at once as well-informed persons and teachers of others, with crude and superficial notions and principles.

If we look, then, to the course of his practical teaching, —to the general tenor of his conversations and actions, and the example throughout of his life and death,—we shall find that his whole labour was directed to the establishment of true moral and religious principles, in opposition to the false and mischievous principles which, he observed, were com­monly acted upon and avowed in the world. The excellence and supremacy of self-knowledge was what he was ever in­culcating; and of self-knowledge, not as a matter of intellec­tual curiosity, or for its value as a science, but in order to self-government and to happiness. He found that this was the last kind of knowledge which men ever thought of acquir­ing ; that they had, in fact, no concern about it ; or that if they were reminded of its necessity, they presumed on their possession of it already. His first effort, then, was to open the minds of men to a perception of the value of this knowledge, and of their own need of it. The questions which he would put—the refutations which he addressed to the various pro­positions or conclusions elicited from others in the course of his conversations—the perplexities to which he would re­duce them—and the unsatisfied state in which he would com­monly leave them, after exciting their doubts—all had a direct tendency to convince men of the insufficiency of their intellectual acquirements, and of their want of some more adequate and availing information.@@1 To the same purport was his disparagement of physical science, and of all mere­ly speculative knowledge, in comparison with that which was useful for human life. For he was far from an utilita­rian, in the modern sense of that term. He did not value particular studies, because they ministered to the necessi­ties or conveniences of human life, or undervalue them be­cause they had no such bearing. But he saw that his clever and ingenious countrymen were studious of intellectual re­finement—that they delighted in the specious, and the ad­mirable, and the subtile, more than in the solid and the un­ostentatious qualifications of the good member of a private family and the useful citizen. He was aware, too, from his own acquaintance with the existing physical philosophy, how imperfect that knowledge was, how entirely hypothe­tical, and incapable of practical application. We must make allowance, therefore, in estimating his objection to specula­tive science, for the polemical spirit in which he assailed a branch of knowledge then, at once, so barren, and so en­croaching in its claims on public attention. We must re­gard him as preparing the way for the due cultivation of the other, the higher as well as more important knowledge, that of man’s own nature, then so little thought of, and so neglected. This seems to be invariably his design on every occasion, whatever may be the immediate purport of his discourse.

When he came to direct the minds of men, once awaken­ed to the importance of moral study, to the subject it­self of human nature, he had to encounter on the very threshold the most perverse notions. All their maxims of life were based on the absolute importance of the present life. The body, and its present appetites and desires, were regarded as the whole of man. The tyrant, in the enjoy­ment of absolute power to gratify every passion without re­striction or penalty, was considered as the apt representa­tion of the highest human felicity. All men’s plans of life accordingly were directed to the acquisition of power for themselves. They studied to improve their external cir­cumstances, and not themselves. Then their religion was merely the fear of mysterious powers influencing the pros­perous or adverse events of the present world, and which

were therefore to be conciliated or appeased by offerings and vows. Socrates set himself strenuously to refute these vain presumptions. He argued the folly of supposing, that men really accomplished their own washes in gratifying each prevailing inclination. He showed, that whilst they did what they pleased at the moment, they did not in fact attain that pleasure which they sought; and led them therefore to surmise, that there must be some end of human pursuit be­yond the gratification of the passions, and further, some ulti­mate end to the whole sum of the active energies of the soul, beyond the present life, and distinct from all bodily as­sociations. But he not only suggested such a thought by shewing the reasonings on the opposite view of human life to be inconsequential and absurd ; he further practically refuted the prevailing fallacies on the subject, by his own example on the other side. He proved to the world, by divesting himself of all the worldly accessaries of hap­piness, and depending exclusively on the internal resour­ces of his mind and character, and by his perpetual cheer­fulness under those privations, that happiness did not re­sult from externals, or from the body, but from the in­ternal nature of man, nor from any thing positive and ab­solute in that nature, so much as from its state of discipline and command over the appetites of the body. Theories of morals were yet to be formed. It remained for Plato to erect the true and sublime standard of human conduct in the perfections of the Divinity, and for Aristotle afterwards to shew the application of the law of habits to the subject. Socrates has the merit of having prepared the way for these developments of the subject, by demonstrating the folly of seeking the ideal of happiness in any enjoyment of the body, or in any thing present.

So also as to religion, though he could not advance, in his conceptions of the retributive justice of the Divine Be­ing, beyond the circle of darkness which limits the natu­ral observation of man, he proved the absurdity of suppos­ing that mere external punishment was the only suffering un­dergone for offences committed. Secret faults, as he pointed out, did not escape with impunity. He appealed to the re­morses of conscience, to shew how surely, however in­visibly, wrong doing was visited with its punishment ; and whilst in his own mind he concluded that there would be a future state, in which each man would receive the merited consequences of his actions, he must also have excited, in the minds of his hearers, a strong though undefined appre­hension of a period of general retribution after death in an­other world. At least they must have seen that it was not so certain, as they may have once supposed, that though a present punishment may have been evaded, punishment would not follow at a future day. In well-disposed minds, there would thus be a foundation laid of a doctrine of the im­mortality of the soul. Under the teaching of Socrates him­self, this truth, perhaps, would scarcely assume the form of a doctrine, so distinctly as it is stated by Plato. It would be simply a practical conviction. And thus Socrates himself probably scarcely propounded it in formal terms, nor without those qualifying doubts which both his memorialists describe him as joining with its enunciation. But Plato, following him, took up the doctrine as a formal truth, and worked it up into a perfect theory, with the formal array of argument and didactic exposition.

There was nothing, indeed, of system in any part of the teaching of Socrates. In the “Memorabilia” of Xenophon, we have probably a very complete specimen of the sub­stance of what he taught, and, in the desultory manner in which the subjects of the several conversations there given are introduced, of the actual way in which he would throw

@@@, Xenopb. Mem. iv. 3. 36. 'Αλλά *ταϊιτα μιv, tφη* ό ∑ω<cpπrηr, *ίσως* διά *to σφuipa* jrιστcveιv «ίδιναι oiδ, *ισκtφaι*

lb. 39. *φpotτiζa, μη κράτιστον g μοι σιyiv κινδυνίύα yàp* όπλων *ovδ(v* ('ιδ<vα<.