retreat, if the enemy are in view, and run on the same tack as their leading ship ; but if he is still out of sight, and they have received intelligence of his approach by their frigates on the look-out, they may bear away large, without confin­ing themselves to keep the wind directly off, unless when in the order of retreat. In the second case, it seldom hap­pens that the weather fleet can be forced to an engagement, because it can always stand on that tack which increases its distance from the enemy ; that is, by standing on one tack while the enemy is on the other. The windward fleet must not keep too near the enemy, and must take all pos­sible means of avoiding being abreast of him.

It is often of advantage to double the enemy ; that is, to bring a part of the fleet round upon his van or rear, so as to place him between two fires. This manœuvre also resolves itself into two principal cases ; first, when the enemy is to windward ; secondly, when he is to leeward. In the first case, the lee fleet that attempts to double the enemy should extend itself abreast of him, so that its van or rear may ex­tend beyond his line, in order to overreach him, by tacking in succession, so that the extended part of the line may get up to windward. If this manœuvre be properly executed, it will be impossible for the ships of the weather line long to maintain their stations, for no vessel closely attacked by two others of equal force can long resist.

It is of some consequence to determine whether the at­tempt to double should be made on the van or the rear of the enemy, as on the propriety of adopting the one or the other of these measures may in a great measure depend the issue of the battle. In the present case, it is most easy to double the van of the enemy, because, if they are engag­ed by the ships abreast of them, those which are advanced ahead will be able, by making all sail, to get in the perpen­dicular to the direction of the wind with the van of the enemy, and to tack in succession to gain the wind of them on the other board, thus keeping them to leeward ; and when they are come sufficiently to windward, they are again to go about, in order to keep the two headmost ships of the enemy’s line continually under their fire. If there be two or three ships to tack in succession and gain the wind of the enemy, they may edge down on the van of the weather line at pleasure, keeping themselves a little to the windward of it ; and as that van is already engaged by the other ships abreast on the other side, she must necessarily soon be disabled. If they bear away they must drop upon the line with which they are engaged to leeward, while the ships to windward still continue to cannonade them. If they attempt going about, in order to attack more closely the ships to windward, they will be raked, while in stays, by their opponents to leeward and to windward, who enfi­lading them with whole broadsides, which they cannot re­turn, must complete their disorder. If they make sail, in order to frustrate the design of the ships inclined to double, those with which they are engaged abreast to leeward have only to perform the same manœuvre, and keep them under their fire ; while the others, after having harassed them as much as possible, will do their best to perform the same ma­nœuvre on the succeeding ships.

If any of the ships in the van of the weather line are dis­abled in the masts or yards, they will drop astern, and run foul of the next succeeding ship, and these again on the next astern. Thus the enemy’s order of battle will be broken, while on the other hand the lee line is preserved ; and those ships which have gained the wind of the enemy will, without engaging more ships than they can manage, contribute to increase the confusion.

When the enemy is to leeward, and the weather fleet at­tempts to double, the ships of the weather line must extend their van beyond that of the enemy, and then veer in order to bring the headmost ships of the lee line between two fires. It must not however be concealed, that it is much more dangerous to the ships engaged in this service to attempt doubling a fleet to leeward than to windward, as, if disabled, or separated too far from their own fleet, they cannot so easily extricate themselves and rejoin the fleet.

When one fleet attempts to double another, this latter will of course do all in their power to avoid the impending danger ; and this they will the more readily do, according to their number or their situation. If the fleet thus threat­ened be to windward, one of the methods proposed to avoid being doubled, is to extend the line towards the point threatened, so as to leave a greater space between the ships ; but in doing this there is a risk of having the line broken by the superior enemy. Another method suggested is, for the flag-ships of the windward fleet to oppose themselves to those of the lee line, which is supposed to render several of the enemy’s ships in the intervals of little use ; but one great inconvenience of this manœuvre is, that it leaves the van and rear most exposed to the enemy’s fire, and that the rear division in particular is in great danger of being doubled. To remedy these defects, the largest ships should be placed in the van and rear of each division, and the fleet must regulate its sailing in such a manner that its rear shall never be astern of the rear of the enemy.

When the enemy is to leeward, the weather fleet is to keep astern of the enemy, so that the van of the weather fleet may be opposed to and attack the enemy’s centre. Hence the enemy’s van will become useless for some time ; and should it attempt to tack and double on the weather fleet, much time will be lost in performing that evolution ; and it also runs the risk of being separated by the calm which often happens in the course of an engagement, occa­sioned by the discharge of the guns. A considerable in­terval might also be left between the centre and the van, if necessary precautions be taken to prevent the van from be­ing cut off.

There are several circumstances of importance to be con­sidered in the subject of chasing, *i*. *e.* when one ship or fleet pursues another, called the *chase,* either to bring her or them to action, or to oblige them to surrender.

When a single ship chases another, it is to be presumed in general that one of them is the better sailer, though this is not always the case, and still by proper manoeuvring the chasing ship, or *chaser,* may gain on the chase. In the fol­lowing observations however we shall suppose the chaser to sail faster than the chase. The manœuvres of the chaser will depend on her being to windward or leeward of the chase.

When the chase is to windward, it is evident, that as soon as she perceives a strange ship which she takes for an ene­my, she will haul her wind, in order to prolong the chase, as otherwise her retreat would soon be cut off. The chaser then stands on nearly close hauled, till she has the chase on her beam : she then tacks, and stands on close hauled till the chase is again on her beam, and then retacks. In this manner she continues tacking every time she brings the chase perpendicular to her course on either board ; and by thus manoeuvring, it is certain that the chaser will, by the superiority only of her sailing, join the other in the shortest time. For since the chaser tacks always as soon as the chase is perpendicular to her course, she is then at the shortest distance possible on that board; and since the chaser is supposed to be the faster sailer, these shortest distances will decrease every time the chaser tacks. It is therefore of advantage to the chase to keep constantly on the same course, without losing her time in going about, as tacking cannot be so favourable to her as to her adver­sary, whose sailing is superior. If the captain of the chaser should so little understand his profession as to stand on a long way, and tack in the wake of the chase, the best thing she can do is to heave in stays, and pass to windward of