Abelard’s application of dialectic to theology betrayed the Nominalistic basis of his doctrine. He zealously combated the Tritheism of Roscellinus, but his own views on the Trinity were condemned by two councils (at Soissons in 1121 and at Sens in 1140). Of the alterna­tives—three Gods or *una res—*which his Nominalistic logic presented to Roscellinus, Roscellinus had chosen the first; Abelard recoiled to the other extreme, reducing the three Persons to three aspects or attributes of the Divine Being (Power, Wisdom, and Love). For this he was called to account by Bernard of Clairvaux (1091-1153), the recognized guardian of orthodoxy in France. Bernard declared that he “ savoured of Arius when he spoke of the Trinity, of Pelagius when he spoke of grace, and of Nestorius when he spoke of the person of Christ.” “ While he laboured to prove Plato a Christian, he showed himself a heathen.” Nor can it be said that the instinct of the saint was altogether at fault. The germs of Rational­ism were unquestionably present in several of Abelard’s opinions, and still more so, the traditionalists must have thought, in his general attitude towards theological questions. “ A doctrine is believed,” he said, “ not because God has said it, but because we are convinced by reason that it is so.” “ Doubt is the road to inquiry, and by inquiry we perceive the truth.” (“ Dubitando enim ad inquisitionem venimus, inquirendo veritatem percipimus.”) The application of dialectic to theology was not new. Anselm had made an elaborate employment of reason in the interest of faith, but the spirit of pious subordination which had marked the demonstrations of Anselm seemed wanting in the argumentations of this bolder and more restless spirit ; and the church, or at least an influential section of it, took alarm at the encroachments of Rational­ism. Abelard’s remarkable compilation *Sic et Non* was not calculated to allay their suspicions. In bringing together the conflicting opinions of the fathers on all the chief points of Christian dogmatics, it may be admitted that Abelard’s aim was simply to make these contradic­tions the starting point of an inquiry which should deter­mine in each case the true position and *via media* of Christian theology. Only such a determination could enable the doctrines to be summarily presented as a system of thought. The book was undoubtedly the precursor of the famous *Books of Sentences* of Abelard’s own pupil Peter Lombard and others, and of all the *Summae Theologiae* with which the church was presently to abound. But the anti­nomies, as they appeared in Abelard’s treatise, without their solutions, could not but seem to insinuate a deep-laid scepticism with regard to authority. And even the pro­posal to apply the unaided reason to solve questions which had divided the fathers must have been resented by the more rigid churchmen as the rash intrusion of an over-confident Rationalism.

Realism was in the beginning of the 12th century the dominant doctrine and the doctrine of the church ; the Nominalists were the innovators and the especial repre­sentatives of the Rationalistic tendency. In order to see the difference in this respect between the schools we have only to compare the peaceful and fortunate life of William of Champeaux (who enjoyed the friendship of St Bernard) with the agitated and persecuted existence of Roscellinus and, in a somewhat less degree, of Abelard. But now the greater boldness of the dialecticians awakened a spirit of general distrust in the exercise of reason on sacred subjects, and we find even a Realist like Gilbert de la Porrée arraigned by Bernard and his friends before a general council on a charge of heresy (at Rheims, 1148). Though Gilbert was acquitted, the fact of his being brought to trial illustrates the growing spirit of suspicion. Those heresy-hunts show us the worst side of St Bernard,

yet they are in a way just the obverse of his deep mystical piety. This is the judgment of Otto of Freising, a con­temporary :—“ He was, from the fervour of his Christian religion, as jealous as, from his habitual meekness, he was in some measure credulous ; so that he held in abhorrence those who trusted in the wisdom of this world and were too much attached to human reasonings, and if anything alien from the Christian faith were said to him in reference to them he readily gave ear to it.” The same attitude is maintained by the mystical school of St Victor. Hugo of St Victor (1097-1141) declares that “the uncor­rupted truth of things cannot be discovered by reason­ing.” The perils of dialectic are manifold, especially in the overbold spirit it engenders. Nevertheless Hugo, by the composition of his *Summa Sententiarum,* endeavoured to give a methodical or rational presentation of the con­tent of faith, and was thus the first of the so-called Summists. Richard of St Victor, prior of the monastery from 1162 to 1173, is still more absorbed in mysticism, and his successor Walter loses his temper altogether in abuse of the dialecticians and the Summists alike. The Summists have as much to say against the existence of God as for it, and the dialecticians, having gone to school to the pagans, have forgotten over Aristotle the way of salvation. Abelard, Peter Lombard, Gilbert de la Porrée, and Peter of Poitiers he calls the “four labyrinths of France.”

This anger and contempt may have been partly justified by the discreditable state into which the study of logic had fallen. The speculative impulse was exhausted which marks the end of the 11th and the first half of the 12th century,—a period more original and more interesting in many ways than the great age of Scholasticism in the 13th century. By the middle of the century, logical studies had lost to a great extent their real interest and application, and had degenerated into trivial displays of ingenuity. On the other hand, the Summists @@1 occupied themselves merely in the systematizing of authorities. The mystics held aloof from both, and devoted themselves to the practical work of preaching and edification. The intellect of the age thus no longer exhibited itself as a unity ; disintegration had set in. And it is significant of this that the ablest and most cultured representative of the second half of the century was rather an historian of opinion than himself a philosopher or theologian. John of Salisbury (Johannes Sarisberiensis) was educated in France in the years 1136-48—in Paris under Abelard (who had then returned to Paris, and was lecturing at St Geneviève) and Robert of Melun, at Chartres under William of Conches, then again in Paris under Gilbert de la Porrée and Robert Pulleyn. The autobiographical account of these years contained in his *Metalogicus* is of the utmost value as a picture of the schools of the time ; it is also one of the historian’s chief sources as a record of the many-coloured logical views of the period. John was a man of affairs, secretary to three successive archbishops of Canterbury, of whom Becket was one. He died in 1180 as bishop of Chartres. When a pupil there, he had imbibed to the full the love of class­ical learning which was traditional in the school. An ardent admirer of Cicero, he was himself the master of an elegant Latin style, and in his works he often appears

@@@1 Among these may be mentioned Robert Pulleyn (*ob*. 1150), Peter Lombard (*ob*. 1164), called the *Magister Sententiarum,* whose work became the text-book of the schools, and remained so for cen­turies. Hundreds of commentaries were written upon it. Peter of Poitiers, the pupil of Peter the Lombard, flourished about 1160-70. Other names are Robert of Melun, Hugo of Amiens, Stephen Langton, and William of Auxerre. More important is Alain de Lille (Alanus de Insulis), who died at an advanced age in 1203. His *De Arte seu de Articulis Catholicae Fidei* is a *Summa* of Christian theology, but with a greater infusion than usual of philosophical reasoning. Alanus was acquainted with the celebrated *Liber de Causis.*