numberless absurdities, such as, that the same thing can be in a million of different places, *whole* and *entire,* at the same instant of times that it is above 1800 years old, and yet may be not more than one minute; that *forms* or sensible qua­lities are real things, independent of their subject and the sentient beings who perceive them ; that the infinite and eternal God, who created and sustains the universe, is him­self wholly and substantially comprehended by the human soul ; and that the half, or fourth, or tenth part of the body of Christ, is equal to the whole of that body. That these are necessary consequences of transubstantiation, has been so completely proved in various works to which every reader may have access, that it is needless for us to repeat argu­ments so hackneyed ; but there are two objections to that doctrine, which, as we do not remember to have met with them elsewhere, and as they appear to us absolutely con­clusive, it may be worth while to state in this place.

The advocates for the real presence in the Lord’s Supper contend, that every word relating to that ordinance is to be taken in the strictest and most literal sense ; and they affect to triumph over the Protestants, because their notions of the sacrament cannot be supported without having recourse to figure and metaphor. This however is a very vain tri­umph ; for we hesitate not to affirm, that supposing tran- substantiation possible, and even capable of proof, there is not in the whole New Testament a single word or a single phrase which, if interpreted *literally,* gives the slightest countenance to that wonderful doctrine. The reader will remember that transubstantiation, as we have stated it from a dignitary of the Romish church, and as it is in fact stated by the council of Trent, consists in a change of the matter, imperceptible substance, or *substratum,* of the bread and wine, into the matter, imperceptible substance, or *substra­tum,* of Christ’s body and blood ; for all parties agree that the sensible qualities of the bread and wine remain, and, according to the Romanist, are, after the consecration, either supported by the *matter* of Christ’s body and blood, or hung upon nothing. But the phrase rwro' *lew* ri <r⅞u,d *μoυ,* if taken in the literal sense, cannot possibly denote the consequence of such a change as this ; for every person at all acquainted with the Greek language, especially the language of the Peripatetic school, knows that v⅛ *s∑ιμa μου* signifies, not the *matter* or *substratum* of my body divested of its sensible qualities, but the body of me in its natural state, consisting of matter and qualities, or matter and form united. Unless therefore the *sensible qualities,* as well as the *matter* of the bread and wine, give place to the sensible *qualities* as well as the *matter* of our Saviour’s body and blood, and unless he appear glorified on the altar as he appeared on the mount at his transfiguration, the words *το βωμά μου* must be inter­preted figuratively. Had the apostles understood their Master’s words in the sense in which they are understood by the church of Rome, they would have rendered them into Greek, not roSri *iβrι το Λμά μm,* “ this is my *body,”* but roυr0 *iβτι ή* ύλη rcù ffω⅛αro'i *μm,* “ this is the *matter* of my body.” In like manner, when St John relates@@1 that Jesus said, “ Whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day,” had he understood his adorable Master to speak of his flesh and blood in the Eucharist in the sense in which they are taught to be there by the church of Rome, he would have represented him as saying, not Ό *Τξώγοα μου* r⅛v Λ⅛xα, xaι *<r!>ωι μου τh* aξ⅛a, but Ό *rgωγωv* τ⅛ ύληs rη{ */Μοχός μου, xal τrivm την* ύληs νοΰ *αίματά; μου, “* whoso eateth the *matter* of my flesh, and drinketh the *matter* of my blood, hath eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day.”

But further, supposing this singular conversion possible in itself, it cannot be rendered credible, however stated in any language that ever was or ever will be spoken by man.

At first sight it may appear paradoxical to affirm that a possible fact cannot be so related as to obtain credit ; but that transubstantiation, if possible, is such a fact, will be apparent on the slightest consideration.

The relation which subsists between things and words is arbitrary ; so that what is termed *body* in English, is σώαα in Greek, and *corpus* in Latin ; and the same thing might with equal propriety (had the authors of these languages so pleased) have been expressed in the first by *soul,* in the second by u>⅛ and in the third by *anima.* The conse­quences of this are, that there is no universal language spoken, that the natives of one country understand not the speech of those of another, and that different men speaking the same language are perpetually liable to mistake each other’s meaning. Between the *substrata* of bodies and their *sensible qualities* there is a relation founded in nature, so that the sensible qualities which indicate the substance to which they belong, to be *gold,* for instance, in one coun­try, indicate the same thing in every other country, and have done so from the beginning of time. The sensible appearances of bodies therefore are a universal language, the language of the Author of Nature, by which he de­clares to his creature man, that though the ύλη \*⅞><irη, or primary matter of all bodies, may be the same kind of sub­stance, yet the ύλη *∙rgosιχt∣s of* one body, or the internal combination of its primary parts, differs from that of an­other ; that gold, for instance, has a different *substratum* or *basis* from iron, lead, or silver ; that the internal orga­nization or structure of the body of an ox is different from that of a horse ; and that the *internal substance* or *substra­tum* which exhibits the appearances of bread and wine is different from that which supports the sensible qualities of flesh and blood. Supposing therefore the doctrine of tran­substantiation to be possible and even true, it would still be impossible, by any statement in human language, or by any argument urged in its support, to render that doctrine an object of rational belief ; for if it be said that the words roùrô *tβτι* ri ff¾⅛α *uoυ* were spoken by a divine person, who could neither be deceived himself nor intend to deceive us, it may be replied, that the sensible appearances of bread and wine, which are confessed to remain, are likewise the language of a divine person, even of the Creator and Go­vernor of heaven and earth ; that this language addressed to the sight, the taste, the touch, and the smell, is equally intelligible to all nations ; that since the creation of the world its meaning has never been mistaken by the scholar or the clown, the sage or the savage, except in this single instance of our Lord’s flesh and blood exhibiting the sen­sible appearances of bread and wine ; and that it is there­fore infinitely more probable that the members of the church of Rome should mistake the meaning of the words *τοΰτί lβτι* r⅛ *βωμά μου,* which, though spoken by Christ, are part of the language of men, and liable to all its ambiguities, than that all mankind should mistake the language of God himself, which is liable to no ambiguities, and which was never in any other instance misunderstood by a single in­dividual. Should transubstantiation therefore be really true, its truth can never be proved or rendered probable, but by an immediate operation of the Spirit of God on the mind of man ; and he who is conscious of no such operation on his own mind, may rest assured that the Father of mercies, who knows whereof he is made, will never bring upon him, for his incredulity in this instance, any of the anathemas denounced by the church of Rome upon those who place implicit confidence in the universal language of Him who created them, in opposition to her figurative and contradic­tory interpretations of the written word. Of the transub­stantiation of the elements a visible miracle would afford no proof. Had the water been changed into wine at the

@@@\* Chap. vi. 54.