in reverse ? Is it possible that confusion and dismay should not follow in a whole line, whose flank is overthrown, and menaced with total destruction, by the progressive advance in a direction upon the rear ?

Yet such must be the infallible result of an oblique at­tack when once it has reached the flank of the opponent undiscovered, as indicated in the preceding maxims ; and when the lines are rapidly formed, according to the method of Frederick, as will be seen in the observations on marches. Fig. 14 demonstrates the mechanism more clearly. The left wing BC, of the army AC, will receive the fire of the second brigade of the army DKL, while the first brigade, or extreme right, formed in column of divisions, will turn it and decide the first attack with rapidity. The second brigade, in the oblique direction of its march, will soon be seconded by the third ; and when that has passed the ex­tremity, which must constantly recoil before a contiguous front, the fourth brigade opens its fire ; and in this manner, supposing the army DF, KL, arrived at the dotted line HI, the whole will have been engaged in succession with a fourth or a third of the enemy’s line, the battalions of W'hich, being crushed one after another, will be nearly sur­rounded.

This demonstration is sufficient to show the great advan­tage of an open oblique order of attack. It is called open, because the disposition, such as that of Leuthen, was nearly at right angles with the line of the Austrians, and different in every respect from a parallel order. All these advantages arc equally applicable to masses concentrated upon the ex­tremity which it is intended to crush. The army AB, fig. 15, instead of forming two lines, as in the former figure, may draw up the first line only, and keep the second in columns at half distances behind the right, centre, and left, prepared to manœuvre or strike the decisive blow. These columns will be more moveable, and not being intended for the first attack, they will nevertheless cover it against counter-movements of the enemy. The battle of Salamanca offers a memorable lesson of this description, where the troops were concealed by the ground, and then suddenly brought in mass upon the enemy’s left wing. That of the Katsbach, almost the counterpart, was equally grounded upon these principles ; both however with the difference, that the lead of the manœuvres was on the side of the ad­versary. Jomini, habituated to the lively national character of France, lays too much stress on the value of the lead in manœuvres, and therefore does not fully appreciate the powers of well-conducted counter-manœuvres, which the cool firmness of British and German soldiers can develope.

The battle of Leuthen furnishes another maxim equally important, namely, that an army with the flank resting upon an obstacle, such as the great pond of Gohlau, which cover­ed the angle of Nadasti, may still be outflanked by an ob­lique attack. For this purpose, it is only necessary to mask the first brigade of the enemy by the nearest of thc attack­ing corps, and move obliquely with the next, so as to press the principal effort upon the second. For the line being broken, the obstacle is no longer of any use ; and the masked Brigade is even in danger of being taken if not promptly withdrawn. But the manœuvre is not so advantageous as when the flank is still supported and easily turned.

Marches in columns to the front, flank, or rear, which must be followed by deployment or echellon formations, are useful as parts of the elementary tactics ; but never safely applicable near the enemy on a great scale, if they are at all complicated in the construction of the columns, or in the nature of the ground. Guibert devoted seve­ral volumes to their mechanism ; but Tempelhoff alone has described the nature of Frederick’s columns, by means of which his dispositions were executed with so much simpli­city and precision. Although the present system of mov­ing by corps has in a great measure superseded the old method of organization by lines, and consequently rendered the march-manoeuvres, which triumphed at Rosbach, Leu­then, and Zorndorff, less applicable, they are still the best for such corps as are obliged to manœuvre in the presence of the enemy, whether it be to engage in front or to turn his flank.

On examining the mechanism of his columns at Kollin, Leuthen, &c., it will be perceived that his army, having broken into open columns, each line forming one by a mere wheel of divisions, right or left in front, by this method the army could,

1. Execute all the movements united without danger of being attacked in detail, because the columns of lines were at no farther distance than was required for actual engage­ment.

2. The enemy could neither cut them off nor penetrate between them.

3. In taking the direction of the intended line, the army, when moved to the ground, is formed in a few minutes, that is, in the space of time required for the word of command to pass down the column to wheel into line. In this me­thod, the only precaution required was to send an advanced guard to protect the march, and at the same time to keep the enemy in suspense.

4. As the army requires only two or three hundred paces between the columns, and the divisions no more than their respective distances, to form into two lines, the manœuvre is easily executed with precision.

5. The army having reached the flank of the enemy by concealing the movement, as before noticed, and wheeling into line, will not allow the enemy time to form an angle, or to change front ; consequently he will be overpowered in succession along his line.

6. To conclude, if two columns of the length of the line of battle are not immediately desired, or the ground re­quires a modification, four columns may be formed, by doubling up the lines, or by marching by wings, without increasing the difficulty of forming. The four columns being constructed of the two lines doubled, when arrived near the point where they are to form, the second and fourth halt until the first and third have proceeded so far