as to disengage from each other. While halted, they protect the march of the others, and when cleared by them, they follow in their rear, and thus are prepared to wheel into line with them.

If the columns are formed by wings, they will again fall into two lines by a simple change of direction, executed by all the heads of columns of each line at the same time to the right or left, and then leading into the rear of the pre­ceding. But this transition of columns of wings into co­lumns of line should take place at some distance from the enemy. At Leuthen, this manœuvre introduced the bat­tle: fig. 16. A, the advanced guard masking the march of the army in four columns ; B B B B, the heads of the four columns forming the first line ; and C C C C, the heads of the second line (now in rear of the first), all chang­ing direction by a wheel to the right at the same instant, and consequently forming two open columns ready to wheel into line. The advance mean time either halts in position to alarm the enemy on another point, or continues to open the march by preceding and covering it.

It is however evident that these kinds of marches must be made on open ground ; for in countries deeply inter­sected, great movements are impracticable ; and it thus be­comes necessary to arrive by the openings which are known, and engage more or less in columns. By Guibert’s and the regulation systems, the army being broken into several co­lumns, they move with their heads often out of sight of each other at the distance of more than a mile, and yet they are expected to keep their alignments and relative distances. When ordered to form, they either close and deploy, or march by echellons to fit into an exact alignment. All this is evidently impossible before the enemy, who must dis­cover the tedious manœuvre, and have time to act as he pleases while the numerous errors are rectifying ; and if the centre divisions should be chosen for the points of deploy­ment, half the columns must turn their backs upon his fire to perform it. Frederick, during the whole seven years’ war, attempted these movements only twice ; first in a com­bination with Bevern to attack Loudohn, which failed by the premature arrival of one column ; and, secondly, at Tor­gau, which, as far as that manœuvre was concerned, failed also ; for Zieten’s column came too late, and was isolated. At Minden the French manoeuvred in the same manner, and were a great part of the night and the next morning employed in rectifying the errors, which gave Prince Fer­dinand time to arrive. It is true, he moved likewise in columns, but he had previously sent all the generals to reconnoitre their routes and points of formation, and cut openings and fix marks to insure the exact direction. Such precautions surpass even the underhand tricks to help the manœuvres in a camp of instruction ; and the very pre­cautions prove the impossibility of applying them in ordi­nary cases. During the revolutionary wars of France, all the belligerents met with failures from vain endeavours to apply them, notwithstanding that the new organization of corps and the use of swarms of skirmishers greatly facili­tated their execution.

Lehwald’s manœuvre at Jöegerndorf is worthy of notice, as particularly applicable in intersected ground. His in­fantry advanced in a double column from the centre, and formed to right and left without risk of confusion ; the ca­valry moving at some distance, easily took up the align­ment.

Thc order of march on Frederick’s system must how­ever be considered only as a manœuvre, and not to be ap­plied to marches in great operations.

As this order of march is best calculated for attacks against lines, so is it also upon columns in march. An at­tack upon an army while on the march is advantageous, for the same reasons as an attack upon an extremity of a line ; because the army attacked on the heads of its columns is precisely in the same situation, relatively to the enemy, as one assailed in flank. The battle of Rosbach furnishes an illustration. A B, fig. 17, represents the army of the king, C D that of the French. Supposing them both in line, CD would still be attacked perpendicularly, and out­flanked on one of its wings, exactly as it was on the head of its columns. The advan­tage of both these manœu­vres lies in the necessity to which the enemy is reduced of bringing his battalions in succession to the front, while the opponent, acting with vigour, defeats them, one after another, by the superior pressure of his mass, provided its march be onward in an appropriate direction ; horizontally if the column moves perpendicularly, and perpendicularly if the march is horizontal. The object for producing, as nearly as possible, an opposite direction, is to present a whole line to a head of a column, or to an extremity of a line ; because, if both moved in a direction to meet with the heads of their columns, both would be obliged to deploy, and a parallel order would be the consequence, without tactical advantage to either army. In fig. 18, the columns AB meeting those of the ene­my CD in the same order, both, fearing to be attacked, will im­mediately deploy ; A B will therefore form the line FG, and CD the line HI, which gives no advantage to either party.

The battle of Rosbach offers a further illustration. As an angle must necessarily be form­ed when the heads of columns are attacked, to check the first efforts of the enemy, the ad­vanced guard or leading brigade should deploy, while the rest of the army should take a new direction of march, clear of the enemy’s flank, in order to protect the retreat of the advance already engaged, and to gain a station for acting offensively. See fig. 19. If the advanced guard or leading