

Hit where it hurts: Healthcare access and Intimate Partner Violence

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2012 el govern del PP
introdueix una reforma

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graph TD; A[2012 el govern del PP  
introdueix una reforma] --> B[Restringeix l'accés al  
sistema de salut públic per  
als immigrants sense un  
permís de residència legal a  
l'estat espanyol]; A --> C[La universalitat del sistema  
de salut es recupera al  
2018 amb el PSOE]; B --> D[Impacte s/mortalitat de la  
població afectada]; B --> E[Impacte sobre les  
denúncies per violència de  
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població afectada

Impacte sobre les
denúncies per violència de
gènere



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journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/euroecorevThe deadly effects of losing health insurance[☆]Arnau Juanmarti Mestres^a, Guillem López Casasnovas^b, Judit Vall Castelló^{c,*}^a Centre for Research in Health and Economics (CRES), Universitat Pompeu Fabra Spain^b Department of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and CRES-UPF Spain^c Department of Economics, Universitat de Barcelona, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona CRES-UPF and IZA Spain

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ABSTRACT

The number of undocumented migrants in developed countries has increased in recent years, which has generated discussions about the extent to which access to public programs should be restricted for this population. This is the first paper that estimates the effects of restricting access to one of these public programs, health care, on mortality rates of undocumented immigrants. We exploit the natural experiment that arises from a reform implemented in Spain in September 2012 that introduced this restriction. We show that during the first three years of implementation, the restriction increased the monthly mortality rate of undocumented immigrants by 0.31 deaths per 100,000 individuals (which corresponds to 82 additional deaths each year). We also document small changes in the composition of the treated population with 5% of middle educated individuals being substituted by lower educated ones. However, this selective migration can only account for 3.45% of our mortality effects. Our results show the large effects of health insurance coverage on the health status of vulnerable populations and have important policy implications for developed countries currently receiving sizeable migration flows.

Avui...


La restricció en l'accés al sistema de salut públic pot afectar les denúncies per violència de gènere



Dos mecanismes que poden explicar la relació causal entre l'accés al sistema de salut i les denúncies per VdG:

- 1) Directe: Personal sanitari té l'obligació de denunciar qualsevol evidència clara de VdG
- 2) Empoderament de les víctimes: informació s/drets, accés a serveis socials

Sistema de Salut Públic ABANS de la reforma



La Reforma: Setembre 2012

Contingut

- Restricció de l'accés al Sistema de salut públic per a les persones immigrants sense permís de residència legal a l'estat espanyol


Afectació Real?

- Govern envia informe a Brussel·les un any després de l'aprovació de la reforma: 873,000 targetes sanitàries s'havien suprimit (13.87% de la població immigrant & 1.86% de la població total al 2012). Part dels immigrants LEGALS també afectats.

Denúncies per violència de gènere & ordres de protecció


- Estadística judicial del Poder Judicial Esp.
- Agregades trimestre (2011-2013) per dones natives/immigrants per província

Denúncies per 10,000 dones



--- Foreign Women — Spanish Women

Denúncies per 10,000 dones



Reducció del 12,7%

Molt estable en les
diferents
especificacions


	Reports per 10,000 women						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Foreign Women	44.632*** (0.000)	40.729*** (0.000)	28.744*** (0.000)	28.690*** (0.000)	28.646*** (0.000)	29.834*** (0.000)	28.107*** (0.000)
Post Reform	-1.259 (0.847)	1.430 (1.997)	-2.303 (1.819)	-0.511 (2.509)	-0.741 (2.589)	-0.720 (2.610)	
Foreign * Post Reform	-7.558*** (2.429)	-7.793*** (2.505)	-7.058** (2.859)	-7.090** (2.872)	-7.098** (2.875)	-7.094** (2.874)	-7.110** (2.880)
Female UR		0.307 (0.205)	0.135 (0.222)	0.161 (0.215)	0.169 (0.219)	0.154 (0.253)	0.214 (0.227)
Female PR			0.694** (0.350)	0.680** (0.343)	0.677** (0.342)	0.665** (0.335)	0.700** (0.333)
Foreign Male UR				-0.041 (0.072)	-0.035 (0.071)	-0.034 (0.072)	0.032 (0.057)
Spanish Male UR				-0.280 (0.435)	-0.223 (0.421)	-0.214 (0.413)	-0.192 (0.426)
Foreign Male PR					0.119 (0.087)	0.117 (0.086)	0.076 (0.084)
Spanish Male PR					0.071 (0.274)	0.076 (0.274)	-0.143 (0.593)
Female Population over 18 y.o.						0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Region FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Reg Linear Trend							✓
Observations	408	408	408	408	408	408	408
R ²	0.865	0.869	0.882	0.882	0.883	0.883	0.893
Mean Dep. Variable	55.880	55.880	55.880	55.880	55.880	55.880	55.880

