at the Sorbonne ; and through Humbert, abbot of Prulli, the doctrine won admission to the Cistercian order. Among the disciples of Duns Scotus are mentioned John of Bas- solis, Franciscus de Mayronis *(ob.* 1327), Antonius Andreæ *(ob. c.* 1320), John Dumbleton and Walter Burleigh (1275-1357) of Oxford, Nicolaus of Lyra, Peter of Aquila, and others. Henry Goethals or Henry of Ghent (Henricus Gandavensis, 1217-93), surnamed *Doctor Solennis,* occupied on the whole an independent and pre-Thomist position, leaning to an Augustinian Platonism. Gerard of Bologna *(ob.* 1317) and Raoul of Brittany are rather to be ranked with the Thomists. So also is Petrus Hispanus (died 1277 as Pope John XXI.), who is chiefly important, however, as the author of the much-used manual *Sum­mulae Logicαles,* in which the logic of the schools was expanded by the incorporation of fresh matter of a semi- grammatical character. Petrus Hispanus had predecessors, however, in William of Shyreswood (died 1249 as chan­cellor of Lincoln) and Lambert of Auxerre, and it has been hotly disputed whether the whole of the additions are not originally due to the Byzantine *Synopsis* of Psellus. By far the greatest disciple of Aquinas is Dante Alighieri, in whose *Dinina Commedia* the theology and philosophy of the Middle Ages, as fixed by Saint Thomas, have received the immortality which poetry alone can bestow. Two names stand apart from the others of the century— Raymond Lully (1234-1315) and Roger Bacon (1214— 94). The *Ars Magna* of the former professed by means of a species of logical machine to give a rigid demonstration of all the fundamental Christian doctrines, and was intended by its author as an unfailing instrument for the conversion of the Saracens and heathen. Roger Bacon was rather a pioneer of modern science than a Scholastic, and persecution and imprisonment were the penalty of his opposition to the spirit of his time.

The last stage of Scholasticism preceding its dissolution is marked by the revival of Nominalism in a militant form. This doctrine is already to be found in Petrus Aureolus *(ob.* 1321), a Franciscan trained in the Scotist doctrine, and in William Durand of St Pourçain *(ob.* 1332), a Dominican who passed over from Thomism to his later position. But the name with which the Nominal­ism of the 14th century is historically associated is that of the “Invincible Doctor,” William of Occam *(ob.* 1347),

who, as the author of a doctrine which came to be almost universally accepted, received from his followers the title *Venerabilis Inceptor.* The hypostatizing of abstractions is the error against which Occam is continually fighting. His constantly recurring maxim—known as Occam’s razor —is *Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.* The Realists, he considers, have greatly sinned against this maxim in their theory of a real universal or common element in all the individuals of a class. From one abstraction they are led to another, to solve the difficul­ties which are created by the realization of the first. Thus the great problem for the Realists is how to derive the individual from the universal. But the whole inquiry moves in a world of unrealities. Everything that exists, by the mere fact of its existence, is individual *(Quaelibet res, eo ipso quod est, est haec res).* It is absurd therefore to seek for a cause of the individuality of the thing other than the cause of the thing itself. The individual is the only reality, whether the question be of an individual thing in the external world or an individual state in the world of mind. It is not the individual which needs explanation but the universal. Occam reproaches the “ modern Platonists ” for perverting the Aristotelian doctrine by these speculations, and claims the authority of Aristotle for his own Nominalistic doctrine. The uni­versal is not anything really existing ; it is a *terminus* or

predicable (whence the followers of Occam were at first called Terminists). It is no more than a “ mental con­cept signifying univocally several singulars.” It is a natural sign representing these singulars, but it has no reality beyond that of the mental act by which it is pro­duced and that of the singulars of which it is predicated. As regards the existence (if we may so speak) of the uni­versal *in mente,* Occam indicates his preference, on the ground of simplicity, for the view which identifies the concept with the *actus intelligendi* (“une modalité pas­sagère de l’âme,” as Hauréau expresses it), rather than for that which treats ideas as distinct entities within the mind. And in a similar spirit he explains the *universalia ante rem* as being, not substantial existences in God, but simply God’s knowledge of things—a knowledge which is not of universals but of singulars, since these alone exist *realiter.* Such a doctrine, in the stress it lays upon the singular, the object of immediate perception, is evidently inspired by a spirit differing widely even from the moderate Realism of Thomas. It is a spirit which dis­trusts abstractions, which makes for direct observation, for inductive research. Occam, who is still a Scholastic, gives us the Scholastic justification of the spirit which had already taken hold upon Roger Bacon, and which was to enter upon its rights in the 15th and 16th centuries. Moreover, there is no denying that the new Nominalism not only represents the love of reality and the spirit of induction, but also contains in itself the germs of that empiricism and sensualism so frequently associated with the former tendencies. St Thomas had regarded the knowledge of the universal as an intellectual activity which might even be advanced in proof of the immortality of the soul. Occam, on the other hand, maintains in the spirit of Hobbes that the act of abstraction does not pre­suppose any activity of the understanding or will, but is a spontaneous secondary process by which the first act (perception) or the state it leaves behind *(habitus derelictus ex primo actu =* Hobbes’s “decaying sense”) is naturally followed, as soon as two or more similar representations are present.

In another way also Occam heralds the dissolution of Scholasticism. The union of philosophy and theology is the mark of the Middle Ages, but in Occam their sever­ance is complete. A pupil of Scotus, he carried his master’s criticism farther, and denied that any theological doctrines were rationally demonstrable. Even the exist­ence and unity of God were to be accepted as articles of faith. The *Centiloquium Theologicum,* which is devoted to this negative criticism and to showing the irrational consequences of many of the chief doctrines of the church, has often been cited as an example of thoroughgoing scepticism under a mask of solemn irony. But if that were so, it would still remain doubtful, as Erdmann remarks, whether the irony is directed against the church or against reason. On the whole, there is no reason to doubt Occam’s honest adhesion to each of the two guides whose contrariety he laboured to display. None the less is the position in itself an untenable one and the parent of scepticism. The principle of the twofold nature of truth @@1 thus embodied in Occam’s system was unquestionably adopted by many merely to cloak their theological unbelief ; and, as has been said, it is significant of the internal dis­solution of Scholasticism. Occam denied the title of a science to theology, emphasizing, like Scotus, its practical character. He also followed his master in laying stress on the arbitrary will of God as the foundation of morality.

@@@1 This principle appeared occasionally at an earlier date, for exam­ple in Simon of Tournay about 1200. It was expressly censured by Pope John XXI. in 1276. But only in the period following Occam did it become a current doctrine.