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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Back in end of 1960's when the Internet was a rather small network, which was inter-connecting major universities, governmental and military organizations, very little attention was devoted to security. Nowadays, when the Internet has become extremely sophisticated in structure, connecting billions of devices ranging from small IoT type devices to humongous data-centers, security has gained number one priority. In present days, a typical Intranet of an organization can include number of geographically separated branch-office networks (for example, consider a factory that has many SCADA devices and a mission control center that is miles and miles away). Since these networks geographically separated, connecting them becomes a necessity, and so is the security of these networks. This is when the layer-3 virtual private networks (L3-VPN) and layer-2 virtual private LAN services (L2-VPLS) solutions become handy. There are, however, other requirements that need to be taken into account. Scalability, resilience to various attacks, from man-in-the-middle to integrity violation attacks, to rather fundamental attacks on asymmetric algorithms (such as RSA, DSA and their elliptic curve counterparts, Diffie-Hellman and Eliptic Curve DH, for sampling) using, for example, Shor's quantum computer algorithm to factorize large numbers, and massive brute force attacks on hash algorithms should be considered thoroughly. With this in mind, in this work we present different security solutions, which can be used to build secure L2 and L3 overlay networks. We present the limitations of each solution and identify how they can be avoided using various VPLS and L3-VPN. With this in mind, we start with a background material

on cryptography. Here we discuss various symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithms, present the definition of hash functions, which considered secure nowadays, and discuss several key agreement algorithms. To make the discussion complete we present the threat that quantum computers pose for such algorithms as RSA and DH, and discuss how post-quantum algorithms such as those that are based on lattice can be used as alternative to classical algorithms for encryption and signature constructions. Although, not considered as part of the present work, future work can include the performance comparison of standardized RSA and DSA algorithms with the performance of lattice-based algorithms incorporated into for example Host Identity Protocol or event Transport Layer Security protocol. We then move on to discussion of TLS, SSL, IPsec, HIP and SSH protocols and how those can be used to achieve integrity and confidentiality of data transmitted over insecure channels. Afterwards, we move on to the discussion of the results we have obtained over the course of several years. Here, we discuss our practical experience with scalable Host Identity Protocol based L3-VPN and VPLS network which is build using the same protocol. We devote a separate section on hardware-accelerated versions of AES and SHA-256 algorithms. We conclude the results section with the analysis of the limitations of each solution and present the results for the various micro-benchmarking settings.

1.1 Questions

In this work, we ask several questions. These are not research questions, but rather practical questions we try to answer to ourselves in order to understand the usability of Python based security solution. Since our work focuses on the application of Host Identity Protocol (HIP) in VPN and VPLS settings we ask the following questions:

First, what is the performance of the pure Python-based implementation of symmetric key encryption and decryption routines as well as hash methods and how do they compare to implementation, which uses special CPU AES and SHA-256 instructions. Here our focus is on the microbenchmarking of two implementations of AES and SHA-256 hashing algorithm, identification of the bottlenecks and further recommendations for our prototype implementation of Host Identity Based VPLS and L3-VPN.

Second, what is the scalability of Host Identity Protocol based VPLS and does it perform in emulated environment such as Mininet. Here we seek the answer to the question whether the HIP-VPLS is usable in environments close to real-life setups.

Third, what is the performance of Python based HIP-VPLS on real hardware. By doing so we want to find the application niche of our security solution. In addition,

we discuss the practical configuration of HIP-VPLS using central controller.

The next question we want to answer relates to the deployment of scalable L3-VPN based on Host Identity Protocol. Here we focus on rather different approach of building secure networks: We consider L3-VPN where nodes in different branches offices form separate broadcast domains, but still can communicate with each other (with assistance of IPv4 routing protocol). Here, we want to answer how to tackle the scalability issues of VPN network by adding hierarchy into the architecture?