Source: Quarterly Judicial Reports, years 2011-2013.

Notes: This table reports the impact of the reform on the number of IPV reports per every 10,000 women. The reform took place after the third quarter of 2012. Column 1 only controls for regional and quarter-year fixed effects. Column 2 also controls the women's unemployment rate and column 3 for women's participation rate. Column 4 additionally controls for foreign and Spanish men's unemployment rates. Column 5 controls for foreign and Spanish men's participation rates. Column 6 controls for the population of women over 18 years old. Finally, column 7 adds regional linear time trends. All standard errors are clustered at the regional level, and wild-bootstrap is performed.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Ordres de protecció per 10,000 dones






Incorporem una
dimensió addicional:
Diferències a nivell de
CCAA's

Diferent intensitat en
l'exposició a la política ja
que algunes CCAA's van
incorporar programes
alternatius de cobertura


Cimas et al. (2016)
avaluen aquests
programes i fan un
rànkung: cobertura de la
població, requeriments
administratius...

Region	Legislative Action	Date	Groups Covered	Requirements	Services Included	Medication
Regions with less enforcement						
Asturias	✓	01/09/2012	No resources	Low	All	All
Navarra	✓	25/02/2013	All	Low	All	All
Basque Country	✓	01/07/2012	No resources	High	All	All
Galizia	✓	31/08/2012	No resources	Medium	All	All
Catalonia	✓	01/09/2012	No resources	Medium	Primary	All
Andalusia	✓	06/06/2013	No resources	Low	All	All
Aragon	✓	19/03/2013	No resources	Medium	All	Partially
Extremadura	✓	15/07/2013	No resources	Medium	All	All
Regions with more enforcement						
Valencian Region	✓	31/07/2013	No resources	Medium	All	All
Cantabria	✓	25/11/2013	No resources	Medium	All	All
Canary Islands	✓	16/08/2013	No resources	High	All	Partially
Madrid						
Murcia						
Balearic Islands						
Castile-Leon						
La Rioja						
Castile-La Mancha						


Denúncies per 10,000 dones: Regions **més** implementació de la restricció nacional



Denúncies per 10,000 dones: Regions **menys** implementació de la restricció nacional




Mecanismes: Reducció de les denúncies..



Reducció de la detecció
per part del personal
sanitari i menor
empoderament de les
víctimes

Canvi en el comportament
dels agressors: reducció en la
incidència

Mecanismes: Reducció de les denúncies..



Reducció de la detecció
per part del personal
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víctimes

Canvi en el comportament
dels agressors: reducció en la
incidència

Canvi en la incidència és
difícil de mesurar amb
aquest tipus de dades

```
graph TD; A[Canvi en la incidència és difícil de mesurar amb aquest tipus de dades] --> B["Macroencuesta de violencia contra la mujer (auto-reportat)"]; A --> C[Analitzar violència extrema: mortalitat i homicidis de dones];
```

“Macroencuesta de
violencia contra la mujer”
(auto-reportat)

Analitzar violència extrema:
mortalitat i homicidis de
dones

	Any Violence		Psychological Violence		Physical Violence		Sexual Violence	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Foreign Women	0.050 (0.031)	0.094 (0.061)	0.045 (0.029)	0.090 (0.066)	0.013* (0.007)	0.016 (0.019)	0.026 (0.019)	0.007 (0.032)
Post Reform	-0.055*** (0.018)	-0.058 (0.038)	-0.036*** (0.012)	-0.038 (0.029)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.041*** (0.013)	-0.050** (0.021)
Foreign*Post Reform	0.051 (0.038)	0.044 (0.037)	0.057 (0.036)	0.049 (0.035)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.012)
Region FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls		✓		✓		✓		✓
Observations	15,453	15,409	15,465	15,421	15,465	15,421	15,465	15,421
R ²	0.019	0.029	0.015	0.023	0.002	0.008	0.021	0.028
Mean Dep. Variable	0.225	0.225	0.198	0.198	0.031	0.031	0.077	0.077

Source: IPV Macro-survey, years 2011 and 2015.

