after defeating the first and driving it into the Lawis, changed his direction to the right, passed through the gorges of the Brenta, upon the left line of the enemy, and forced the wrecks of this fine army into Mantua, where it ultimately capitulated.

In 1799, the system of Carnot again prevailed. France, twice punished for operating with two exterior lines, now adopted three. An army on the left observed the Lower Rhine, one in the centre was on the Danube, and a third occupied Switzerland. These armies could not unite till they reached the valley of the Inn, eighty leagues from their base. The archduke uniting his forces in the centre, gained the victory of Stockach, and the Helvetian army was constrained to evacuate the Grisons and Eastern Swit­zerland. In their turn the allies committed the same fault, Instead of pursuing the conquest of this central bulwark of Europe, they formed a double line in Switzerland and on the Lower Rhine. The army in the former country was ruined at Zurich, while that in the latter was trifling about Manheim. In Italy a double line was formed by the French ; one towards Naples, where 32,000 men were em­ployed to no purpose ; while the other, on the Adige, was too weak, and suffered severe loss. At length, when the army of Naples returned towards the north, it committed the fault of taking a direction from that of Moreau. Su- warow took an able central position, marched against the first of these armies, and defeated it within a few leagues of the other.

In 1800 the scene changed again. Napoleon, having re­turned from Egypt, displayed a new combination of the lines of operations : 150,000 men filed off on the flanks of Switzerland, opening on one side on the Danube, and on the other upon the Po. This masterly combination secured immense advantages. Modern Europe had not as yet pre­sented such operations. The French armies, forming two interior lines, which reciprocally sustained each other, forced the Austrians to take a contrary or exterior direc­tion, which disabled them from communicating together. By this arrangement, the reserve army cut off the commu­nications of Melas with the base, while it preserved all its own with the army of the Rhine,@@1 which constituted its se­condary line. A reference to the map of that seat of war will show Moreau posted at Stockach and Zürich, and Kray facing him on the north side of the Danube ; in Italy, Napoleon on the Po, at Pavia, and Tortona, with a corps at Vercelli, completely insulating Melas at Alessandria; while the French commander, in case of check, had all the gorges of Switzerland, the St Bernard, Simplon, St Go­thard, and Splugen open. The events of that period offer convincing proofs of the decisive effect of a proper choice of lines of operations.

In a subsequent campaign, Napoleon, breaking up from Boulogne, and directing several corps through Central Ger­many to approach the Danube, suddenly turned the posi­tion of Mack at Ulm, and, placing himself upon his com­munication, forced him to surrender. But in this cam­paign his fortune began to blind him. Forgetting that he had no base of operations nearer than the Rhine, he hurried forward to Vienna, and thence to meet the Rus­sians in Moravia. Prussia was in arms, a British corps had reached the west of Germany, Bohemia had ζisen in mass, the Tyroleans made a successful resistance, and the Archduke Charles, after crippling the French army of Italy, had advanced to the vicinity of Vienna. At this moment, with only a small reserve at Frankfort, the Austro- Russians, who had every interest to temporize, hazarded the battle of Austerlitz ; and his good fortune and the imprudence of the allies saved him from a dilemma from which that victory would not have relieved him, but for the pusillanimous feelings which signed the peace.

Similar manœuvres towards the sources of the Saale produced the disasters of the Prussians at Jena and Auer- stadt. But in this war Napoleon became still more en­amoured of deep and baseless lines of operations, the bane­ful effect of which he was not destined to feel till the campaign of 1812, when he invaded Russia without a true base nearer than the Rhine. His secondary base on the Vistula bore no relation to the depth of his line of opera­tione, intersected by the Niemen, the Dwina, and a solitary waste of endless woods and heaths. Although he operated on a simple line, the immense distance from his base left him without communications. The extremes or pivots of the secondary base were already turned and broken, when Kutusoff moved to the rear of his flank upon Kaluga, to­wards the Berezina, and destroyed the greatest army re­corded in modern history. The next year, though his lines were shorter, circumstances were totally altered ; he operated with ability in mass ; but being greatly inferior in horse, and the allies manoeuvring likewise in mass, the first battles were indecisive, till his adversaries, operating upon double exterior lines,—on this occasion applicable from their great superiority in numbers and in cavalry,—moved again round the flank, and decided the question at Leipzig.

Meantime, the duke of Wellington, in the peninsula, *cunctando restituit rem.* Opposing a single line against a single line, he saved Portugal by his masterly position of Torres Vedras, without a battle. Next he drove the enemy from thc frontier fortresses, by alternately carrying his masses across the Tagus. His line was shorter from north to south than that of the enemy, and he caused them to increase theirs by the destruction of the bridge of Al- mcras. Thus he forced his opponents to operate exterior­ly. After the victory of Salamanca, his march into Spain was by two interior lines ; and though this operation has been hlamed, because it ended in a retreat, we forget that the enemy was obliged to abandon the south, or one half of Spain, to produce it. The next operation was upon a single and decisive line. The enemy was encountered at Vittoria before he could concentrate his forces, cut off from his base, and driven headlong into Pampeluna.

This comparison of the combinations and results of the most celebrated campaigns shows, that all the lines of opera­tions that have been crowned with success depended on gene­ral principles, of which the following are the principal heads.

1. A double line of operations is advantageous if the enemy has likewise a double line, provided theirs be ex­terior, and at a greater distance than yours, and unable to unite without first risking a battle.

2. An army possessing interior lines more connected than those of the enemy, can, by strategical movements, destroy them successively, by carrying the mass of forces alternately upon each point ; as was exemplified in the cam­paign of 1758, and subsequently at Manheim and the lines of Mayence, at Würtzburg and Emmendingen, at Lonato and Castiglione, Trente and Bassano, at Stockach and Ziirich, Abendsberg and Eckmuhl, &c.

3. In order to effect this movement, a corps should be left before the army which it is intended to keep in check, with orders not to engage, but merely to retard the march, by taking posts behind defiles or rivers, and retreating to­wards the army.

4. From the above premises, it follows that a double line of operations against an enemy whose corps are in closer connection, will always be unfortunate with equal numbers, if the enemy profits by the advantages of his situation, and manœuvres with rapidity within it.

@@@, Army of the Rhine, of the Sambre and Meuse, were names given to French armies, although they were not always on these rivers.