mass, and procure a greater front, the divisions should be formed only two deep ; for thus the battalions will be more moveable. The march in front, three deep, is always fa­tiguing to the centre rank, which, being pressed between the first and third, produces fluctuation, and consequent faintness in the onset. In this manner all the desired strength will be produced ; the three grand divisions giving a depth of six ranks, which is more than sufficient ; and the front being one third longer, augments the quantity of fire, if it should become necessary to use it. The enemy like­wise wlll be awed by a display of greater numbers, and the artillery will have less effect than upon more solid masses.

If the proposal of Jomini were applied to the British system of battalion, the same effect would be obtained by fronts of wings of battalion, each three deep. What is said of fluctuation in the march is indeed true ; but the lock-step is never, and cannot be, observed, in a charge or rapid advance to the front in action. The ranks open in those cases sufficiently to allow freedom of step. Firing three deep, though practised at drill, is, in truth, when ap­plied in battle, not more efficient, perhaps less, than in two ranks. If therefore the expedient of forming battalions only in two ranks be resorted to, still the fronts of wings covering each other, and producing only a depth of four men, would be sufficient for troops so eminently qualified for battle as the British. This proposal of Jomini is an avowal of the inefficiency of dense columns, as they are usually formed by the French and other continental armies, in attacks and charges. If that general had been engaged against the British, he would have been still more con­vinced of this. During the late wars, not an instance oc­curred where a hostile *column, au pas de charge,* broke through a British *line.* And the charge at Maida by a brigade of light infantry, at Barossa by the 87th and three companies of the guards, at Vimiera by the 50th, and at Waterloo by the whole line, all in deployed order, two deep only, against lines or columns, demonstrates the error of supposing that a mass of human beings, possessed of in­dividual will and feelings, can be subjected to the laws of mechanical action.

Rogniat, general of engineers, in the dispositions of the legion which he proposes, instead of battalions, contends for three ranks deployed, and the second line in columns, at quarter distance, ready to form squares when required ; but both he and Jomini agree in the unprofitableness of fire from a third rank, in which they only maintain opi­nions that were long ago held by Folard, Saxe, and Lloyd.

Another system may be suggested, which would obviate many inconveniences under which the present labours. The present system of the infantry might be left such as habit, founded on experience, has framed it ; with the ex­ception of arming a third rank with rifled fusils, and spears about ten feet six inches in length : the fusil, when not used, to be slung on the shoulder in the manner of rifle­men ; and the spear with a spike to fix in the ground, and a hook about four and a half feet from the bottom, to serve for a rest in firing.@@1 As light infantry now form nearly one third of the foot in armies, this species of troops should perform all their duties, and be exercised accordingly. When scattered in front, their fire from a rest would be more destructive ; the spear would give them more confi­dence and security against light cavalry. When called back into line, they would give it solidity ; and in a charge, their spears, reaching beyond the bayonets of the first rank, would render it doubly formidable. Being drilled to form in front or rear, they would be the first rank when the bat­talion forms square to resist cavalry. In pursuits, they alone should be let loose upon the enemy. By their insti­tution, every battalion, every detachment, would have its proportion of light infantry. Intrenchments would be more obstinately defended, and breaches more easily stormed. If a rivulet were to be forded, their spears would sound for a passage on a whole line in a moment. On the outposts, three spears and two great-coats would form a tent. The idea is not new, for the Austrian militia in Hungary have a corps (Granitzer Schutzen) thus armed. Should the cui­rassiers in the armies again resume the lance,—an event of some probability, since it is asserted that the Polish lancers of the guard of Napoleon, now in the Russian service, changed their small Ukraine horses for a larger breed about two years ago, with the intention of being converted into cuirassier lancers,—it may be foreseen that the spear will again be resumed in the infantry.

X. On the extensive subject of position we can only give some particulars.

1. The best military positions cannot cover a state mere­ly by being occupied and maintained.

2. Every position has its key or decisive point, as before observed ; but this point is not difficult to find. In a scat­tered line, it is in thc centre ; in a contiguous line, it will be found on that point where the nearest connection lies with the base of operations.

3. When an army occupies a position upon a height, or any other ground fit for a field of battle, it is important to have the front and flanks most carefully reconnoitred and watched, to prevent the enemy gaining either extremity of the line by a secret movement.

4. But as it is admitted, that to employ strong corps for that purpose, causes a useless waste of force, attracts the attention of the enemy, and does not, after all, secure the army from surprise, it is preferable to place small posts of observation in all the sinuosities of the ground, with orders to communicate with each other and with the army, or the nearest intermediate corps. These two latter rules were demonstrated by the surprise and attack of the Prussian army at Hochkirchen, of Korsakoff at Zürich, and Murat at Tarutina, but especially on the first-mentioned occasion ; for, next to the battle of Leuthen, no instance produces more ample proof of the terrible effects of an army being surprised and taken in flank. The whole mass of Daun’s forces was actually upon both flanks before they were dis­covered.

5. On ground of difficult access, such as vineyards, en­closures, gardens, steep heights, &c. the defensive order of battle should be in lines deployed two deep, covered by swarms of skirmishers. But the corps destined for attacks, and the reserves, are best in columns, formed on their cen­tres, in the manner above described (IX.) ; for the re­serves, being destined to fall upon the enemy at the cri­tical moment, must advance with resolution and rapidity, that is, in column. If however it be desired to awe the enemy by a greater display of forces, the reserve may be deployed until the moment of attack.

6. A superior army should never wait to be attacked, still less wholly deploy into line, if compelled by circum­stances to remain in its post. In this case no more troops should form line than are necessary to check the enemy. The remainder, formed into three or four heavy columns, should be placed ready to strike a decisive blow upon the most important point. A great army wholly deployed can no longer manœuvre with the same facility as columns ; and

@@@1 As these troops would have no bayonet, they might be furnished with pontoneer swords, and saws and hatchets ; both instruments of great utility in securing posts, clearing obstacles, and opening roads, and a thousand other daily warns. It is not meant that they should not have a drill of their own, and modes of formation independent of the battalion ; but merely that, in giving or receiving charges in line *at* square, they should then constitute a third rank.