CHAPTER 2

Background

Since we are going to discuss the security protocols in this work, we begin this section with the shallow dive into cryptography basics. Here, we discuss symmetric and asymmetric cryptography algorithms, to make the description a little bit complete we show how RSA algorithm works, discuss the math behind Diffie-Hellman (DH) and its Elliptic Curve counterpart. We will also discuss the Shor's algorithm and its quantum computer implementation that theoretically can efficiently factorize big number. This algorithm, if powerful enough quantum computers will exist in the near future, puts the RSA algorithm - the major building block of modern security solutions - at risk of being cracked (once the modulus of RSA algorithm factorized into prime components, the private key of RSA algorithm can be easily recovered). We will conclude this part of the background material with the discussion of post-quantum computer public key encryption solution based on lattice (more specifically we will discuss Learning With Errors (LWE) algorithm). We believe that, eventually, this type of cryptography will be the replacement for traditional RSA and DH algorithms, which rely on the hardness of factorization of the big numbers and discrete logarithms. In the epilog of this section, we will put few words on how lattice public key cryptography can be used, for example, together with Host Identity Protocol.

In the second part of the background material, we will review the basics of the Host Identity Protocol, Transport Layer Security Protocol and Secure Shell Protocol, since these protocols are the main building blocks of secure tunneling protocols that we discuss in this work.

We will finalize the discussion of the background material with a short overview of various L2, L3 and L4 tunneling solutions, including L2 802.1Q QinQ tunneling, L3 Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) VPLS, L4 TLS and SSH tunneling.

2.1 Cryptography basics

Cryptography comes in many flavors: symmetric key cryptography (3DES, AES, Twofish, RC4) which, in turn, can be categorized into block cipher and stream cipher and asymmetric key cryptography (such as RSA, DSA, ECDSA). There are also key exchange protocols such as Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Cryptography DH for negotiation of common keys over insecure channels. Different algorithms applicable in different settings depending on requirements. Typically, as we will discuss later, symmetric key cryptography is used to protect data-plane traffic in networks, whereas, asymmetric-key cryptography is more applicable to the common key negotiation, authentication and identification purposes [1].

2.1.1 Symmetric cryptography

We start with the symmetric key cryptography. Common key and rather trivial operations such as permutations and substitutions are at the heart of any symmetric key cryptography algorithm. Although, this type of cryptography is efficient because of the usage efficient operations, it comes with a limitation though. In symmetric key cryptography, both sender and receiver need to share the same key, which complicates such important aspects as key distribution and revocation and so alone this encryption solutions a very hard to use alone in modern cryptosystems. Typically, asymmetric key cryptography such as RSA used to derive session keys – TLS, HIP and many other protocols follow this design idea.

Symmetric key cryptography comes in two different flavors: block and stream. For example, block cipher (such as AES, 3DES, Twofish [1]) use blocks of data (typically, the size of the block is 128, 160, 256 bits [1]), and encrypts or decrypts one block at a time. There are different modes of operation, though, for block ciphers, examples are counter mode and cipher block chaining. The latter one uses so-called initialization vector to add extra randomness into encryption process, and encryption of proceeding blocks depends on the output of the previous block. Modes of operations are important for security reasons. However, not all modes of operations useful and secure. For example, Electronic Code Book (ECB), while allow achieving fast processing and parallelization, is considered insecure in many settings. In Figure[] we demonstrate AES encryption in CBC mode:

The other type of symmetric key algorithms is stream cipher. Here the encryption and decryption performed on separate bits, one bit at a time. CR4 is an example of stream cipher. Stream ciphers are extremely important in real-time processing, for example, Wi-Fi uses stream ciphers to encrypt the data plane traffic.

2.1.2 Asymmetric cryptography

Asymmetric key cryptography, in its simplest form, is the brilliant in the age of computing. Guessing from the name that this type of cryptography uses different keys for encryption and decryption does not require deep thought. This property makes this group of algorithms suitable for various key distribution, revocation and signature ideas.

There is a magnitude of different asymmetric key security algorithms. RSA, DSA and its Elliptic curve variant ECDSA are the pillars of modern security solutions. But the flexibility of these schemes comes at an extra price of CPU cycles. All this makes these solutions inapplicable for securing data plane traffic, but only rather to secure control plane. In what follows, just to underpin the beauty of the math behind asymmetric key cryptography, we provide a description of RSA algorithm.

In RSA cryptosystem, the sender generates a pair of keys as follows: First, the sender chooses large enough two prime numbers p and q . Next, the sender computes $n = pq$ and evaluates Euler's phi function: $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$. This is the same as the number of numbers coprime to n . The sender then selects at random encryption exponent e such that $1 < e < \phi(n)$ such that e is coprime to $\phi(n)$ and computes the decryption exponent d such that $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$ using modular multiplicative inverse.

