numerous objections brought against the notion by Sextus Empiricus do we meet with the thought which furnished the nerve of modern scepticism in Hume. The practical result of his scepticism Ænesidemus sought, like the Pyrrhonists, in *αταραξία****.*** He is somewhat strangely said to have combined his scepticism with a revival of the philosophy of Heraclitus ; but the assertion perhaps rests, as Zeller contends, on a confusion. To Agrippa is attri­buted the reduction of the sceptical tropes to five. Of these, the first is based on the discrepancy of human opinions ; the second on the fact that every proof itself requires to be proved, which implies a *regressus in infini­tum ;* the third on the relativity of our knowledge, which varies according to the constitution of the percipient and the circumstances in which he perceives. The fourth is really a completion of the second, and forbids the assump­tion of unproven propositions as the premises of an argu­ment. It is aimed at the dogmatists, who, in order to avoid the *regressus in infinitum,* set out from some principle illegitimately assumed. The fifth seeks to show that reasoning is essentially of the nature of a *circulus in pro­bando,* inasmuch as the principle adduced in proof requires itself to be supported by that which it is called in to prove. The attack made in several of these five tropes upon the possibility of demonstration marks this enumeration as distinctly superior to the first, which consists in the main of arguments derived from the fallibility of the senses. The new point of view is maintained in the two tropes which were the result of a further attempt at generaliza­tion. Nothing is self-evident, says the first of these tropes, for, if all things were certain of themselves, men would not differ as they do. Nor can anything be made certain by proof, says the second, because we must either arrive in the process at something self-evident, which is impossible, as has just been said, or we must involve ourselves in an endless regress.

When we review the history of ancient thought, we find, as Zeller puts it, that “the general result of all sceptical inquiries lies in the proposition that every asser­tion may be opposed by another, and every reason by reasons equally strong—in the *ίσοσθϵveιa των λόγων.* Or, as the same thing may be expressed, what all sceptical proofs come back to is the relativity of all our ideas. We can never know the nature of things as they are, but always only the manner in which they appear to us. The criterion of the sceptic is the appearance. Not even his own proof can claim truth and universal validity : he does not assert; he only seeks to relate how a thing strikes him at the present moment. And even when he expresses his doubts in the form of universal statements they are intended to be included in the general uncertainty of knowledge ” *(Phil. d. Griechen,* iii. 2, p. 58). Both Zeller and Hegel, it may be added, remark upon the difference between the calm of ancient scepticism and the perturbed state of mind evinced by many modern sceptics. Universal doubt was the instrument which the sceptics of antiquity recommended for the attainment of complete peace of mind ; rest and satisfaction can be attained, they say, in no other way. By the moderns, on the other hand, doubt is portrayed, for the most part, as a state of unrest and painful yearning. Even Hume, in various noteworthy passages of his *Treatise,* speaks of himself as recovering cheerfulness and mental tone only by forgetful­ness of his own arguments. His state of universal doubt, so far from being painted as a desirable goal, is described by him as a “ malady ” or as “ philosophical melancholy and delirium.” The difference might easily be interpreted either as a sign of sentimental weakness on the part of the moderns or as a proof of the limitation of the ancient sceptics which rendered them more easily satisfied in the

absence of truth. It seems to prove, at all events, that the ancient sceptics were more thoroughly convinced than their modern successors of the reasonableness of their own attitude. But whether the ancients were the better or the worse sceptics on that account is a nice question which need not be decided here. It may be doubted, however, whether the thoroughgoing philosophical scepti­cism of antiquity has any exact parallel in modern times, with the single exception possibly of Hume’s *Treatise on Human Nature.* It is true we find many thinkers who deny the competency of reason when it ventures in any way beyond the sphere of experience, and such men are not unfrequently called sceptics. This is the sense in which Kant often uses the term, and the usage is adopted by others,—for example, in the following definition from Ueberweg’s *History of Philosophy* :—“ The principle of scepticism is universal doubt, or at least doubt with regard to the validity of all judgments respecting that which lies beyond the range of experience.” The last characteristic, however, is not enough to constitute scepticism, in the sense in which it is exemplified in the ancient sceptics. Scepticism, to be complete, must hold that even within experience we do not rationally conclude but are irration­ally induced to believe. “ In all the incidents of life,” as Hume puts it, “ we ought still to preserve our scepticism. If we believe that fire warms, or water refreshes, 'tis only because it costs us too much pains to think otherwise ” *(Treatise,* bk. i. iv. 7). This tone, which fairly represents the attitude of ancient sceptics, is rare among the moderns, at least among those who are professed philosophers. It is more easily matched in the unsystematic utterances of a man of the world like Montaigne.

One form of scepticism, however, may be claimed as an exclusively modern growth, namely, philosophical scepticism in the interests of theological faith. These sceptics are primarily Apologists. Their scepticism is not “ de bonne foy ” ; it is simply a means to the attainment of a further end. They find that the dogmas of their church have often been attacked in the name of reason, and it may be that some of the objections urged have proved hard to rebut. Accordingly, in an access of pious rage, as it were, they turn upon reason to rend her. They deny her claim to pronounce upon such matters ; they go further, and dispute her prerogative altogether. They endeavour to show that she is in contradiction with her­self, even on matters non-theological, and that everywhere this much vaunted reason of man (la superbe raison) is the creature of custom and circumstance. Thus the “im­becility ” of reason becomes their warrant for the reception by another organ—by faith—of that to which reason had raised objections. The Greeks had no temptation to divide man in two in this fashion. When they were sceptics, their scepticism had no ulterior motives ; it was an end in itself. But this line of argument was latent in Christian thought from the time when St Paul spoke of the “foolishness” of preaching. Tertullian fiercely re-echoed the sentiment in his polemic against the philo­sophers of antiquity :—“ Crucifixus est Dei filius ; non pudet, quia pudendum est, Et mortuus est Dei filius; prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est. Et sepultus resurrexit ; certum est, quia impossibile est.” But, as Christianity became firmly established, Christian writers @@1 became more tolerant of speculation ; and, instead of

@@@1 This turn of thought is not confined, however, to Christian thinkers; it appears also in the Arabian philosophy of the East. Al- Ghazzálí (Algazel) (1059-1111) in his *Tah&fot al- Filásifa* (“The Collapse of the Philosophers ”) is the advocate of complete philo­sophical scepticism in the interests of orthodox Mohammedanism—an orthodoxy which passed, however, in his own case into a species of mysticism. He did his work of destruction so thoroughly that Arabian philosophy died out after his time in the land of its birth.