if not rolled up in confusion by an actual charge on either or both of these extremities. This caused the defeat of the Aus­trians at Prague, and of the Prus­sians at Breslau. Fig. 7.

5. If two allied armies or great corps take up positions forming a re-entering angle with a space between them, and some considerable obstacle masks that space, they expose themselves to be attacked and defeated separately : this danger increases with the increase of the distance be­tween them. The corps A D being separated from B E by a wood, lake, or other con­siderable obstacle at G, the enemy F H, being covered by that obstacle, may attack and defeat one before the other can arrive to sustain it. Fig.

8. This principle results from the maxims of interior against exterior lines of operations. Such positions as these were occupied by Prince Henry and Hulsen, at Freyberg and Katzenhausern, with the Tharand forest, and, what was worse (at the distance of more than six leagues), with the Mulde, between them ; yet the army of the empire, su­perior in force, remained three months before them, until Prince Henry moved and defeated it at Freyberg.

1. To insure the success of an attack, properly combined and reinforced on the essential point, it is necessary to re­fuse the weaker wing. This precaution is obvious, not only for the purpose of keeping a weaker part out of reach, but also because reinforcements are readily drawn from it to the point where the effort is making. Thus, instead of ex­posing it to be repulsed by superior forces, there is a real advantage in keeping it reserved to secure the victory. Leuthen affords a proof of the wisdom of such a disposition ; Kollin and Jöegerndorf of the consequences when it is dis­regarded.

2. If it be admitted that the most advantageous attacks are those which emanate from a concentrated effort upon an extremity of the hostile line, it becomes indispensable to gain that extremity by measures which mask the move­ment ; for by neglecting this precaution, the enemy may follow the march of the columns in their endeavours to turn him, present constantly a front, or even anticipate and take them in flank, as happened at Rosbach.

3. The march may be concealed by the darkness of the night, by the conformation of the ground, or by means of a false attack on the front of the enemy. The two last men­tioned arc to be preferred, because night marches are un­certain and even dangerous, slower and always more irre­gular, than those by day. For this purpose it is not neces­sary to march by lines, if the movement be masked by an attack of the advanced guard, while the mass advances to­wards the extremity desired, in columns of battalions at half distances. This will render it difficult to be discovered by the enemy in time to be counteracted.

4. In order to molest a greater space of front, instead of an advanced guard making a regular attack, it is preferable to employ a corps of light troops formed in parties, having points for re-assembling light cavalry, and some artillery to sustain them. This method is sure to distract the enemy’s attention, and keep his whole line in check.

An oblique attack, according to Guibert and the *Journal Topographique,* is a disposition by which a part, or the choice of the forces, is advanced towards the enemy, and

the other kept out of his reach. This definition is not quite correct, as figs. 9, 10, 11, and 12 demonstrate. An army may be out of reach of the enemy, and therefore refused in a line nearly parallel, and strongly reinforced on a wing, without being oblique. (Fig. 9.) It may also be in an in­clined line on the head of the attacks, and form a positive diagonal, without being reinforced (fig. 10); or perpendicular upon a flank, as at Kunersdorff, with a wing reinforced (fig. H) ; or horizontal upon the head of the columns without being oblique. (Fig. 12.) There are several modifications of these four orders (among others fig. 11); as, for example, a perpendicular angle to the front, as formed by the Austrians at Prague, Kollin, and Hochkirchen (fig. 13) ; the angle AC being perpendicular to the army DE, reinforces the right wing of the line AB without being oblique : so also an angle to the rear would reinforce the line without obliquity.

A parallel line, considerably rein­forced upon the most important point, is no doubt good, and even very generally applicable ; for it is conformable to the principle which forms the basis of all ope­rations : but it has several incon­veniences. The weak part of the line, being near the enemy, may be engaged, contrary to the in­tention, and be defeated ; which event would balance and arrest the advan­tages gained on the other wing ; as happen­ed to both armies at Wagram. The rein­forced wing having de­feated its opponent, can­not take it in flank and rear without a considerable move­ment, which would separate it from the other, if already engaged. But admitting the weaker wing not to be en­gaged, the other cannot even then turn the flank without drawing it circularly along the hostile front, which the ene­my must necessarily anticipate by being on the chord of the movement, and consequently give him the advantage of the offensive by reaching the decisive point first with the mass of his forces.

With the oblique order of Frederick, as applied at Leuthen, the effect is quite different ; the extremity of the wing attacked is not only overpowered by a whole line, but the end of that wing is constantly outflanked, and the line turned, without manœuvre, or prolongation of direction, simply by a direct advance of the oblique line. The dis­tance of the divisions which are not intended for the prin­cipal attack, places them out of the danger of being engag­ed by a superior force, and yet sustains the wing in ac­tion. These effects of the open oblique attack, although known, cannot be too often presented to the reflections of military men. They offer, besides, another advantage still more decisive, in bringing the half of the army constantly into action against the extremity, probably of only two bri­gades, of the hostile army, which has no counter-manoeuvre to stop its progress. What troops can stand against such odds, when, besides, they are constantly outflanked and taken