The public key is then (n, e) and the private key is (n, d) . To encrypt the message m the sender computes $c = m^e \pmod{n}$. The decryption is similar $m = c^d \pmod{n}$. The beauty is in Fermat's little theorem, which states that $m^{\phi(n)} \pmod{n} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. Now, $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$, which means that $ed = k\phi(n) + 1$, and so $m^{(ed)} \pmod{n} \equiv m^{(k\phi(n)+1)} \pmod{n} \equiv 1^k m \pmod{n} \equiv m \pmod{n}$.

In practice, RSA requires random padding to protect against such attacks as chosen ciphertext attacks and making two identical plaintext produce various ciphertexts. Padding also ensures that the message size is multiple of encryption block-size. In practice, Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) scheme is used [1].

It is good to know that if the message hashed and encrypted with private key, the result is a form of digital signature, since the sender cannot later deny that it was involved into encryption process. Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) is another

example of asymmetric signature scheme and was specifically design for that purpose. Elliptic Curves another version of DSA algorithm.

Frankly speaking, symmetric signature schemes can be also used. For example, one can use one-time hash-based signatures to produce the secure digital signatures. Nevertheless, the application of these type of signature algorithms is rather impractical and finds little application in real-life settings.

2.1.3 Cryptographic hash functions

Mathematically, speaking hash function is special function that given a pre-image of an arbitrary size produces an image or hash of a fixed size, which is universally unique. Secure hash functions guarantee, to a certain degree, that the result of a hash function is irreversible. That it is, it should be extremely hard to find a pre-image, or original message, given a hash or fingerprint. Secure hash functions should be also collision resistant. In other words, it should be extremely hard, if not impossible at all, to find two different messages m and m' that will hash to the same value, i.e., $hash(m) = hash(m')$.

Secure hash functions are important in modern cryptography. For example, they serve as authentication tokens for transmitted message over the wire (useful, for example, in detecting message manipulation during transmission), they allow compressing the message before signing it with the digital signature algorithm, and they can be used to find the differences between the messages efficiently. The application area is of course broader than just these few examples.

Hash functions come in different flavors, but good ones should be computationally efficient and resistant to collisions. Today, hash functions such as MD2, MD4 and MD5 considered broken, as there are works that showed successful attacks. Briefly speaking, researchers successfully found collisions for this hash functions. Therefore, it is not recommended to use these hash functions in security applications. A more modern family of SHA hash functions also exists. For example, engineers recommend using SHA-256, SHA-512 and SHA-3 in modern applications, as no successful attacks were registered for these types of hash functions.

Hash functions pave a road for such a notion as authentication tokens when combined with a secret key in a special way. Examples are HMAC [], PMAC, CMAC which is based on AES cipher. For instance, by sending an HMAC together with the original message one can make sure that the message will not be tampered during the transmission. In addition, if the message will be altered on the path to recipient, this fact will be flagged immediately during the verification process.

Hash functions are also useful in signatures. For example, one-time signature are

using hash functions to construct an digital signature of a message. An interested reader can find more information about hash functions here [\[1\]](#).

2.1.4 Key exchange protocols

2.1.5 Post-quantum Lattice-based cryptography

2.2 Security protocols

2.2.1 Host Identity Protocol (HIP)

2.2.2 Transport Layer Security Protocol (TLS)

2.2.3 Secure Shell Protocol (SSH)

2.3 L2, L3 and L4 tunneling

2.3.1 Virtual Private LAN Services (VPLS) L2VPN solutions

QinQ tunneling

MPLS-based VPLS

2.3.2 L3 Virtual Private LAN (VPN) security solutions

Multipoint to single point VPN

SSH tunneling

CHAPTER 3

Results

- 3.1 Hardware-enable symmetric cryptography
- 3.2 Host Identity Protocol based VPLS
- 3.3 Scalable multipoint to multipoint VPN using HIP protocol

CHAPTER 4

Conclusions

References

- [1] D. Stinson. Cryptography: Theory and Practice, Second Edition. CRC/C&H, 2nd edition, 2002.