ECO 2302 - Problem Set 2

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1 Part 1

1. Solve profit maximization problem for downstream firm

$$\max_{p(Z)} \quad \{p(Z)X(Z) - \eta(Z)X(Z)\} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad X(Z) = Ap(Z)^{-\rho}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \quad \max_{p(Z)} \quad \{Ap(Z)^{1-\rho} - \eta(Z)Ap(Z)^{-\rho}\}$$

FOC is

$$(1 - \rho)Ap(Z)^{-\rho} + \eta(Z)A(-\rho)p(Z)^{-\rho-1} = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \quad p(Z)(\rho - 1) = \eta(Z)\rho$$

$$\Rightarrow \quad p(Z) = \frac{\rho}{\rho - 1}\eta(Z)$$

Revenues R(Z) can be derived as

$$R(Z) = p(Z)X(Z) = Ap(Z)^{1-\rho} = A\left[\frac{\rho}{\rho - 1}\eta(Z)\right]^{1-\rho}$$

Total Costs C(Z) can be derived as

$$C(Z) = \eta(Z)X(Z) = \eta(Z)Ap(Z)^{-\rho} = \eta(Z)A\left(\frac{\rho}{\rho - 1}\eta(Z)\right)^{-\rho} = A\left(\frac{\rho}{\rho - 1}\right)^{-\rho}\eta(Z)^{1-\rho}$$

2. Variable profit by a z-seller from selling to a Z-buyer can be expressed as

$$\begin{split} \pi(z,Z) &= \frac{1}{\sigma}C(Z) \left[\frac{p(z,Z)}{q(Z)}\right]^{1-\sigma} \\ &= \frac{1}{\sigma}A \left(\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}\right)^{-\rho} \eta(Z)^{1-\rho} \left[\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\frac{w}{z}\frac{1}{q(Z)}\right]^{1-\sigma} \\ &= \frac{1}{\sigma}A \left(\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}\right)^{-\rho} \left[\frac{q(Z)}{Z}\right]^{1-\rho} \left[\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\frac{w}{z}\frac{1}{q(Z)}\right]^{1-\sigma} \\ &= \frac{1}{\sigma} \left(\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}\right)^{-\rho} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\right)^{1-\sigma} Aw^{1-\sigma}q(Z)^{\sigma-\rho}Z^{\rho-1}z^{\sigma-1} \\ &= \gamma Aw^{1-\sigma}q(Z)^{\sigma-\rho}Z^{\rho-1}z^{\sigma-1} \end{split}$$

where
$$\gamma = \frac{1}{\sigma} \left(\frac{\rho}{\rho - 1} \right)^{-\rho} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right)^{1 - \sigma}$$
.

3. Consider the case $\rho = \sigma$. From the equilibrium sorting condition, we have

$$\pi(\underline{z}(Z), Z) = wf$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \gamma A w^{1-\sigma} Z^{\rho-1} \underline{z}(Z)^{\sigma-1} = wf$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \underline{z}(Z) = \left(\frac{w^{\sigma} f}{\gamma A}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \frac{1}{Z}$$

In this case, the sorting function $\underline{z}(Z)$ is increasing in w, f and decreasing in A, Z.

2 Part 2

I have written the code in Python (using root function in scipy.optimize library) to find $\underline{z}(Z)$ given Z, A, w and f by solving nonlinear equation

$$r(\underline{z}) \equiv \gamma A w^{1-\rho} Z^{1-\rho} \left[\int_{\underline{Z}(Z)}^{\infty} z^{\sigma-1} dF(z) \right]^{\frac{\sigma-\rho}{1-\sigma}} \underline{z}(Z)^{\sigma-1} - wf = 0$$

As $z \sim log \mathcal{N}(0,1)$, we have $z^{\sigma-1} \sim log \mathcal{N}(0,\sigma-1)$. The integral term $\int_{\underline{Z}(Z)}^{\infty} z^{\sigma-1} dF(z)$ is then the partial expectation of log $\mathcal{N}(0,\sigma-1)$ which is

$$\int_{\mathbf{Z}(Z)}^{\infty} z^{\sigma - 1} dF(z) = e^{\frac{(\sigma - 1)^2}{2}} \Phi\left(\frac{(\sigma - 1)^2 - \ln \underline{\mathbf{z}}(Z)}{\sigma - 1}\right)$$

4. I first fix A = w = f = 1 and solve for $\underline{z}(Z)$ given different values of $Z \in [0.1, 1]$. The plot of $\underline{z}(Z)$ against Z is shown in Figure (1). The equilibrium sorting function $\underline{z}(Z)$ is decreasing in Z suggesting that more productive downstream firms match with more upstream suppliers (more productive downstream firms also match with less productive upstream suppliers).




Figure 1: Equilibrium Sorting Function with A, w, f = 1

5. In this part, I solve for the equilibrium sorting function $\underline{z}(Z)$ given different values of A, w, f. Figure (2), (3), and (4) consequently present $\underline{z}(Z)$ when A, w, and f takes different values. Qualitatively, there's no difference in direction with the analytic solution in part (3): $\underline{z}(Z)$ is decreasing in A and increasing in w, f.




Figure 2: Equilibrium Sorting Function with w, f = 1




Figure 3: Equilibrium Sorting Function with A,f=1




Figure 4: Equilibrium Sorting Function with A, w = 1