

Implementing Host Identity Protocol using Python

Abstract—Host Identity Protocol, or HIP, is layer 3.5 solution, which was initially designed to split the dual role of the IP address - locator and identifier. Using HIP protocol one can solve not only mobility problems, but also establish authenticated secure channel. In this short report we will introduce description of the implementation of HIP and IPSec protocols using Python. We will also present the microbenchmarking results for various cryptographic primitives, and present the results for overall performance of HIP and IPSec, which we implement in userspace using Python language.

I. INTRODUCTION

Sometimes it is easier to implement prototypes in userspace using high-level languages, such as Python or Java. In this document we attempt to implement the Host Identity Protocol version 2 using Python language. In the first part, we describe various security solutions, then we discuss some implementation details of the HIP protocol, and finally, in the last part of this work we discuss the performance of the HIP and IPSec protocols.

II. BACKGROUND

In this section we will describe basic background. First, we will discuss the problem of mobile Internet and introduce the Host Identity Protocol. We then move to the discussion of other layer 3 security protocols. We will conclude the section with the discussion of Elliptic Curves and a variant of Diffie-Hellman algorithm, which uses EC cryptography (ECC).

A. Dual role of IP

Internet was designed initially so that the Internet Protocol (IP) address was playing dual role: it was the locator, so that the routers could find the recipient of a message, and identifier, so that the upper layer protocols (such as TCP and UDP) can make bindings (for example, transport layer sockets use IP addresses and ports to make a connections). This becomes a problem when a networked device roams from one network to another, and so the IP address changes, leading to failures in upper layer connections.

B. Layer 3 security protocols

There are a lot of solutions today which allow communicating parties to authenticate each other and establish secure channel. But only few provide a separation of identifier and locator.

Locator Identifier Separation Protocol (LISP)

Identifier/Locator Network Protocol (ILNP)

Secure Shell protocol (SSH) is one security solution [1]. SSH is the application layer protocol which provides an encrypted channel for insecure networks. SSH was originally designed to provide secure remote command-line, login, and

command execution. But in fact, any network service can be secured with SSH. Moreover, SSH provides means for creating VPN tunnels between the spatially separated networks.

IPSec runs directly on top of the IP protocol and offers two various services: (i) it provides the so called Authentication Header (AH), which is used only for authentication, i.e., it uses various HMAC algorithms, and (ii) it provides Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP), which is an authentication plus payload encryption mechanism. To establish the security association (negotiate secret keys and algorithms) one can use IKE or IKEv2, ISAKMP (popular on Windows) or use preshared keys and set of negotiated algorithms.

Internet Key Exchange protocol (IKE)

Mobile TCP (mTCP) There are a lot of solutions for mobility support. For sampling see Mobile IP, ROAMIP and Cellular IP.

C. Diffie-Hellman (DH) and Elliptic Curve DH

Because `pycryptodome` library does not support Diffie-Hellman (DH) and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithms, we have sat down and derived our own implementation of these protocols. Here we will mention some background on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and discuss the implementation details of ECDH.

Elliptic curves have the following form $y^2 \equiv x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p}$. For the curve to have at least one root the discriminant should be non zero. In other words, $\Delta = -16(4a^3 + 27b^2) \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p}$, where p is a large enough prime number.

By defining a binary operation, which is an addition operation, we can make elliptic curve form an abelian group. Remember, abelian group has the following properties: (i) closure, meaning that if $A, B \in E$, then $A + B \in E$, (ii) associativity: $\forall A, B, C \in E$ follows that $(A + B) + C = A + (B + C)$. (iii) existence of identity element I , such that $A + I = I + A = A$, (iv) existence of inverse: $\forall A \in E$ $A + A^{-1} = A^{-1} + A = I$; (v) commutativity: $A + B = B + A$ $\forall A, B \in E$. Finally, we should mention that there should exist an element G , such that multiple additions of such element with itself, kG , generates all other elements of the group. Such groups are called `cyclic` abelian groups.

