is presented according to an established law, and therefore called *sense ;* and acting in a similar manner upon all, or at least upon a great majority of mankind, and there­fore called *common sense.* See Metaphysics.

*Moral Sense* is a determination of the mind to be pleased with the contemplation of the affections, actions, or charac­ters, of rational agents, which we call good or virtuous.

This moral sense of beauty in actions and affections may at first view appear strange. Some of our moralists them­selves are offended at it in Lord Shaftesbury, as being ac­customed to deduce every approbation or aversion from

rational views of interest. It is certain that his lordship has carried the influence of the moral sense very far, and some of his followers have carried it farther. The advocates for the selfish system seem to drive their opinions to the oppo­site extreme ; and we have elsewhere endeavoured to show that the truth lies between the contending parties. See Moral Philosophy.

SENSES, Pleasures and Ραινs of. The natural agree­ableness, disagreeableness, and indifference of our sensations and perceptions, present to the mind an important and ex­tensive field of inquiry ; and on this subject we shall here make a few observations. All our senses have been cer­tainly bestowed upon us for wise and beneficent purposes ; and accordingly we find, that all of them, when properly cultivated, or exercised and improved, are capable of af­fording us pleasure. The senses of smell and of taste seem rather intended for the preservation of our animal existence, and in this point of view are properly an object of the na­tural history of man ; whilst the other three seem to be more peculiarly intended for our mental improvement, and accordingly form the object of intellectual and of moral philosophy. And agreeably to this we know that we de­rive a great deal of useful knowledge, in an easy and simple manner, concerning the objects that surround us, in the early part of life, from all the senses, particularly from sight and touch, and this too without labour or study. But this is not the only purpose for which the senses were designed.

It being thus certain that the senses were bestowed upon us partly to preserve our animal existence, and partly for our mental improvement, it seems reasonable, even *a priori,* to expect that nature would attach some pleasure to such use and exercise of them as are calculated to promote these ends, and pain to the contrary ; particularly in those in­stances in which she has left the management of them sub­ject to our own control. And accordingly we cannot but observe what delight we derive from our senses, especially in the morning of life, by which it would seem that nature intended thus winningly to invite us to the proper exercise and improvement of them, and as it were unconsciously acquire much useful knowledge. It is this species of plea­sure that supports and excites boys in the constant and often immoderate exercise of their organs of voluntary mo­tion, the powers of which are thus increased and invigo­rated.

The exercise and improvement of the senses being sub­servient to our intellectual improvement, nature has also kindly attached much refined and rational pleasure to the mental exertions ; so that we are thus seduced, as it were, to the cultivation of the various extraordinary powers and faculties of the mind.

It is evident that nature has given such organs and fa­culties to man. as are calculated not only to make him live, but also to render life agreeable. Here too we obtain a slight glimpse at least of some of the final causes of the pleasures of sense. But if it be asked how it happens that there are such wide diversities between our sensations, some being by nature very agreeable to all men, and some as disagreeable, whilst there are others so indifferent as to give neither pleasure nor pain, we must confess that we can give no satisfactory answer, to show how so many very different sensations are produced by vnrious kinds of im­pressions made on certain organs of the body, and how all these different impressions excite such sensations as suggest not only corresponding perceptions and external qualities, but at the same time affect the mind with pleasure, pain, trouble, anxiety, or disgust. To be successful in these in­quiries, we must presuppose some knowledge of the nature of the connection subsisting between the mind and the body, which there is reason to think is placed beyond the limits prescribed by nature to human research.

The pleasure or pain which constantly attends certain