time. The success of his plan must depend upon the ex­actness and concert between the different divisions ; a mis­fortune attending any one vitiates or destroys the whole project, and yet each column, separately, will be too weak to strike an important blow if a favourable opportunity should occur. They will suffer severely from mishaps, and they cannot well take advantage of misfortunes.

“ Λn army that manœuvres upon simple and interior lines gets rid of all these incumbrances ; the troops will be together and well in hand, with the general upon the spot, ready to rectify errors, and to superintend every movement ; and upon whichever road he marches against an enemy act­ing upon double or multiplied lines, his combinations must be more simple, and his numbers must be superior ; he will have the power of overwhelming whatever division of his adversary he may meet with, and, by thus disorganizing his opponent’s plan of campaign, enable himself to cut off their communications, or to attack their columns in detail. We will suppose however that, finding their line pene­trated, they might, by great exertions, unite the remainder of their scattered corps by a retrograde movement ; but they will hardly be able to cover their communications, which must be nearly as numerous as their divisions, and the attacking army will give battle in the execution of a preconcerted plan, while they will be in the confusion of a baffled one. If the great principle, however, of carrying a mass upon the decisive point has governed the general who advances upon the simple line, he will, by a victory, deprive his foe of retreat, and utterly destroy him ; while, if he fail, his communications are still open, and, from want of a plan, the pursuit cannot be very vigorous.”

These remarks upon manoeuvring lines are well illus­trated in modern military history. In the seven years’ war, Frederick had the choice of attacking Austria, on his left by Silesia into Moravia, in the centre through Lusatia, and on the right by Saxony, both into Bohemia. His na­tural territorial line was undoubtedly the first of these three ; because, while his own flank was covered by the fortresses of Silesia, he could penetrate at once into the vitals of the Austrian dominions, and masking Olmutz, threaten Vienna. He did not feel the advantage of this line until the third campaign, when he was everywhere outnumbered by the enemy ; and yet even then he might have had signal success, if his besieging train, &c. had been in more efficient order and better applied. From this pe­riod he became sensible of the superior utility of central lines, and from 1758 he operated successively with his principal mass in Saxony, Silesia, and Brandenburg ; the same troops were victorious in all these quarters, by alter­nately reinforcing each corps so as to attain a superiority. Having missed the opportunity in 1757, of deciding the war by a successful invasion, he at last gloriously saved his kingdom by this new system. All these successes belong to the three first classes of simple, double, and interior lines of operations. Those of his adversaries, on the contrary, were always of the fourth and fifth exterior lines, and lines upon an extended front. For, on looking at the map of the seat of war, it will be readily observed that he ope­rated within the triangle formed by Dresden, Breslau, and Custrin, while the enemy manoeuvred outside of that figure. After the battle of Hochkirch, indeed, when this area was broken in, he made a master-stroke, by uniting his three armies in Saxony, and thus wresting from Daun the advan­tages of his victory. The operations of that crisis belong to the tenth or accidental lines, in which Frederick has never been surpassed. To this class belong, likewise, his invasion of Bohemia, after raising the siege of Olmutz ; his march into Silesia, and manœuvres before and after the battle of Liegnitz, in 1760 ; and his central position at Buntzelwitz, by which he kept the enemy divided, in 1762.

The French operations in Hanover were not more suc­cessful. In 1758 they formed two lines of operations, in Hessia and on the Wezer, upon a development of 300 miles. Prince Ferdinand, manoeuvring upon their extreme left, had only isolated corps to contend with, and drove them across the Rhine. Marshal Contades, after the battle of Crevelt, felt the advantage of the line of the Rhine, all the fortresses being in his hands ; but while he acted without vivacity on his right, Prince Ferdinand took a central di­rection, and broke the concert between the two hostile armies, who, at the end of the campaign, lost nearly all they had gained, having spent their time in disjointed marches, and in writing *projets* and counter *projets.* After the battle of Bergen in 1759, the French, grown wiser, united all their forces in Hessia ; they made conquests, which even the defeat of Minden did not wholly repair. In 1760, Marshal Broglie, persisting in operations in mass, made a respectable campaign ; but in the next two, armies were again formed at a great distance ; Prince Ferdinand again was beforehand with them everywhere. At length they approached each other to attack, but, for want of con­cert, were defeated at Fellinghausen.

In comparing the constant difference of the lines of ope­rations which the Austrians, Russians, and French adopt­ed, with those of the Prussians and Hanoverians, their op­posite results are at once discovered.

During the wars of the revolution, the duke of Bruns­wick’s march into Champagne was a simple line, but wanted corps to cover the flanks, and activity in the execution. The recovery of Belgium by the Austrians was also effect­ed by operating in mass; but on the French frontier they wasted their time in sieges, and acted upon exterior and eccentric lines. The French operated in a similar man­ner, but having a line of fortresses and numerical supe­riority, they were at last successful, and expelled the allies from Belgium. This worthless system was then cried up, and denominated Carnot’s. Accordingly, in 1795, the French persisted in acting on double lines. They ma- nceuvred on the Rhine, by Dusseldorf and Manheim. Cler- fait operating centrally, carried his masses alternately from right to left, gained the decisive victories of Manheim and the lines of Mayence, and threw the French army of the Sambre and Meuse back across the Rhine to cover the Mo- zelle, and Pichegru under the cannon of Landau.

In 1796, the French, in their lines of operations on the Rhine, still copying Frederick’s faulty system of 1757, and their own of 1794 and 1795, were not more successful than in the preceding campaign. The armies of the Rhine, and of the Sambre and Meuse, moved from the extremities of their base to take a concentric direction on the Da­nube. As in 1794, they formed two exterior lines. The Archduke Charles opposed his own in an interior direction, to be more readily concentrated, and seized the critical moment, while the corps of Count Latour was covered by the Danube, to steal some marches unperceived by Moreau, and to throw his mass upon Jourdan, who was routed at Würtzburg. This decided the fortune of the campaign in Germany, and compelled Moreau’s deep lines to retreat into France.

Meanwhile Napoleon commenced his extraordinary ca­reer in Italy, as Frederick had recommended half a cen­tury before. His system was to divide the enemy, and force the Austrians and Piedmontese to take two exterior lines. They fell into the snare, and he defeated them se­parately at Mondovi and Lodi. An army had assembled in the Tyrol to relieve Mantua ; it was led on in two lines, se­parated by a lake (Guarda). The French general, raising the siege, hurried with the mass of his forces to meet the first column at Brescia, and routed it; the second column arrived soon after on the same ground, and was likewise driven back upon the Tyrol. Wurmser determined to cover the two lines of Roveredo and Vicenza; Napoleon,