of the individual forms, was individualized and present *secundum totam suam quantitatem* in each individual. But if *homo* is wholly and essentially present in Socrates, then it is, as it were, absorbed in Socrates ; where Socrates is not, it cannot be, consequently not in Plato and the other *individua hominis.* This was called the argument of the *homo Socraticus* ; and it appears to have been with the view of obviating such time and space difficulties, emphasized in the criticism of Abelard, that William latterly modified his form of expression. But his second position is enveloped in considerable obscurity. Abelard says, “Sic autem correxit sententiam, ut deinceps rem eamdem non essentialiter sed individualiter diceret.” In other words, he merely sought to avoid the awkward con­sequences of his own doctrine by substituting “ individualiter ” for “essentialiter ” in his definition. If we are to put a sense upon this new expression, William may pro­bably have meant to recall any words of his which seemed, by locating the universal in the entirety of its essence in each individual to confer upon the individual an inde­pendence which did not belong to it—thus leading in the end to the demand for a separate universal for each individual. In opposition to this Nominalistic view, which implied the reversal of his whole position, William may have meant to say that, instead of the universal being multiplied, it is rather the individuals which are reduced to unity in the universal. The species is essentially one, but it takes on individual varieties or accidents. If, however, we are more ill-natured, we may regard the phrase, with Prantl, as simply a meaningless makeshift in extremities ; and if so, Abelard’s account of the subse­quent decline of William’s reputation would be explained. But there is in some of the manuscripts the various read­ing of “ indifferenter ” for “ individualiter,” and this is accepted as giving the true sense of the passage by Cousin and Rémusat (Hauréau and Prantl taking, on different grounds, the opposite view). According to this reading, William sought to rectify his position by assert­ing, not the numerical identity of the universal in each individual, but rather its sameness in the sense of indis­tinguishable similarity. Ueberweg cites a passage from his theological works which apparently bears out this view, for William there expressly distinguishes the two senses of the word “same.” Peter and Paul, he says, are the same in so far as they are both men, although the humanity of each is, strictly speaking, not identical but similar. In the Persons of the Trinity, on the other hand, the relation is one of absolute identity.

Whether this view is to be traced to William or not, it is certain that the theory of “indifference” or “non­difference ” *(indifferentia)* was a favourite solution in the Realistic schools soon after his time. The inherent diffi­culties of Realism, brought to light by the explicit state­ment of the doctrine and by the criticism of Abelard, led to a variety of attempts to reach a more satisfactory formula. John of Salisbury, in his account of the con­troversies of these days *(Metalogicus,* ii. 17) reckons up nine different views which were held on the question of the universale, and the list is extended by Prantl (ii. 118) to thirteen. In this list are included of course all shades of opinion, from extreme Nominalism to extreme Realism. The doctrine of indifference as it appears in later writers certainly tends, as Prantl points out, towards Nominalism, inasmuch as it gives up the substantiality of the universale. The universal consists of the non-different elements or attributes in the separate individuals, which alone exist substantially. If we restrict attention to these non-different elements, the individual becomes for us the species, the genus, &c.; everything depends on the point of view from which we regard it. “ Nihil omnino est praeter

individuum, sed et illud aliter et aliter attentum species et genus et generalissimum est.” Adelard of Bath (whose treatise *De Eodem et Diverso* must have been written between 1105 and 1117) was probably the author or at all events the elaborator of this doctrine, and he sought by its means to effect a reconciliation between Plato and Aristotle :—“ Since that which we see is at once genus and species and individual, Aristotle rightly insisted that the universals do not exist except in the things of sense. But, since those universale, so far as they are called genera and species, cannot be perceived by any one in their purity without the admixture of imagination, Plato main­tained that they existed and could be beheld beyond the things of sense, to wit, in the divine mind. Thus these men, although in words they seem opposed, yet held in reality the same opinion.” Prantl distinguishes from the system of indifference the “status” doctrine attributed by John of Salisbury to Walter of Mortagne *(ob.* 1174), according to which the universal is essentially united to the individual, which may be looked upon, *e.g.,* as Plato, man, animal, &c., according to the “ status ” or point of view which we assume. But this seems only a different expression for the same position, and the same may doubt­less be said of the theory which employed the outlandish word “maneries” (Fr. *manière)* to signify that genera and species represented the different ways in which individuals might be regarded. The concessions to Nominalism which such views embody make them representative of what Hauréau calls “ the Peripatetic section of the Realistic school.”

Somewhat apart from current controversies stood the teaching of the school of Chartres, humanistically nourished on the study of the ancients. Bernard of Chartres *(ob.* 1167), called by John of Salisbury “ perfectissimus inter Platonicos seculi nostri,” taught at Chartres in the begin­ning of the 12th century, when William was still lectur­ing at St Victor. He endeavoured, according to John of Salisbury, to reconcile Plato and Aristotle; but his doctrine is almost wholly derived from the former through St Augustine and the commentary of Chalcidius. The *universalia in re* have little place in his thoughts, which are directed by preference to the eternal exemplars as they exist in the supersensible world of the divine thought. His *Megacosmus* and *Microcosmus* are little more than a poetic gloss upon the *Timaeus.* William of Conches, a pupil of Bernard’s, was more eclectic in his views, and, devoting himself to psychological and physiological ques­tions, was of less importance for the specific logico-meta- physical problem. But Gilbert de la Porrée (Gilbertus Porretanus, or, from his birthplace, Poitiers, also called Pictaviensis, 1075-1154), who was also a pupil of Bernard’s, and who was afterwards for about twenty years chancellor of the cathedral of Chartres before he proceeded to lecture in Paris, is called by Hauréau the most eminent logician of the Realistic school in the 12th century and the most profound metaphysician of either school. The views which he expressed in his commentary on the pseudo-Boetian treatise, *De Trinitate,* are certainly much more important than the mediatizing systems already referred to. The most interesting part of the work is the distinction which Gilbert draws between the manner of existence of genera and species and of substances proper. He distinguishes between the *quod est* and the *quo est.* Genera and species certainly exist, but they do not exist in their own right as substances. What exists as a sub­stance and the basis of qualities or forms *(quod est)* may be said *substare* ; the forms on the other hand by which such an individual substance exists qualitatively *(quo est) subsistunt,* though it cannot be said that they *substant.* The intellect collects the universal, which exists but not