peculiarities of the later Stoic ethics are due to the con­dition of the times. In a time of moral corruption and oppressive rule, as the early empire repeatedly became to the privileged classes of Roman society, a general feeling of insecurity led the student of philosophy to seek in it a refuge against the vicissitudes of fortune which he daily beheld. The less any one man could do to interfere in the government, or even to safeguard his own life and prop­erty, the more heavily the common fate pressed upon all, levelling the ordinary distinctions of class and character. Driven inwards upon themselves, they employed their energy in severe self-examination, or they cultivated resig­nation to the will of the universe, and towards their fellow- men forbearance and forgiveness and humility, the virtues of the philanthropic disposition. With Seneca this resig­nation took the form of a constant meditation upon death. Timid by nature, aware of his impending doom, and at times justly dissatisfied with himself, he tries all means of reconciling himself to the idea of suicide. The act had always been accounted allowable in the school, if circum­stances should call for it : indeed, the first three teachers had found such circumstances in the infirmity of old age. But their attitude towards the “ way out ” (*ἐξαγωγη*) of incurable discomforts is quite unlike the anxious senti­mentalism with which Seneca dwells upon death.

From Seneca we turn, not without satisfaction, to men of sterner mould, such as Musonius Rufus, who certainly deserves a place beside his more illustrious disciple, Epictetus. As a teacher he commanded universal respect, and wherever we catch a glimpse of his activity in these perilous times—whether banished by Nero, or excepted from banishment by Vespasian, as the judicial prosecutor of that foul traitor Egnatius Celer, or as thrusting himself between the ranks of Vespasianists and Vitellianists, to preach conciliation on the eve of a battle—he appears to advantage. His philosophy, however, is yet more con­centrated upon practice than Seneca’s, and in ethics he is almost at the position of Aristo. Virtue is the sole end, but virtue may be gained without many doctrines, mainly by habit and training. Epictetus testifies to the powerful hold he acquired upon his pupils, each of whom felt as if Musonius spoke to his heart. Amongst a mass of his practical precepts, we come across an original thought, the famous distinction between “ things in our power,” *i.e.,* our ideas and imaginations, and “ things beyond our power,” *i.e.,* the course of events and external advantages. The practical lesson drawn from it is, that we must school ourselves to accept willingly the inevitable.

In the life and teaching of Epictetus this thought bore abundant fruit. The beautiful character which rose superior to weakness, poverty, and slave’s estate is also presented to us in the *Discourses* of his disciple Arrian as a model of religious resignation, of forbearance and love towards our brethren, that is, towards all men, since God is our common father. With him even the “ physical basis ” of ethics takes the form of a religious dogma,—the providence of God and the perfection of the world. We learn that he regards the *δαιμωv* or “ guardian angel ” as the divine part in each man ; sometimes it is more nearly conscience, at other times reason. His ethics, too, has a religious character. He begins with human weakness and man’s need of God : whoso would become good must first be convinced that he is evil. Submission is enforced by an argument which almost amounts to a retractation of the difference between things natural and things contrary to nature, as understood by Zeno. Would you be cut off from the universe? he asks. Go to, grow healthy and rich. But if not, if you are a part of it, then become resigned to your lot. Towards this goal of approximation to Cynicism the later Stoics had all along been tending.

Withdrawal from the active duty of the world must lead to passive endurance, and, ere long, complete indifference. Musonius had recommended marriage and condemned unsparingly the exposure of infants. Epictetus, however, would have the sage hold aloof from domestic cares, another Cynic trait. So, too, in his great maxim “bear and *forbear*," the last is a command to refrain from the external advantages which nature offers.

Epictetus is marked out amongst Stoics by his renuncia­tion of the world. He is followed by a Stoic emperor, M. Aurelius Antoninus, who, though in the world, was not of it. The *Meditations* give no systematic exposition of belief, but there are many indications of the religious spirit we have already observed, together with an almost Platonic psychology. Following Epictetus, he speaks of man as a corpse bearing about a soul ; at another time he has a threefold division—(1) body, (2) soul, the seat of impulse (*πvευματιov*), and (3) *vους* or intelligence, the proper *ego.* In all he writes there is a vein of sadness : the flux of all things, the vanity of life, are thoughts which perpetually recur, along with resignation to the will of God and for­bearance towards others, and the religious longing to be rid of the burden and to depart to God. These peculiarities in M. Antoninus may perhaps be explained in harmony with the older Stoic teaching; but, when taken in con­nexion with the rise of Neoplatonism and the revival of superstition, they are certainly significant. None of the ancient systems fell so rapidly as the Stoa. It had just touched the highest point of practical morality, and in a generation after M. Antoninus there is hardly a professor to be named. Its most valuable lessons to the world were preserved in Christianity ; but the grand simplicity of its monism slumbered for fifteen centuries before it was re­vived by Spinoza.

*Literature.—*The best modern authority is Zeller, *Phil. d. Griech.,* iii. pt. i.∙(3d ed., 1880),—Eng. transl. *Stoics,* by Reichel (1879), and *Eclectics,* by S. F. Alleyne (1883). Of the 214 numbers to which the bibliography of Stoicism extends in Ueberweg-Heinze, *Grund­riss der Gesch. der Phil.* (7th ed., 1886), may be cited F. Ravaisson, *Essai sur le Stoicisme,* Paris, 1856 ; M. Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos,* Oldenburg, 1872; H. Siebeck, *Untersuchungen zur Phil. d. Griechen,* Halle, 1873, and *Gesch. d. Psychologie,* i. 2, Gotha, 1884; R. Hirzel, “Die Entwicklung der stoisch. Phil.,” in *Untersuch­ungen zu Ciceros Schriften,* ii. pp. 1-566, Leipsic, 1882 ; Ogereau, *Essai sur le Système des Stoiciens,* Paris, 1885; L. Stein, *Die Psy­chologie der Stoa,* i., Berlin, 1886. (R. D. H.)

STOKE-UPON-TRENT, a market-town and municipal and parliamentary borough of Staffordshire, is situated on the Trent, on the Trent and Mersey Canal, where it unites with the Cauldon Canal, and on the London and North- Western and North Staffordshire railway lines, 2 miles east of Newcastle-under-Lyme, and 15 north of Stafford. It is connected with Burslem and other places by steam tramway. The principal public buildings are the town- hall (1835), with assembly rooms, the new market-hall (1883), the Minton memorial building (1858), containing rooms for art and science classes, the free library and museum (1878), and the North Staffordshire infirmary, founded in 1815 and removed to its present site in 1868. A cemetery 21 acres in extent was laid out in 1883. There are statues of Josiah Wedgewood (1863) and of Colin Minton Campbell (1886). The head offices of the North Staffordshire Railway Company are in the town. Stoke has no antiquarian interest, and owes its importance to the porcelain and earthenware manufactures. It may be regarded as the centre of the “ Potteries ” district. Stoke was created a parliamentary borough in 1832, with two members, but by the Act of 1885 a large part of this went to form the new borough of Hanley. The population of the municipal borough (formed in 1874, with an area of 1660 acres) was 19,261 in 1881 ; the area has since been increased to 1720 acres. The population of the