Notes: This table reports the impact of the reform on the probability of suffering from any kind of IPV (columns 1 and 2), psychological IPV (column 2), physical IPV (column 3), and sexual violence (column 4). The Post Reform dummy is equal to one the year 2015, and zero the year 2011. All specifications control for regional fixed effects, women's unemployment rate, women's participation rate, and foreign and Spanish men's unemployment and participation rates. All standard errors are clustered at the regional level, and wild-bootstrap is performed.

Canvi en la incidència és
difícil de mesurar amb
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graph TD; A[Canvi en la incidència és difícil de mesurar amb aquest tipus de dades] --> B["Macroencuesta de violencia contra la mujer (auto-reportat)"]; A --> C[Analitzar violència extrema: mortalitat i homicidis de dones];
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“Macroencuesta de
violencia contra la mujer”
(auto-reportat)


Analitzar violència extrema:
mortalitat i homicidis de
dones

	Deaths per 10,000 women	
	Total	Homicide
Foreign Women	-22.583** (11.282)	-0.016*** (0.005)
Post Reform	0.328 (1.429)	-0.005 (0.008)
Foreign * Post Reform	0.010 (0.334)	-0.007 (0.005)
Region FE	✓	✓
Year-Quarter FE	✓	✓
Reg Linear Trend		
Controls	✓	✓
Observations	408	408
R ²	0.875	0.112
Mean Dep. Variable	0.324	0.006

Source: Mortality Register Database, years 2011-2013.

Notes: This table reports the impact of the reform on the total number of deaths per 10,000 women (Columns 1) and the number of deaths due to homicide per 10,000 women (Columns 2). The reform took place after the third quarter of 2012. All specifications control for regional and quarter-year fixed effects, women's unemployment rate, women's participation rate, foreign and Spanish men's unemployment and participation rates, and the population of women over 18 years old. All standard errors are clustered at the regional level, and wild-bootstrap is performed.

Mecanismes: Reducció de les denúncies..




	Reports per 10,000 women			
	Total	By Victims	By Injury Report	By Police/Family
Reg More Enforcement	-43.822 (41.307)	-41.143 (99.140)	-14.763 (14.934)	12.085 (61.654)
Post Reform	0.121 (1.252)	-0.960 (0.909)	0.788 (0.542)	0.294 (0.718)
Reg More Enforcement* Post Reform	-1.185** (0.595)	-0.937 (0.664)	-0.442* (0.256)	0.194 (0.394)
Region FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	204	204	204	204
R ²	0.957	0.912	0.864	0.704
Mean Dep. Variable	13.310	9.860	1.376	2.074

Source: Quarterly Judicial Reports, years 2011-2013.


Notes: This table reports the impact of the reform on the number of IPV reports per 10,000 women (Columns 1), and the number of IPV reports initiated by the victims (Columns 2), injury report (Column 3), and the percentage of IPV reports that apply for protection orders (Columns 4 and 5). The reform took place after the third quarter of 2012. Columns 1, 2, and 3 report the reform's effect on the different outcomes for regions where the reform enforcement was stronger, while columns 4, 5, and 6 estimate it for regions that enforced the reform less. All specifications control for regional and quarter-year fixed effects, women's unemployment rate, women's participation rate, foreign and Spanish men's unemployment and participation rates and the population of women over 18 years old. All standard errors are clustered at the regional level, and wild-bootstrap is performed.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.


Denúncies per 10,000 dones




Denúncies (x 10,000 dones) iniciades pel sistema de salut (parte lesions)




Denúncies (x 10,000 dones iniciades per la víctima)



Denúncies (x 10,000 dones) iniciades per policia, amics, família...



