the Old Academy contended (*μετριοπάθεια*). Further, it explains the incessant war which the later Stoics waged with imagination.

The end of action has then been explained to be a con­sistent life, a rational life, and, lastly, a life according to nature. Now the Cynics had already traced back con­sistency to a certain Herculean strength or force of will, which again is an effect of the bracing or tension of the soul’s substance, so that this ever-recurring attribute is as available to explain will as intelligence. Herein we discover, as it were, an internal source of the external harmony and regularity of a consistent life. Our will should be directed to this source rather than to its manifestations,—to “right” *(i.e.,* inflexible and straight) “reason,” which has attained a character of intense rigidity, an intensive energy raised to an impassable degree. For this infallible firmness of the reason the technical term is *δίὰεσις*, a “ disposition ” which, like straightness or crookedness in a line, admits of no degrees of less or more ; thence comes harmony, regularity, and consistency in all our acts, which alone is truly beautiful *(καλόν =* fair or noble ; for which the Romans characteristically said *honestum =* honourable). Not even Christianity laid more stress upon inwardness, or taught more explicitly that motive counts for every­thing and external performance for very little. Once let the reason become “ right ” and it imparts this same character to all that it affects. First the soul is made strong, healthy, beautiful ; when, therefore, it thus fulfils all the conditions of its being, it is absolutely perfect. Now the perfection of anything is called its virtue ; the virtue of man, then, is the perfection of his soul, *ue.,* of the ruling part or rational soul. But “ out of the heart are the issues of life make the soul perfect and you make the life perfect. From such a “ disposition ” must proceed a life which flows on smoothly and uniformly, like a gentle river (*εΰροια* *βίου).* No longer is there anything to hope or fear ; this harmonious accord between impulses and acts is itself man’s wellbeing or welfare (*ευδαιμonα*). Cleanthes scouts the notion of adding to such perfection that occasional result of a decaying activity entitled pleasure ; Chrysippus remonstrates indignantly with Plato for appealing to the “ moral bugbears ” of future rewards or punishments. There is no “ wages of virtue,” not even the continuance of her activity ; for lapse of time can add nothing to perfect wellbeing ; it is complete, whole, and indivisible now.

Virtue, then, as right reason, is at once knowledge and strength of will ; for a right comprehension of Stoic psychology shows that these two are identical. The unity of all virtue is sufficiently apparent, but the Stoics also acknowledged a plurality of specific virtues grouped round the four cardinal virtues of Plato. Wisdom *(φρόνησις)* was, according to Zeno and Cleanthes, the common element ; according to Aristo, it should rather be termed know­ledge *(όπιστήμη);* and this view was adopted in the school to avoid the awkwardness of using the same term *(φρόνησις)* both for a special virtue and for the generic attribute of them all. Wisdom or knowledge in distributing to others is justice, in endeavour it is temperance, in endurance it is courage or fortitude ; but in every virtuous act all four of the virtues are implicit. Virtue is thus the unconditional good ; it is at once the absolute end and the means to the end.

Goodness must be interpreted, as Socrates used to interpret it, that which furnishes some advantage or true utility ; its opposite, evil, as that which produces harm or disadvantage. Obviously only virtue, and that which comes from virtue, confers any real advantage; only vice can really do harm. Goodness is a wider genus than virtue ; all virtue is good, but not all goods are virtues. There are goods of soul, such as habits and happy aptitudes which may be acquired in varying degrees (i.e., they are *εξεις*, not *διαθέσεις)* ; others are only single actions *(εvε'pγειαι).* A friend again may be a means to good *(ποιητικόν τέλους).* All these goods are utilities *(ωφελήματα),* and therefore deserve to be sought *(αιρετά).* Similarly evils may be classified as—(1) vices, settled dispositions contrary to right reason, proceeding from that ignorance which infallibly attends on a slackening of the soul’s fibre; (2)

evil habits or inclinations *(ευκaτaφopιaι)* ; (3) isolated vicious actions. All these evils alike are to be shunned *(φευκτά)* ; all alike are harmful *(βλάμματα)* ; the moral responsibility rests with the individual, in so far as he is ignorant or has his soul relaxed.

Good and evil, however, is not an exhaustive classifica­tion. There is a large class of things which are neither the one nor the other ; which do not conduce to our attainment of the end, nor hinder us therefrom ; which are neither to be pursued nor shunned, but are simply in­different (*αδιάφορα*). To all these objects the attitude of the Cynics was complete indifference, wherein they were followed by Aristo ; that of the sceptics professedly utter insensibility. Now the most original feature of the Stoic ethics is the classification of things indifferent and their arrangement in a certain scale in accordance with the value, positive or negative (*άξία*, *παια*), to be assigned to them either intrinsically or in certain circumstances (*κατά* *περίσταση*). Some objects are so unimportant that in regard to them Aristo’s attitude of complete indiffer­ence is justified. Placing them at the zero point, we may advance in both directions, assigning to all the objects of instinctive natural impulses a positive value, in virtue of which they are to be picked out *(ληπτa)* in preference to other indifferent things not of this description. Thus bodily health, though not a good, is entitled to a certain value ; disease, though not an evil, has a certain negative value. The former class is according to nature, the latter contrary to nature ; the former are instinctively sought by children as tending to maintain their “ constitution ” or nature ; the latter their “ uncorrupted impulses ” (*άδιάστpoψoL άφορμαί)* lead them to shun as tending to mar, cripple, or destroy life. Similarly, actions may be classi­fied : all virtuous actions are right actions *(κατορθώματα) ;* all vicious actions are wrong actions or “ sins ” *(αμαρτή­ματα).* The attainment of any one of the objects in the class of things indifferent, looked at in itself, is neither right nor wrong. But, if the object picked out be that object out of all at the moment present to us which has the highest value, then the action of selecting it admits of being defended on probable grounds, and as such is entitled to be called (quite apart from the agent’s disposi­tion, whether virtuous or vicious), *materialiter,* an act “ meet and fit ” to do *(καθήκον).* Such an act need not be preceded by any reasoning at all ; in the case of the brutes and of children it is always instinctive, yet in all cases it is capable of being justified on grounds of probability (o *πpαχθεv εvλοyοv έχει απολογίαν).* Similarly with the selection of an object which has less value in preference to one of higher value : such a blunder is not, taken in itself, a wrong action, but it violates fitness *(παρά το καθήκον).* Amongst fitting actions, some are always fitting, others only at times, under given circumstances ; some indifferent objects we select for their own sakes, others merely as means. The range of such human functions is wide enough to include the acquisition of information, the exercise of temperance and courage, even altruistic con­duct. And yet some actions in man are on a level with the nutritive functions of the plant (Diog. Laer., vii. 86). Again, our human functions compose our whole conscious life ; even life, then, considered in itself, has in it no moral good ; we may, if need be, under certain circum­stances, voluntarily withdraw from it.

The Stoics maintain that the variety of things indifferent is essential to virtue, because it is the field upon which reason is exercised. Virtue is a body, therefore it is corporeal ; therefore its active principle needs a passive material to act upon. Things indifferent are capable of being put to a good or a bad use, though some lend themselves to use more easily than others. Nor does virtue merely avail itself, now and then, of things indifferent,—it can do nothing else than avail itself of them. Though they are not goods, and though their attainment does not confer wellbeing, yet all virtue is the selection or choice of them. For how is a