Towards Arms and Influence Networks

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The International Arms Trade

Arms Transfers: A State-to-State Network

- Economic Factors
 - Supply: domestic arms industry
 - Demand: military requirements
 - Treated here as exogenous
- Patterns of Trade Network Structure
 - Hegemonic
 - Industrial
 - Restrictive

The network emerges from the combination of political and economic factors

Overall Goals

Research Questions

- Why does any given arms transfer occur?
- Is there a dominant pattern?
- Forecast future transfers

Why do we care?


- Make effective policy
- Prevent unintended consequences
- Identify opportunities

Work in progress!

Data Sources


- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
 - Transfers between 1950 2011
 - Only major conventional weapons and components
 - Normalized to Trend Indicator Values (TIV)
- United Nations General Assembly Votes
 - Votes on resolutions between 1946 2012
 - Cleaned of unanimous votes
 - Used to measure political affinity
- Annual data aggregated together over longer periods to reduce noise


Arms Trade Network Overview



Arms Trade Network Overview

Cold War: 1950 - 1989







Spearman Corr: 0.99

Spearman Corr: 0.89

Arms Trade Network Overview

2001 - 2011








Spearman Corr: 0.99


Spearman Corr: 0.90

Network Overview










Appears to suggest that supply & demand are preferential attachment factors


Evidence for industrial pattern

- Communities: countries are 'closer' to other countries within their community than those outside of it
- Algorithm: Louvain Method
 (Blondel et. al, "Fast unfolding of communities in large networks," Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment 2008)
- Does not specify a target # of communities
- Hypotheses:
 - Evidence for <u>hegemonic pattern</u>: overlap between SIPRI communities and known political structures
 - Evidence of <u>industrial pattern</u>: SIPRI communities surrounding major exporters


UN Voting Communities 1950-1989




UN Voting Communities 1990-2000




UN Voting Communities 2001-2012




SIPRI Communities 1950-1989



SIPRI Communities 1990-2000



SIPRI Communities 2001-2011



Exponential Random-Graph Model

- Method for estimating tie formation
- Stochastically generate possible network configurations, based on observed network statistics
- Estimate log-odds of tie formation, along with statistical significance
 - Functionally similar to regression

Exponential Random Graph Model

1975-1985

Network Statistic	Variable	Hegemonic	Models	Industrial Model	Mixed Models	
		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Node Matching	UN Community	-3.701*** (0.049)			-3.540*** (5.16e-02)	
Edge Existence	UN Similarity		-7.491*** (0.088)			-8.138*** (0.109)
Node In- Degree	Import Vol.			-9.72e-04*** (1.9e-05)	-5.38e-04*** (1.47e-05)	-3.19e-05** (1.03e-05)
Node Out- Degree	Export Vol.			3.75e-06** (1.18e-06)	2.66e-05*** (1.42e-06)	4.79e-05*** (1.47e-06)
	BIC	26,729	12,472	38,250	23,293	11,445

Exponential Random Graph Model

2001 - 2011

Network Statistic	Variable	Hegemonic	Models	Industrial Model	Mixed Models	
		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Node Matching	UN Community	-3.508*** (0.044)			-3.289*** (4.4e-02)	
Edge Existence	UN Similarity		-5.722*** (0.057)			-6.187*** (6.79e-02)
Node In- Degree	Import Vol.			-9.27e-04*** (1.8e-05)	-4.4e-04*** (1.36e-05)	3.61e-05*** (7.34e-06)
Node Out- Degree	Export Vol.			-2.05e06 (1.57e-06)	2.18e-05*** (1.93e-06)	4.83e-05*** (1.7e-06)
	BIC	27,340	11,409	39,889	24,920	10,694

Exponential Random-Graph Model

Takeaway:

- Smaller change than expected between Cold
 War and contemporary patterns
- Industrial model appears insufficient <u>on its own</u>
- Neither pattern dominates; best explanation combines both.

Agent-Based Model

- Goal: explain the arms transfer network using statelevel behavior model
- Model outline:
 - Each country is an agent
 - Agents act in random sequence
 - Agent proposes a transfer to another
 - Potential receiver may accept or reject
 - Agent behavior:
 - Maximize exports
 - Be close to allies
 - Be far from rivals

Agent-Based Model

Work in progress!

Initial observations:

- Complete random behavior: ~5% overlap with observed network
- Export-maximizing only: ~15% overlap with observed network
- UN Affinity-weighted export maximizing:
 ~22% overlap with observed network
- Computationally expensive!

Future Work

- Add and test additional variables
- Dynamic network analysis
- Continue refining ABM

Questions?