Conclusions...



Restringir l'accés al Sistema de salut públic redueix les denúncies per violència de gènere

Afecta un grup especialment vulnerable de la població; dones immigrants

Important no només per les dones, sinó també pels efectes (spillover) negatius de viure en entorns amb violència per a les generacions posteriors.

	Applications for Protection Orders per 10,000 Women					
	All Foreigners	EU	Rest of Europe	America	Africa	Asia/Oceania
Foreign Women	17.733* (10.260)	16.654 (13.588)	-10.268 (10.880)	47.255*** (0.000)	11.608** (4.709)	8.729 (6.332)
Post Reform	-2.755 (2.112)	-1.409 (2.593)	17.573 (10.867)	-6.190** (3.022)	-1.574 (4.354)	0.442 (1.304e+19)
Foreign * Post Reform	-3.666** (1.423)	-2.237 (2.302)	-5.215 (4.558)	-5.291*** (1.781)	-3.168 (2.757)	0.460 (1.980)
Region FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	102	102	102	102	102	102
R ²	0.924	0.874	0.677	0.915	0.888	0.462
Mean Dep. Variable	46.941	36.585	32.733	69.538	45.373	15.991

Source: Yearly Judicial Reports, years 2011-2013.

Notes: This table reports the impact of the reform on the number of applications for protection orders every 10,000 women for foreign women of different nationalities, taking Spanish women as the control group. Column 1 compares the applications for protection orders of Spanish women and foreign women before and after the reform, column 2 compares women born in a country of the EU with Spanish women, column 3 compares women born in a European country outside the EU with Spanish women, column 4 compares women born in America with Spanish women, column 5 compares women born in Africa with Spanish women, and column 6 compares women born in Asia or Oceania with Spanish women. The Post Reform dummy is equal to one in the year 2013 and zero in the years 2011 and 2012. All specifications control for regional fixed effects, women's unemployment rate, women's participation rate, and foreign and Spanish men's unemployment and participation rates. All standard errors are clustered at the regional level, and wild-bootstrap is performed.

	Applications for Protection Orders per 10,000 Women				
	All Foreigners	Rest of Europe	America	Africa	Asia/Oceania
Women from Outside EU	8.103 (6.815)	-29.005*** (9.054)	19.146** (7.608)	2.769 (9.914)	-443.403 (295.807)
Post Reform	-9.932 (6.455)	11.423 (9.038)	-14.255** (5.893)	-8.037 (8.696)	-17.707 (15.875)
Outside EU * Post Reform	-2.804 (2.208)	-3.137 (5.934)	-4.796** (1.862)	-1.088 (4.732)	12.888 (9.260)
Region FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	102	102	102	102	102
R ²	0.874	0.689	0.881	0.767	0.801
Mean Dep. Variable	46.941	32.733	69.538	45.373	15.991

Source: Yearly Judicial Reports, years 2011-2013.

Notes: This table reports the impact of the reform on the number of applications for protection orders every 10,000 women for foreign women of different nationalities, taking women born in a country of the EU (except Spain) as the control group. Column 1 compares women born in a country of the EU and all the rest of the foreign women, column 2 compares women born in a European country outside the EU with women born in a country of the EU, column 4 compares women born in America with women born in a country of the EU, column 5 compares women born in Africa with women born in a country of the EU, and column 6 compares women born in Asia or Oceania with women born in a country of the EU. The Post Reform dummy is equal to one in the year 2013 and zero in the years 2011 and 2012. All specifications control for regional fixed effects, women's unemployment rate, women's participation rate, and foreign and Spanish men's unemployment and participation rates. All standard errors are clustered at the regional level, and wild-bootstrap is performed.

