the exercises on the citizens, but excluded the slaves from the gymnasium. Now all classes were hearers of the philo­sopher ; the smith, the carpenter, the fuller, the dresser of leather, were engaged in discussing problems of ethics and politics, no less than the high-born and wealthy citizen, and the orator, and the statesman, and the general. This was an evident indication of a corresponding change in the go­vernment itself a change, which really came to matu­rity not long after the time of Socrates, when the machi­nery of the government passed from the hands of the gene­rals and the men of practical ability, into those of the ora­tors of the republic, and when rhetoric, or oratory, became the master science, and only another name for politics.@@1

Those, then, whose attention had been drawn to the per­son of Socrates many years before, and had then only laugh­ed at the exaggerations of the comic muse, might naturally begin to suspect, in the progress of events at Athens, that there was a real danger to the institutions of the country couched under the humorous mien and conversation of the real Socra­tes. They would now, as they watched his increasing influ­ence and reputation, recal their early associations of the lu­dicrous with the name of Socrates, not with the good humour with which they were originally received, but with the unde­fined fears since acquired, in the course of their daily obser­vation, of one in whose hands the destinies of their country seemed to be placed. They would probably then think that they had judged his case too leniently before as spectators, and that they were now called upon to pronounce authori­tatively as judges, not so much from the representations and arguments of the. accusers, as from their own experience of the great change which their country had evidently under­gone, and was still undergoing. Even indeed at the time of trial, nearly half of the great body of jurors were in fa­vour of his acquittal ; and Melitus would have failed alto­gether, but for the speeches of Anytus and Lycon, men of popular and rhetorical powers, who addressed the court in support of the charge ; so strongly did the weight of his personal character, and the interest which he had excited by his friendly and instructive intercourse with every class of citizens, prevail in his favour.

We should take into account, further, the general neu­trality of Socrates on questions of politics, and his decisive energy on particular political occasions, in which he was called upon by the circumstances of his position to take part. Both lines of conduct would create enemies. Neu­trality in a state distracted with parties is the most unpo­pular course which can be adopted ; however candid and reasonable the principle of such conduct may be, all parties, look with jealousy at one who will not be associated with them in the guilt and the danger of party-struggles. They envy him his exemption from their violence, his reputation of candour, his safety under every vicissitude of party-as­cendancy. Corcyra, as a state, was obnoxious to the other states of Greece for its neutral policy. So was the indivi­dual at Athens who kept aloof from public business, amidst that restless pragmatical spirit which actuated the state and its citizens. Athenians could not understand and appreciate the motives of one who abstained from the public assemblies, and the courts, and the theatres,—who shrank from all public offices,—was a member of no faction or club,—engaged in no trade,—disregarded even his own domestic concerns,—and

lived a private man, where every one else was the servant of the public, busy with the affairs of the state, and incessant­ly pushing his own interests by his political activity.@@2 The laws of Solon indeed inculcated the principle, that every one should take his side in the contention of parties.@@3 So­lon wished, to interest the people in the maintenance of the constitution which he had given them ; and accordingly, obliged them by penalties to attend to public affairs. This was evidently his reason for compelling their attendance in the assemblies and courts, as also for this singular provision. The increased action of the democratic spirit in the time of Socrates must have greatly fostered the opinion thus de­clared in their ancient laws. And thus we find philosophers in general held in disrepute at Athens, on account of their inactivity and unconcern in public affairs. The busy so­phist, the orator, and the man of the world, censured them as pusillanimous, and indolent, and incapable of the duties of a citizen. Some of the early philosophers, indeed, had been distinguished as statesmen, and legislators, and gene­rals. The Pythagoreans in Magna Græcia appear still to have sustained this character in some measure. But now philosophers were observed, for the most part, to lead a con­templative life of leisure, and to present a striking contrast to the general society of Grecian states. Plato takes every opportunity in his writings of defending philosophy from this calumny directed against the persons of its votaries, evident­ly treating it as a grievance which he had felt in his own case. Aristotle also indicates the prevalence of the same objection against philosophers at his day, when he studiously maintains that exertions of the mind in mere speculation are to be re­garded as even more really practical than those which are di­rected to external results.@@4 Socrates accordingly was a puzzle to many of his contemporaries. They wondered that he should freely dispense the treasures of his wisdom, and not convert' it into a marketable commodity. Whilst they gave him credit for integrity, they regarded such -a proceeding as mere folly.@@4 They asked how he could think to qualify others for public life, without taking part in it himself, if he really knew what it was to be a statesman. But he was content, in reply, to point to the number whom he had laboured to render capable of public duties, as a more effectual service on his part to the state, than a mere personal activity.

But though the general conduct of Socrates was to avoid all interference in affairs of state, he had shewn on one or two very important occasions his patriotic feeling, and the energy with which he could carry it into effect. He had served with distinguished courage at Potidæa, Amphi­polis, and Delium, as we have seen ; and proved himself, on those hard-fought days, one who, as Pericles character­izes the Athenians, could philosophize without effeminacy, and, without being inured to the dangers of the field, could brave them at the moment of trial with no diminished spi­rit. But still greater occasions of trial were those of civil exertion at home, to which he was called not long before the accusation of impiety. Perhaps one of the most memo­rable instances of resolute firmness which history presents, is to be observed in the fact, that when the uproar of fac­tion was demanding the iniquitous condemnation of the ge­nerals who commanded at Arginusæ, Socrates stood alone among his colleagues in office, and refused to put the ques­tion to the vote, as the epistates, or superintendent of the

@@@1 Aristot. Eth. Nic. x. Τά *iι ereλιrnui seraγγtλλetraι μ'n iiiâfxut ei gepiarai, rpâmi i' airvt c!ι3ti(,* βλλ’ β∕ wsλn-ej⅛nnβ∕, x,r.λ, Των *ii βeφιfrωt ei eraγγiλλ6μneι* ... où yàg *at* nj» *aυri∣t rfj ^ηrep∣xe* oùôi %<⅛a∣ *er!6tβat.* c. ult.

@@@’ Thucyd. ii. 40. *in ∏ ret; ai∣ro∣( eixsieit άμα xal πeλιrιxωt erιμiλtιa,* xα∕ irifo∕ς <rfif *ieγa τιτςαμμηοις* rβ troλmxa μ∙ιj srisj; *γtenar μettι γάο rit ri μηiit rùtii μtrtχetra* oùx *aπξaγμeta* βλλ’ *aχgtmt teμιζeμn,*

@@@\* Plutarch, Solon, 20, tom. i. p. 354, ed. Reiske.

@@@1 Aristot. Pol. vi. 3. Αλλα *rit ereajcrixit eux ataγxcubt1* Χ.Γ. λ. Also Ethic. Nic. x. 7. The oration of Isocratee against the so­phists is addressed to the same popular calumny against philosophy.

@@@\* Xenoph. Mem. i. 6. τ∩ ∑ωxf<xrtc, *ίγύ reι* ffs *μht iir.cuet teμlζω, feφit it eii' vrutrιevt,* x.r.λ, . . . *Kai ni>jt veri reû At- ripùtre; iρeμiteu, x.r.λ,* Ibid.