of these, are in a great measure subservient. This is one of the causes why many pleasures, which we cultivate with all our might, cannot be immortal. If a person be thirsty, spring-water is nectar to him ; if hungry, any kind of food is agreeable, even the smell of food is grateful. To a man in a heat, or in a fever, cold is pleasing ; and to one in a cold fit nothing is so agreeable as heat. To these same persons, at other times, so far are these things from being agreeable, that they are often disgusting. The most de­cided glutton cannot always relish a sumptuous feast.

Besides the sensations excited by external objects, there are others also which cause pain and pleasure. If the ac­tion of the muscles be strong, easy, and cheerful, and not continued so as to fatigue us, it causes pleasure. On the contrary, when this action is attended with a sense of list­lessness, lassitude, difficulty, and debility, it more or less causes pain. In fine, various states and affections of the mind, such as the exercise of memory, imagination, and judgment, nearly for similar reasons, are sometimes painful, at other times agreeable. “ Animi affectus, qui modici grate excitant, vehementes, aut graves et diuturni, hujus pariter ac corporis vires frangunt ; hominem interdum statim extinguunt, sæpius longa valetudine macerant. Somni etiam, quo ad exhaustas vires reficiendas egemus, exces­sus, vel defectus, et animo et corpori nocet.” “ Desidia, sive animi sive corporis, utriusque vires languescunt : ni­mia exercitatione haud minus læduntur. Statuit enim pro­vida rerum parens, ut singularum partium, et universi cor­poris animique vires usu roborentur et acuantur ; et huic iterum certos fines posuit : ita ut neque quem voluit na­tura usus impune omittatur, neque ultra modum intenda­tur.” *(conspectus Medicintæ.)*

*“ Of* such sensations and feelings as are agreeable or dis­agreeable, we may remark,” says Dr Reid, “ that they dif­fer much, not only in degree, but in kind and in dignity. Some belong to the animal part of our nature, and are com­mon to us with the brutes ; others belong to the rational and moral part. The first are more properly called sensa­tions, the last feelings. The French word *sentiment* is common to both. ”

“ The Author of nature, in the distribution of agreeable and painful feelings, hath wisely and benevolently consulted the good of the human species ; and hath even shown us, by the same means, what tenor of conduct we ought to hold. For, first, the painful sensations of the animal kind are ad­monitions to avoid what would hurt us ; and the agreeable sensations of this kind invite us to those actions that are necessary to the preservation of the individual, or of the kind. Secondly, by the same means nature invites us to moderate bodily exercise, and admonishes us to avoid idle­ness and inactivity on the one hand, and excessive labour and fatigue upon the other. Thirdly, the moderate exer­cise of all our rational powers gives us pleasure. Fourthly, every species of beauty is beheld with pleasure, and every species of deformity with disgust ; and we shall find all that we denominate beautiful to be something estimable or useful in itself, or a sign of something that is estimable or useful. Fifthly, the benevolent affections are all accompanied with an . agreeable feeling, the malevolent with the contrary. And, sixthly, the highest, the noblest, and most durable pleasure is that of doing well and acting the part that be­comes us ; and the most bitter and painful sentiment is the anguish and remorse of a guilty conscience.” These ob­servations with regard to the economy of nature in the dis­tribution of our painful and agreeable sensations and feel­ings are so well illustrated by the elegant and judicious au­thor of *Théorie des Sentiments Agréables,* that we deem it unnecessary to make any further remarks on this subject. A little reflection may satisfy us that the number and va­riety of our sensations and feelings are prodigious. For, to omit all those which accompany our appetites, passions, and

affections, our moral sentiments and sentiments of taste, even our external senses, furnish a variety of sensations differing in kind, and almost in every kind an endless variety of de­grees. Every variety we discern with regard to taste, smell, sound, colour, heat, and cold, and in the tangible qualities of bodies, is indicated by a sensation corresponding to it.

The most general and the most important division of our sensations and feelings is into the agreeable, the disagree­able, and the indifferent. Every thing we call pleasure, happiness, or enjoyment, on the one hand, and, on the other, every thing we call misery, pain, or uneasiness, is sensation or feeling. For no man can for the present be more happy, or more miserable, than he feels himself to be. He cannot be deceived with regard to the enjoyment or suffering of the present moment.

But, besides the sensations that are agreeable or disa­greeable, there is still a greater number that are indifferent. To these we give so little attention that they have no name, and are immediately forgotten, as if they had never been ; it even requires attention to the operations of our minds to be convinced of their existence. For this end we may ob­serve, that to a good ear every human voice is distinguish­able from all others. Some voices are pleasant, and some dis­agreeable ; but the far greater part cannot be said to be the one or the other. The same thing may be said of other sounds, and no less of tastes, smells, and colours ; and if we consider that our senses are in continual exercise while we are awake, that some sensation attends every object they present to us, and that familiar objects seldom raise any emotion pleasant or painful, we shall see reason, besides the agreeable and disagreeable, to admit a third class of sensations, that may be called indifferent. But these sen­sations that are indifferent are far from being useless. They serve as signs to distinguish things that differ ; and the in­formation we have concerning things external comes by these means. Thus, if a man had not a musical ear so as to receive pleasure from the harmony or melody of sounds, he would still find the sense of hearing of great utility. Though sounds gave him neither pleasure nor pain of them­selves, they would give him much useful information ; and the same may be said of the sensations which we have by all the other senses.

SENSIBLE Note, in *Music* (derived from the French term *note sensible),* means simply the note which ascends by a semitone to the tonic or key-note of any scale, major or minor. For example, in scale of C, B to C ; or in scale of A, G# to A, and so on. (See Music.) This note is one of the marked characteristics of modern European tonality.

SENSIBILITY is a nice and delicate perception of pleasure or pain, beauty or deformity. It is very nearly al­lied to taste, and, as far as it is natural, seems to depend up­on the organization of the nervous system. It is capable, however, of cultivation, and is experienced in a much higher degree in civilized than in savage nations, and among per­sons liberally educated than among boors and illiterate me­chanics. The man who has cultivated any of the fine arts has a much quicker and more exquisite perception of beauty and deformity in the execution of that art, than another of equal or even greater natural powers, who has but casually inspected its productions. He who has been long accus­tomed to that decorum of manners which characterizes the polite part of the world, perceives almost instantaneously the smallest deviation from it, and feels himself almost as much hurt by behaviour harmless in itself as by the gross­est rudeness ; and the man who has long proceeded stea­dily in the paths of virtue, and often painted to himself the deformity of vice, and the miseries of which it is produc­tive, is more quickly alarmed at any deviation from recti­tude than another who, though his life has been stained by no crime, has yet thought less upon the principles of virtue and consequences of vice.