Contribution

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graph TD; A[Contribution] --> B[FIRST paper causal link healthcare access and IPV reporting]; A --> C[Effectiveness policies to increase reporting IPV]; C --> D[Women's political representation (Iyer et al. 2012)]; C --> E[Women Police station (Amaral et al. 2019; Miller & Segal, 2018)]; C --> F[Domestic Violence Courts (Moore, 2009; Garcia-Hombrados & Martinez-Matute, 2021)]; C --> G[Law's enforcement (Iyengar, 2009; Chin & Cunningham, 2019)];
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FIRST paper causal link
healthcare access and
IPV reporting

Effectiveness policies
to increase reporting
IPV

Women's political
representation (Iyer et
al. 2012)

Women Police station
(Amaral et al. 2019;
Miller & Segal, 2018)

Domestic Violence
Courts (Moore, 2009;
Garcia-Hombrados &
Martinez-Matute,
2021)

Law's enforcement
(Iyengar, 2009; Chin &
Cunningham, 2019)

J. G. is a Venezuelan woman aged 56. In 2014 she arrived in the Canary Islands owing to a family regrouping process. J. suffers from diabetes and needs insulin. However, although she is legally resident in Spain the National Social Security Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguridad Social, INSS) refuses to issue her a health card. As a consequence of this refusal, J. is unable to obtain not only the medical follow-up she needs but also the insulin she must have as it is only available on prescription.

Rosa is a 71-year-old Uruguayan woman who has been living in Spain for many years with her daughter and her granddaughters, who are her only family. She registered more than three years ago and she used to have a healthcare card. She suffers from a chronic cardiovascular disease. She has had to go to the emergency ward on several occasions, because this is the only way for her to access the healthcare system. She has already received several invoices but she does not have the financial means to pay them.

She was referred to a specialist hospital with persistent respiratory insufficiency - she needed urgent surgery to replace an aortic valve. When she was discharged she received a medical report referring her for follow-up care with her general practitioner. But, to complete the vicious circle, she cannot receive this follow-up care because she does not have a healthcare card.

M. L. is a Bolivian woman who has been a victim of trafficking for sexual purposes. Despite the fact that this situation had been confirmed by the sub-office of the Regional Government in Lugo, when M. went to the casualty department as a consequence of the injuries caused by gender violence she was billed for being attended. As if this were not enough, as M. is pregnant she attended hospital once more to give birth for which she was again billed.

As a consequence of this situation M. has accumulated a debt of over 30,000 euros with the tax authorities; this prevents her from receiving subsidies for the three years that it takes to resolve her claim.

Unfortunately M.'s story is not an isolated case as our organisations have recorded similar incidents at the same hospital.

Source: REDER report, "Anatomy of the healthcare reform", 2015.

Source: REDER report, "Five myths for five years of health exclusion", 2017.

	Spanish Women					
	Before Reform			After Reform		
	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max
Reports per 10,000 women	11.24	5.89	21.63	10.93	5.62	20.24
Applications per 10,000 women	3.12	1.14	7.18	2.93	1.18	6.00
% Reports with Applications	28.52	15.43	46.21	27.65	12.46	45.46
Fema UR	20.19	9.38	36	23.72	14.1	38.98
Female Population	1032.58	117.66	3169.79	1034.57	117.78	3174.69
Female PR	50.57	43.40	62.69	51.13	45.56	60.83
Male UR	18.91	9.85	33.62	22.20	12.98	34.79
	Foreign Women					
	Before Reform			After Reform		
	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max
Reports per 10,000 women	55.88	31.85	109.09	48.01	24.57	94.78
Applications per 10,000 women	14.49	4.58	31.43	12.34	1.95	26.30
% Reports with Applications	26.80	6.06	56.94	26.86	3.42	60
Fema UR	32.92	16.36	60.43	37.22	16.17	64.16
Female Population	133.25	15.85	449.77	130.97	16.06	443.28
Female PR	70.99	53.20	84.68	70.68	59.73	81.16
Male UR	36.50	18.31	68.21	39.23	18.47	74.47

Migration

- We look at the characteristics of foreign Women that are correlated with IPV (in the macro-survey)
- We use the LFS to understand whether foreign Women with these characteristics have changed before and after the reform (selection on observable characteristics that are correlated with IPV)
- Additionally, we look at the effect separately by regions with more/les migration of foreign Women & effects are significant and of similar size in Both regions
- We do not see a break in the migration patterns of foreign Women at the time of the reform (continuous reduction cos of the crisis but smooth).

