to render troops not engaged immoveable, is repugnant to the best principles of tactics.

7. An army posted behind villages should cover the front with them, by occupying the enclosures, &c. with some bat­talions of infantry, and the outlets with cannon. The first line should be sufficiently near to sustain and be sustained by them, and also to provide the means of securing the evacuation of the place, in case the enemy should have gained so much ground on other points as to be able to mask them. Villages, being liable to be turned, should not be held by considerable corps of infantry, unless their to­pographical situation should constitute them the key of the position, as was the case at Vimiera. The battle of Blen­heim deserves attention on account of the consequences produced by the neglect of the principles applicable to villages.

8. When an army occupies a position perpendicular to a river, with a wing resting on the border, that wing should not be attacked, because, if the enemy changed front in mass towards the river, the attacking corps might be driven into it. On the contrary, if the onset is directed against the other wing with the principal mass of forces, that chance is in favour of the assailants ; because the wing being turn­ed, the whole line will be pressed towards the stream, and incur the risk of being destroyed. This would have been the case with Hiller’s corps at Wagram, if a prompt retreat had not saved it. Similar would have been the fate of the united French army at Talavera de la Reyna, had they per­sisted in an attack upon the Spaniards ; and they acted with great judgment in directing their efforts solely towards Lord Wellington’s left.

9. In the successful defence of a position, a repulsed at­tack should not be pursued, unless that attack had been de­cisive ; because it might have been combined by the ene­my for the purpose of drawing the defensive force out of its advantageous ground. An untimely pursuit by the Austrian right lost the battle of Prague, and by the Sax­ons that of Kesselsdorff, and again by the Austrian centre that of Jemmappes.

10. Positions may sometimes be so arranged, that although they be scattered, they still possess the faculty of timely reunion. Several are indicated in Frederick’s secret stra­tegical instructions, and one occurs when he besieged Olmutz. Being greatly inferior to the enemy, who menaced him from several quarters, he posted a corps at Littau, while he remained in person with the covering army at Prosnitz ; and in order to connect the two masses at will, a small corps occupied the hill of Hrad, between Namiest and Laskow, to serve as an intermediate point. Orders were given to the corps at Littau, in case of attack, to re­treat towards him, and if a superior attack were made upon the covering army, he would retire towards the other ; but if timely information were received, all were to unite in the position of Gross Jenitz.

11. As it is a maxim to operate against a weak part of the enemy’s line, no position should be attacked upon its strongest point, as the Austrians did at Breslau ; but if the hostile position be prolonged by a detached corps, the principal effort should be directed against it; because, if that be defeated, the main body is turned, and thereby worsted.

12. Armies may sometimes be posted behind a ridge of hills with defensive points upon their summits. These should not be attacked without an exact knowledge of the position behind, and precautions to resist a counter move­ment. The events of Austerlitz and on the Katsbach prove the necessity of this precaution.

13. No position or disposition of attack should be made where the line is intersected perpendicularly by a difficult obstacle, such as a river or morass ; because the enemy may act defensively on one side, and throw his whole mass on the other ; as happened at Dresden, where the left wing of the allies was separated from the main body by the ra­vine of Plauen, and severely handled.

14. When an army remains immoveable in its position, both its flanks are liable to be turned. To obviate such manœuvres, others of a similar character should be opposed to them, as was done at Albuera. These counter-ma­noeuvres are not difficult to execute, because the army turning a flank moves upon the arc, while the opponent takes the chord; consequently he is enabled to move a greater mass in less time, even when both parties are equal in forces. Rosbach, Vimiera, and Salamanca, are decisive examples, where the enemy moved in open day (which it is both difficult and dangerous to do in the night), and thereby rendered the counter-offensive both prompt and de­cisive.

15. There are positions which cannot be turned nor at­tacked obliquely. If the stratagem to draw the enemy out of them does not take effect, a parallel attack with the centre reinforced is likely to be the best adapted to such circumstances. The dispositions of Marlborough at Blen­heim were of this class, and deserve the study of military men.

1. Between two armies equally capable of manoeuvring, the defensive one may form an angle with advantage to se­cure a flank from attack ; but to render this precaution efficacious, the angle alone is not sufficient, because its utility is only momentary ; the mass therefore should change front in the same direction, and present a whole line to the enemy.

2. If the army be sufficiently strong to assume the offen­sive against the assailant, a change of front, which is mere­ly defensive, should be followed as soon as the angle is formed and the enemy checked, by placing the line in co­lumns of divisions to the flank, and prolonging the direc­tion from the position first occupied to gain the hostile flank. Thus taken in front by the angle, and in flank and rear by the new direction, the enemy will be defeated. In fig. 6, A is the army endeavouring to turn the left flank of B, which forms the angle C, and under the protection of this corps prolongs its line in the direction EE, by means of which the extremity of the hostile flank is gained. A can­not well oppose the exe­cution of this movement in the presence of the angle C and of the line E, which, though it be in column, can form in an instant ; hence A must fall back and change front also.

3. An angle to the front of the line or *potence,* such as the Austrians formed at Prague and Kollin, is not so service­able as one thrown back to the rear ; because the enemy can readily outflank its extremity from his position, while that extremity can be sustained but by slow degrees. Thus at Kollin, the Prussian cavalry turned it at the beginning of the action ; and at Eylau, Benningsen repulsed the corps of Davoust on his left, and Ney on his right.

4. If a defensive position has an angle to the rear, the front will be weakened in proportion as that angle be­comes more acute : but if there be a considerable inter­val on the summit, where the two lines should meet, the danger will be still greater ; for if the enemy can esta­blish himself on the point A, it is clear that the two wings, A C and A B, will be enfiladed, and forced to retreat ;