the capital, and had appointed the archduke Albert to command the whole army. The Army of the North, which had reached Olmütz on the 10th of July, now received orders to move by road and rail towards Vienna, and this operation brought them right across the front of the II. Prussian army. The cavalry established contact on the 15th in the neighbourhood of Tobitschau and Rochetinitz (action of Tobitschau, July 15th), and the Austrians finding their intention discovered, and their men too demoralized by fear of the breech- loader to risk a fresh battle, withdrew their troops and endeavoured to carry out their concentration by a wide circuit down the valley of the Waag and through Pressburg. Meanwhile the Prussian main army was pursuing its advance under very adverse circumstances. Their railway communication ended abruptly at the Austrian frontier; the roads were few and bad, the country sparsely cultivated and inhospitable, and the troops suffered severely. One third of the cavalry broke down on a march of 97 m. in five days, and the infantry, after marching 112 m. in ten days, had to have a two days’ halt accorded them on the 17th. They were then in the district about Brünn and Iglau, and on the 18th the royal headquarters reached Nikolsburg. News had now been received of the arrival of Austrian reinforcements by rail at the capital both from Hungary and Italy, and of the preparation of a strong fine of provisional defences along the Florisdorf position directly in front of Vienna. Orders were therefore issued during the 18th for the whole army to con­centrate during the following days in the position held by the Austrians around Wagram in 1809, and these orders were in process of execution when on the 21st an armistice was agreed upon to commence at noon on the 22nd. The last fight was that of Blumenau near Pressburg on the 22nd; this was broken off at the stated time.

*Langensalza.—*In western Germany the Prussian forces, depleted to the utmost to furnish troops for the Bohemian campaign, were opposed to the armies of Hanover and Bavaria and the 8th Federal corps (the last consisting of Hessians, Württembergers, Badensers and Nassauers with an Austrian division drawn from the neutralized Federal fortresses), which were far superior in number. These minor enemies were, however, unready and their troops were mostly of indifferent quality. Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, which were nearest to Prussia and therefore immediately dangerous, were dealt with promptly and without waiting for the decision in the main theatre of war. The 13th Prussian division (v. Goeben) was at Minden, Manteuffel’s troops from the Elbe duchies at Altona, v. Beyer's division (Federal fortress garrisons) at Wetzlar. On the 15th and 16th of June Beyer moved on Cassel, while the two other Prussian generals converged on Hanover. Both places were in Prussian hands before the 2oth. The Hessians retired upon Hanau to join the 8th Federal corps; only the Hanoverians remained in the north, and they too, threatened by Beyer’s advance, marched from their point of concentration at Gottingen southward for the Main. With proper support from Bavaria the Hanoverians could perhaps have escaped intact ; but the Bavarians considered that their allies (about 20,000) were strong enough by themselves to destroy whichever of the con­verging Prussian columns tried *to* bar their way, and actually the Hanoverian general v. Arentschild won a notable success over the improvised Prussian and Coburg division of General v. Flies, which advanced from Gotha and barred the southward march of the Hanoverians at Langensalza. The battle of Langensalza (June 27th) showed that the risks Mo!tke deliberately accepted when he trans­ferred so many of the western troops to the Bohemian frontier were by no means imaginary, for v. Flies, outnumbered by two to one, sustained a sharp reverse before the other columns closed in. But the strategical object of General Vogel v. Falckenstein, the Prussian commander-in-chief in the west, was achieved next day. By the morn­ing of the 29th Manteuffel and Goeben lay north, v. Flie's column (backed by a fresh brigade) south of Langensalza, and Beyer approached from Eisenach. Whatever had been the prospects of the Hanoverian army five days previously, it was now surrounded by twice its numbers, and on the 29th of June the capitulation of Langensalza closed its long and honourable career.

