In a military point of view, the economical system has been productive of immense losses to the nation ; but if, under given circumstances, in time of peace, the army must be very generally reduced, care should be taken not to de­stroy the elements of regeneration. On a war breaking out, all the troops in the kingdom should be brigaded, with their generals, staff, field train of artillery, commissariat, and me­dical officers, and concentrated as much as possible, for the purpose of rapidity of execution, and creating habits of duty in large bodies, which the staff and commissariat ge­nerally begin to learn when before the enemy, at a period when all parties should be fully acquainted with them, and when mistakes may be fatal. The orders of government are thus executed as soon as issued, and that species of confusion is obviated which all who served in the beginning of the late war must have witnessed.

Till the beginning of the present century, plans of ope­rations were usually arranged in the cabinet, by superan­nuated officers, on obsolete principles, or by ministers with­out professional knowledge, upon combinations entirely poli­tical. The Austrian government was particularly unfor­tunate in this system. Plans, calculated with the preci­sion of summer manœuvres, where every march, battalion, and detachment were prescribed, without adverting to the measures of the enemy, tied the hands of the generals, who were never successful against a formidable enemy but when they disobeyed their instructions, as Eugene did at Zenta. But when Frederick traced his own plans of campaign, al­though even he was not fully sensible of the laws which should regulate territorial and manœuvring lines of opera­tions, still circumstances and superior *tact* soon led him into the true system. Jomini blames, with sagacity, some of his initial operations ; but he does not sufficiently consi­der his circumstances and his era. He compares the ope­rations of Napoleon, with all the resources, fortresses, po­pulation, and revolutionary excitation of France, together with the adventurous gambling of his hero, to the conduct of *a* sovereign who had his native throne to defend, without a military frontier, with a scanty population, a barren soil, and no pecuniary means but such as arose from his econo­my ; and yet he rose superior to all the difficulties of his situation, though under circumstances more unpromising than those which ultimately hurled Napoleon from his throne.

II.—MANŒUVRING LINES OF OPERATIONS.

The connection between manœuvring lines and those which nature has marked out, and thc views of the general-in-chief, form separate classes, each named after the nature of that connection.

1. *Simple lines of operations* are those when an army operates in a single direction from a frontier, without form­ing detached corps.

2. *Double and multiplied lines,* when an army acts upon the same frontier with two or three isolated corps, towards one or several objects.

3. *Interior lines of operations* are formed to oppose se­veral hostile lines, and arc so directed as to possess internal connection, and enabled to move and approach each other, without allowing the enemy to oppose a superior mass to them.

4. *Exterior lines,* on the contrary, possess the opposite qualities. They are such as an army may form at the same time, upon the two extremities of one or several hostile lines.

5. *Bines upon an extended front* are those which are ar­ranged upon a great contiguous development by isolated divisions, but still belonging to the same mass of forces, and operating upon the same object. Under this head are comprehended, likewise, lines formed by two separate corps

upon one given extent. They are then double lines upon a great front.

6. *Deep or lengthened lines* are those which, commencing at their base, pass over a great extent of country before they can attain their object.

7. *concentric lines of operations* are either several or a single line subdivided, moving from distant points in order to arrive at the same object, in front or in rear of their base.

8. *Eccentric lines* designate a single mass starting from one point, and dividing itself in order to form several di­verging lines upon isolated objects.

9. *Secondary lines* are those in the great combinations of two armies, which designate their relative connection while operating upon the development of the same fron­tier.

10. *Accidental lines* are produced in the original plan of campaign, when unexpected events necessitate a new di­rection for the operations. They are of the highest im­portance, and rarely adopted but by generals of the first abilities.

Formerly lines of operations were considered only as they effected the *matériel* of armies : it was even advanced, that armies encamped near their magazines had no lines of operations; but an example will prove the fallacy of this opinion. Supposing two French armies encamped, one on the Upper Rhine in front of Brisac, and the other on the Lower Rhine in front of Dusseldorf, with both their magazines in the safest place, that is, behind the river. These armies must have either an offensive or defensive object, and therefore have territorial as well as manœuvring lines of operations. 1st, The territorial defensive line will extend from the point of their position to the point which they are to cover ; therefore they would both be cut off if the enemy occupied that point before them. If Melas, with his army, could have subsisted near Alessandria in Lombardy after the battle of Marengo, he was no less cut off from his line of operations as long as his victorious op­ponents occupied the line of the Po. 2d, Their manœuvring lines would be a double against a simple one, if the enemy concentrated his masses to crush one of the armies: it would be a double external line against a double internal, if the enemy formed also two corps, but so directed that they could be united most readily.

The article in the Edinburgh Review on the work of Jomini makes the following able remarks on lines of ope­rations. “ Among all these lines, the simple and interior are the best, particularly when combined, as being most congenial to the great principle of carrying a mass of troops upon the decisive point. A few remarks will make the truth of this apparent. If an army advances from its base of operations upon one line, it is clear that the general commanding will have but two important dangers to pro­vide against ; first, that of his troops being attacked un­awares; and, secondly, that of being turned and cut off from his communications with his base. The most effectual method of guarding against either is, to attack the opposing enemy first, or, as the author calls it, *prendre l'initiative ;* and if, in so doing, the assailants can place themselves in such a position that a victory will give them the means of utterly destroying their adversary, while a defeat will not be of material detriment to themselves, the manœuvre must be considered as a perfect one. Now, a single and interior line has a manifest advantage over every other in aiding such an operation. An army which moves upon double, exterior, or multiplied lines, must be weakened in proportion to the number of its divisions. The general has many combinations to attend, and many dangers to guard against ; his columns being on many roads, and unconnect­ed, must also be dependent upon many persons and many orders. Obstacles will be multiplied at every step ; and errors cannot be known or corrected without much loss of