


**Herd Privacy on Social Networking Sites**

David Masad

George Mason University

## Facebook privacy settings



## Twitter Account Settings

Tweet Privacy ☐ Protect my tweets

Only let people whom I approve follow my tweets.

If this is checked, your future tweets will not be available publicly. Tweets posted previously may still be publicly visible in some places.

- Users expose information on their friends' pages:
  - Comments
  - Photographs
  - The friendships themselves
- Average  $\sim 140$  friends<sup>2</sup> – up to 19,600 friends-of-friends.
- “Share with friends of friends”

Users' privacy depends in part on their friends' privacy.

This is already intuitively understood – sometimes...



Source: <http://www.lamebook.com/smokin-dopes/>



Source: <http://failbook.failblog.org/2011/09/21/funny-facebook-fails-classic-medical-reasons/>

- Real data difficult to obtain.
- Support intuitive understanding with formal analysis.
- Estimate magnitude of effect.
- (Demonstrate modeling approach to SNS)

# Model Description - Overview

- Random network of Users / User Pages, connected by mutual Friendships.
- Users expose personal information on Friend's pages.
- Each user's page is shared with either:
  - Friends only
  - Friends of Friends
- Measure maximum possible information exposed.

# Model Description - Assumptions

- Mutual Friendships.
- Random subset of Friends are 'close friends'
  - Information only exposed on close friends' pages.
- Only 2 privacy options.
- Personal information treated abstractly:
  - $[0,1]$  – *proportion* of personal information exposed.
  - All users expose information uniformly.

SNS represented by an undirected graph:

- Nodes: Users / User Pages
- Edges: Friendships


User Model:

- Exposure vector  **$b$** : Information on self and others exposed.
- Knowledge vector  **$k$** : What information on other users can the user access?
- Privacy: 0 (Closed) or 1 (Open).
  - Chosen randomly with fixed probability.




# Model Description

- Target User (Closed Profile)
- Close Friend (Open Profile)
- Close Friend (Closed Profile)
- # Information Exposed




# Model Description

- Target User (Closed Profile)
- Close Friend (Open Profile)
- Close Friend (Closed Profile)
- # Information Exposed
- # Information Visible



# Model Description



$b_{j,i}$  – The information on user  $i$  exposed on user  $j$ 's page.

$b_{i,i}$  – The information user  $i$  exposes on  $i$ 's page.  
**Constant for all users.**

When  $i$  and  $j$  are close friends:

$$b_{j,i} = \frac{1 - b_{i,i}}{\text{number of } i \text{'s close friends}}$$

Otherwise:  $b_{j,i} = 0$

$k_{j,i}$  – The total of user  $i$ 's personal information that user  $j$  has access to.

$$k_{j,i} = \sum_{n=1}^N b_{n,i} \cdot v_{j,n}$$

$v_{j,n}$  – visibility

$v_{j,n} = 1$  if either:


- $j$  and  $n$  are friends
- $j$  is a friend-of-a-friend of  $n$  AND  $n$ 's privacy is Open.

User  $i$ 's Exposure is mean of  $k_{j,i}$  across all  $j$ .


- # of Nodes: 1,000
- Graph generators
  - Watts-Strogatz (Cluster-heavy)
  - Holme-Kim (Scale-free + clustering)
- Base edge count: 144
- Fraction of close friends: 0.15
- $b_{i,i} = 0.6$

**Parameter sweep over Privacy Mix.**

# Results – Mean Exposure



# Results – Mean Exposure



- Users' own privacy settings have a stronger effect than other users' settings.
- As the proportion of users with Open privacy settings increase, the exposure of **all** users increases.



# Results – Individual Exposure

	Graph Type	
	Watts-Strogatz	Holme-Kim
(Intercept)	-0.383**	-0.124**
Pr(Open)	0.002	0.012*
Open Privacy	0.514**	0.458**
Fraction of Friends w/ Open Privacy	0.340**	0.266**
Closeness	0.977**	0.680**
$R^2$	0.99	0.98

\* – significant at 5% level; \*\* – significant at 0.1% level

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- Exposure is affected strongly by Friends with open privacy settings.
- Overall network Openness is not separately significant.
- Position within the network is important.

Besides their own page settings, user privacy is significantly affected by:


- Friends' privacy settings.
- Position within the network.

**Users have little/no ability to assess or control these factors.**

Besides their own page settings, user privacy is significantly affected by:

- Friends' privacy settings.
- Position within the network.

**Users have little/no ability to assess or control these factors.**



## Friends' Privacy Settings:

- Generally unknown.
- May change with no notice.
- Friends may add additional friends.

## Position within the network:

- Nearly impossible for users to determine.
- Centrality higher among both popular and boundary-spanning users.

Both factors may exacerbate effects of broad changes to SNS policy.

Questions / Comments?