*The Main Campaign.―* The Prussian army, now called the “ Army of the Mam,” of three divisions (one being unusually strong), had next to deal with the 7th (Bavarians) and 8th (other South Germans) Federal corps in the valley of the Main. These were nominally over 100,000 strong and were commanded by Prince Charles of Bavaria. The *ordre de bataille of* the 8th corps is interesting. It was com­manded by Prince Alexander of Hesse; the 1st division (3 infantry brigades, 1 cavalry brigade, 6 batteries) came from Württemberg; the 2nd division *(2* infantry and 1 cavalry brigades, 5 batteries) from Baden, the least anti-Prussian of all these states; the 3rd division *(2* infantry and 1 cavalry brigades, 1 rifle battalion, 4 batteries) from Hesse-Darmstadt; the 4th division consisted of an Austrian brigade of 7 battalions (three of which were Italians), a Nassau brigade, and two batteries and some hussars of Hesse-Cassel. The remainder of the Hesse-Cassel troops, which had retired southward before Beyer’s advance on Cassel, went to the Rhine valley about Mainz. The centre of the *rayon of* the 8th corps was Darmstadt, and the Bavarian line extended from Coburg to Gemünden. It appears that Prince Charles wished to march via Jena and Gera into Prussia, as Napoleon had done sixty years before, but the scheme was negatived by the Austrian government, which exercised the supreme command of the

allies. The Bavariahs did, however, advance, and made for the Eisenach-Gotha region, where the Prussian-Hanoverian struggle was in progress. Meanwhile the 8th Federal corps advanced also, but actuated probably by political motives it took the general direction of Cassel, and between the two German corps a wide gap opened, of which Vogel v. Falckenstein was not slow to take advantage. On the day of Königgrätz the Prussians moved into position to attack the Bavarians, and on the 4th of July v. Goeben won the victory of Wiesenthal (near Dermbach). The 7th corps thereupon drew back to the Franconian Saale, the 8th to Frankfurt, and on the 7th of July the Prussian army was massed about Fulda between them. Vogel v. Falckenstein moved forward again on the 8th, and on the 10th the Bavarians were again defeated in a series of actions around Kissingen, Waldaschaeh and Hammelburg. Meanwhile Prince Alexander’s motley corps began its advance from Frankfurt up the Main valley to join the Bavarians, who had now retired on Schweinfurt. The army of the Main, however, had little difficulty in defeating the 8th corps at Laufach on the 13th and Aschaffenburg on the 14th of July. The Prussians occupied Frankfurt (16th). Vogel v. Falckenstein was now called to Bohemia, and v. Manteuffel was placed in command of the army of the Main for the final advance. The 7th and 8th corps now at last effected their junction about Würzburg, whither the army of the Main marched from Frankfurt to meet them. The Federals advanced in their turn, the Bavarians on the right, the 8th on the left, and the opponents met in the valley of the Tauber. More partial actions, at Hundheim (23rd), Tauber Bischofsheim (24th),Gerchsheim (25th), Helmstadt (25th) and Rossbrunn (26th) ended in the retreat of the Germans to Würzburg and beyond ; the armistice (Aug. 2nd) then put an end to operations. A Prussian reserve corps under the grand duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, formed at Leipzig, had meanwhile overrun eastern Bavaria up to Nuremberg.

This campaign presents the sharpest contrast to that of Bohemia. Small armies moving freely within a large theatre of war, the occupa- tion of hostile territory as a primary object of operations, the absence of a decision-compelling spirit, on either side, the hostile political “ view ” over-riding the hostile “ feeling ”—all these conditions remind the student of those of 17th and 18th century warfare. But the improved organization, better communications and supplies, superior moral, and once again the breech-loader *versus* a standing target, which caused the Prussian successes, at least give us an opportunity of comparing the old and the new systems under similar conditions, and even thus the principle of the “armed nation” achieved the decision in a period of time which, for the old armies, was wholly insufficient.

The various treaties of Prague, Berlin and Vienna which followed the armistice secured the annexation by Prussia of Hanover, the Elbe duchies, the electorate of Hesse, Nassau and Frankfurt, the dissolution of the existing confederation and the creation of a new North German Confederation under the hegemony of Prussia, and the payment of war indemnities to Prussia (the Austrian share being £6,000,000). Venetia was ceded by Austria to Napoleon III. and by him to King Victor Emmanuel.

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