applicable ; while, on the contrary, he who is obliged to await the enemy, is no longer master of a single combina­tion, because his movements must be subordinate to those of his adversary, and it is too late to arrest them when they are already executing. The general who takes the lead knows what he intends to perform ; he conceals his march, surprises or overpowers an extremity or a weak part of the hostile line, while the waiting army is defeated on one of its points, before the knowledge of the attack has reached its commander. Hence the following are corollaries.

1. An army taking the lead in a movement can conceal it until in full execution ; therefore, when the manœuvre takes place in the interior of its own line of operations, the commander may gain several marches of the enemy.

*2.* To judge soundly of military operations, it is highly important to banish all calculations which suppose that the hostile general will be informed of a movement, and will oppose it by the best possible manœuvre, from the instant that the movement is begun.

3. When two armies combine to place the enemy between two fires, from the distance of several marches, they must ground the disposition upon a double line of operations against a simple one, and expose themselves to be defeated separately if the enemy takes advantage of his central posi­tion. Such a manœuvre is similar to a movement made at a distance against the flanks, and should be ranged among those which cannot produce a simultaneous effect at the moment required.

II. The second consists in directing the movements against a weak point of the enemy, when that point offers the greatest advantages.

An attack to the front is always to be avoided, if a con­centrated effort can possibly be made upon the extremity of an enemy’s line, for which simple demonstrations on the front are sufficient.

Against double and scattered lines of operations, it is pre­ferable to direct the attacks upon the central points ; for the mass of forces having ruined a central division, the corps ■ to the right and left can no longer operate in unison, and are forced to retreat eccentrically ; as was proved in the disasters of Wurmser, Mack, and the duke of Brunswick. Against simple lines of operations, and contiguous lines of battle, the weak points are the flanks, because they are lia­ble to be crushed before they can be sustained. Albuera offers perhaps the only positive example to the contrary in modern history ; for here the right wing of the allies was turned and routed, and yet the battle gained by the centre forming an echellon to the rear.

A deep column being attacked on the head, is in a simi­lar condition as an extremity of a line; both the one and the other are engaged in succession and defeated, or what is termed rolled up. This was proved at Rosbach and Auerstadt. It is however more practicable to make a fresh disposition from a column than with the extremity of a line, when attacked by the enemy.

In executing a general strategical movement against an extremity of an enemy’s line of operations, or of position, a mass is not only brought to bear against a weak point, but also, from that extremity, it becomes easy to gain the rear and communications, either of the base or of the secondary line of the opponent. Napoleon’s manœuvre in 1805, by Donauwerth and the line of the Lech, turned the line of communication of Mack with Vienna, which was his base ; and it intercepted his connection with Bohemia, which was his most important secondary line, by which he expect­ed the assistance of the Russians. Such were also the views of Soult when he turned the allies at Albuera, and of Junot in his attack upon the flank and rear of the British at Vi- miera. Napoleon performed the same manœuvre against the Prussians in 1806 by Saalfield and Gera, Kutusoff in 1812 by Kaluga and Krasnoi, the grand allied army in 1813 when it debouched from Bohemia upon Dresden and Leipzig, and Napoleon finally attempted it in 1815 by Wavre.

1. But if it be intended to remedy the deficiency of numbers, by acting with all the forces upon a single point of the enemy’s line, that line being contiguous, the point selected should be as far as possible from the centre, be­cause the centre can be sustained immediately from both the wings; while, on the contrary, an extremity can only receive succours by degrees from the divisions nearest at hand.

2. An attack upon the centre is never advisable except­ing when the hostile line is very extensive, and scattered into separate divisions: then indeed the result must be successful from the same causes, and the consequences even more brilliant, because the enemy’s corps will there­by be totally separated, and disabled from re-uniting ; whereas an attack upon the flank can produce similar suc­cess only under particular circumstances.

III. The result of the preceding truths leads to the maxim, that as it is better to attack the extremity of a line, yet that both the extremities should not be attacked at the same time, unless there be a very great superiority on the part of the assailant. An army of 60,000 men forming two corps of 30,000 each, for the purpose of attacking an ene­my equally numerous, is deprived of the power of striking a decisive blow ; because it enables the adversary to take equal measures, or even, if the movement be extended and unconnected, to assemble his mass against one of the divi­sions, and destroy it by his momentary superiority. Mul­tiplied attacks by means of a greater number of columns are still more dangerous, more repugnant to the best prin­ciples of war, particularly when they cannot commence acting at the same moment and upon the same point. But when there is a very great superiority of force on the side of the assailant, then indeed both the extremities of the hostile line should be attacked, because thus a greater number of troops is brought into action on both his wings ; whereas if this great superiority were kept in one mass up­on a single point, the adversary might deploy as many as the other party could bring into action, and thus engage with equal numbers. In this case it is only requisite to collect the greatest mass upon that wing where the great­est success is expected. Daun manœuvred in this way at Hochkirch, and the whole allied forces at Leipzig.

To illustrate this maxim more fully, it is necessary to enter into some detail, and fix a few particular principles. If 50,000 men, intending to attack 60,000, should form two corps of nearly equal force, and, with a view to embrace both the extremities of their line, should extend and iso­late the attacks, it is clear that the 60,000 will have the fa­cility of moving more rapidly within the interior of their line, than the assail­ant’s corps with such a mass between them, as fig. 5 demon- trates. The two corps B and C might gain momentarily some ground, but the enemy A, leaving a corps to check C up­on the most advantageous ground for defence which its po­sition might offer, could throw the remaining mass of forces on the front, flank, and rear of B, which must consequently be destroyed. If B and C should have a third detachment on the centre, the result would be still more disastrous, for then separate corps would attack without union a force everywhere imposing, which could not fail to overpower them. This took place at Kollin, from inattention to the orders of the king ; at Neerwinden in 1793 ; and at Stockach in 1799, where Dumouriez and Jourdan were defeated by Prince Coburg and the Archduke Charles. At Krevelt