Lets define O , a point at infinity, to be identity element, such that $P + O = O + P = P, \forall P \in E$. Also, we define $P + (-P) = O$, where $-P = (x, -y)$. Next lets suppose that $P, Q \in E$ (reads P and Q belong to elliptic curve), where $P = (x_1, y_1)$ and $Q = (x_2, y_2)$. We can then distinguish the following three cases: (i) $x_1 \neq x_2$ (in this case the line, which passes through the two given points, must intersect the curve somewhere at a third point $R = (x_3, y_3)$), (ii) $x_1 = x_2$ and $y_1 = -y_2$ (in this case the line is vertical, and it does not pass through a third point on the curve); and finally (iii) $x_1 = x_2$

and $y_1 = y_2$ (in this case the line is tangent to a curve, but still crosses the curve at a third point $R(x_3, y_3)$). Given case (ii), we can define a negative point as $-R = (x, -y)$.

In the first case, line L passes through points P and Q . Using simple geometry, we can derive an equation of the line as follows: $y = \beta x + v$, such that

$$\beta = (y_2 - y_1)(x_2 - x_1)^{-1}$$

Also, we can find v as

$$v = y_1 - \beta x_1 = y_2 - \beta x_2$$

In order to find the points that intersect the curve, we can substitute $y = \beta x + v$ into equation of an elliptic curve:

$$(\beta x + v)^2 = x^3 + ax + b$$

By rearranging the terms of the equation, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} x^3 + ax + b - \beta^2 x^2 - 2\beta vx - v^2 &= \\ x^3 + (a - 2\beta v)x - \beta^2 x^2 + b - v^2 &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

But since the obtained equation has three roots we have:

$$\begin{aligned} (x-x_1)(x-x_2)(x-x_3) &= (x^2 - xx_2 - xx_1 + x_1x_2)(x-x_3) = \\ x^3 - x^2x_3 - x^2x_2 + xx_2x_3 - x^2x_1 + xx_1x_3 + xx_1x_2 - x_1x_2x_3 &= \\ x^3 - (x_3 + x_2 + x_1)x^2 + (x_2x_3 + x_1x_3 + x_1x_2)x - x_1x_2x_3 \end{aligned}$$

But noticing that the $\beta^2 = x_1 + x_2 + x_3$, we have:

$$x_3 = \beta^2 - x_1 - x_2$$

Moreover, since $P + Q = -R$, we have:

$$-y_3 = \beta(x_3 - x_1) + y_1$$

or

$$y_3 = \beta(x_1 - x_3) - y_1$$

The second case is simple, by definition we have $P - Q = O$. And finally, we should mention that the third case is much like the first case, but with one difference - the line that passes through P and Q is tangent to the curve, because $P = Q$. By applying an implicit differentiation to an original function of an elliptic curve, we have:

$$2y \frac{\partial y}{\partial x} = 3x^2 + a$$

From this we can derive β as follows:

$$\beta = \frac{\partial y}{\partial x} = (3x_1^2 + a)(2y_1)^{-1}$$

This expression allows us to derive the x_3 as follows:

$$x_3 = \beta^2 - 2x_1$$

Finally, just as in the first case, we have $y_3 = \beta(x_1 - x_3) - y_1$. Of course, all operations are done modulo prime p .

We now turn to discussion of ECDH protocol and some of the implementation details. We have used the parameters for the elliptic curve which are defined in RFC5903 [2]. ECDH proceeds in the following manner: Party A generates random number i , where the size of this random number is equal to the number of bytes that make up the prime number p (this is specified in the parameters set). Party B generates in a similar fashion number j . Both parties, using point on a curve G , which is also a generator (again specified in RFC5903), compute public keys: $K_A = iG$ and $K_B = jG$. We have used well-known **double and add algorithm** [3] to efficiently compute the multiplication. Next parties exchange the public keys and derive a shared secret as follows $S = iK_B = jK_A = ijG$.

To test the implementation we have used test vectors provided in previously mentioned RFC.

III. HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE

For hardware we have used the following setup. We have used single machine as initiator. The machine had dual core Intel Celeron processor, 16 GB of Random Access Memory (RAM) and 500 GB hard disk drive. The responder was less capable Raspberry PI microcontroller, but had quad core CPU each running at 1.0 GHz, 1 GB of RAM and a flash card for durable storage. For software we have used Ubuntu 18.04 on initiator, and Raspbian OS - on responder.

IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION

In this section we will discuss the performance related issues of our HIPv2 implementation. We begin the discussion with the set of microbenchmarks. Thus, we first evaluate the performance of ECDH and DH algorithms, then we switch to performance of RSA, DSA, and ECDSA signature algorithms, we conclude the discussion with the performance of various HMAC algorithms.

To demonstrate the performance of ECDH and DH algorithms we have executed the key exchange algorithms 100 times for various groups. Thus, in Figure 2 we show the performance of DH and in Figure 3 we show the performance of ECDH for various curve parameters. To understand how two are related in Table I we show the sizes of various keys and how they are related to symmetric keys. Obviously, ECDH shows far better performance than regular DH algorithm. This performance improvement is largely due to reduced key sizes.

We have ran the HIPv2 BEX for 20 times and measured the total packet processing time (we have combined packet processing time for initiator and responder). In Figure 4 we show the boxplots for the packet processing duration. To run the tests we have used the following configuration: for signatures we have used RSA with 2048 bits long modulus, SHA-256 for HMAC and hashing, ECDH with NIST521 curve,




Fig. 1: Average duration of puzzle solving




Fig. 2: Diffie-Hellman key exchange duration (total)

Symmetric key sizes, bits	DH keys, bits	ECDH keys, bits
80	1024	160
112	2048	224
128	3072	256
192	7680	384
256	15360	521

TABLE I: Security strength of keys




Fig. 3: Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange duration (total)




Fig. 4: Packets' processing time

AES-256 for encryption and 16 bits for puzzle difficulty. We have noticed that processing R1 packet consumes considerable amount of time on responder. Since our implementation was lacking pre-creation of R1 packets, such lengthy packet processing time was expected. We have also measured the overall duration of the HIPv2 base exchange (BEX). In Figure 5 we demonstrate distribution of HIP BEX durations. Clearly, implementing cryptographic protocols in userspace using high-level languages, such as Python, is not the best choice: the performance of such implementations is really poor and it is better to implement the security solutions using lower level languages, such as C or C++.

Finally, we have measured throughput for TCP connections over IPSec tunnel and plain TCP. We have used `iperf` tool to measure throughput. Clearly, with our implementation we




Fig. 5: Duration of HIPv2 BEX




Fig. 6: Obtained throughput for TCP over IPSec and plain TCP connections

were able to achieve throughput slightly 25 times less, than throughput, which we have obtained for plain TCP connections.

While experimenting with the HIPv2 protocol we have noticed one limitation: if RSA keys larger than 4096 bits long are used together with the ECDH NIST 521 curve, the size of the packet becomes unacceptably large and protocol fails (HIPv2 packet size cannot be larger than 2008 bytes). Therefore we have only experimented with RSA keys of sizes: 512, 1024, 2048 and 4096 bits.

V. CONCLUSIONS

In this short document we have discussed the implementation details of Host Identity Protocol (HIP), which as a layer 3.5 security solution aiming at separation of dual role of an IP address. HIP protocol not only solves the problem of separation of roles of the IP addresses, but can also be a secure mobility solution. There are many applications of HIP in modern networks - from establishing a secure channel between stationary network entities, to securing mobile users.

We have created a minimal Python-based implementation of HIP and experimented with it: (i) we have made several microbenchmarks, and (ii) we completed several rounds of stress tests of the solution (basically, we have made

several concurrent connections to HIP server and measured duration of HIP base exchange). We have also implemented Encapsulated Secure Payload (ESP) for IPSec and measured overall performance by performing several rounds of bandwidth measurements using iperf tool.

REFERENCES

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