	Reports per 10,000 women	
	Regions more female foreign migration	Regions less female foreign migration
Foreign Women	38.560*** (13.852)	21.896*** (0.000)
Post Reform	-2.089 (4.549)	1.096 (2.492)
Foreign * Post Reform	-6.274** (2.793)	-5.540* (2.834)
Region FE	✓	✓
Year-Quarter FE	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓
Observations	192	216
R ²	0.909	0.876
Mean Dep. Variable	45.541	45.731
P-value Difference	0.854	

Source: Quarterly Judicial Reports, years 2011-2013.


Notes: This table reports the impact of the reform on the number of IPV reports per 10,000 women. Column 1 reports the reform's effect for regions that experienced external migration between 2011 and 2012 of foreign female individuals above the median while column 2 reports the reform's effects for regions that experienced less external migration than the median. The reform took place after the third quarter of 2012. All specifications control for regional and quarter-year fixed effects, women's unemployment rate, women's participation rate, foreign and Spanish men's unemployment and participation rates, and the population of women. All standard errors are clustered at the regional level, and wild-bootstrap is performed. Finally, the p-value testing the hypothesis that the coefficients for the interaction term are equal between the two groups are reported at the bottom.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Report IPV situation to police or court

Directly by victim (71%)
Police if they assist victims (15%)

Doctors/Medical Centre (12%)
Family/Friends (2%)



Investigation phase

Dismiss, accept, accept & issue
protection order (27%)

Within 72 hours of the report

What's in France's controversial immigration law?

Parliament adopted on Tuesday night a law on immigration that was described as an 'ideological victory' by far-right leader Marine Le Pen.

Le Monde with AFP

Published on December 20, 2023, at 5:39 pm (Paris) · 3 min.

France's Parliament adopted a new law on immigration Tuesday, December 19, after a compromise between President Emmanuel Macron's government and the right-wing Les Républicains party shifted the contents of the final draft rightwards. Here are the key measures in the new law.



• Healthcare

The law includes a restriction on access to the "sick foreign national" residence permit. With a few exceptions, it will only be granted if there is no "appropriate treatment" in the country of origin. Public health insurance coverage will also be excluded if the applicant has sufficient resources.

One of LR's demands, the abolition of the only healthcare coverage available to undocumented people, was not included in the law. But LR obtained from the government a pledge to reform that program in 2024.


Editorial [Macron's immigration law marks a political and moral rupture](#)

Le Monde with AFP

French health minister quits as immigration law splits Macron's ruling party

French President Emmanuel Macron faced cracks within his ruling alliance on Wednesday as Health Minister Aurélien Rousseau tendered his resignation in protest at a controversial immigration law that the far right's Marine Le Pen hailed as an "ideological victory" for her camp.

Issued on: 20/12/2023 - 12:42 ⌚ 3 min



French doctors vow to 'disobey' bill stripping undocumented migrants of healthcare rights

A push by France's conservative-led Senate to strip undocumented migrants of their access to free healthcare has sparked a public outcry among workers across the medical profession, many of whom have pledged to ignore a measure they describe as an ethical, sanitary and financial aberration.

Issued on: 13/11/2023 - 21:53 ⌚ 5 min



$$\frac{HSB_{rqyf}}{Pop_{rqyf}} (*10,000) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Foreign_f + \beta_2 Post_{qy} + \beta_3 Foreign_f * Post_{qy} \\ + \beta_4 X_{rqyf} + \delta_r + \mu_{qy} + U_{rqyf}$$

- $\frac{HSB_{rqyf}}{Pop_{rqyf}}$: number of reports or applications for protection orders per 10,000 women residing in region r in year y and quarter q by nationality f
- $Foreign_f$: 1 for immigrant woman, 0 for nationals
- $Post_{qy}$: 1 for all periods after 2012, quarter 3, 0 otherwise
- X_{rqyf} : Labor market controls and female population
- δ_r : Region FE
- μ_{qy} : Quarter-Year FE
- Standard errors clustered at the regional level (wild-bootstrap)

	Applications per 10,000 women						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Foreign Women	11.373*** (0.000)	9.707*** (0.000)	5.590* (2.893)	5.600* (2.873)	5.616* (2.857)	6.441 (4.401)	5.969 (4.200)
Post Reform	-0.998* (0.512)	-0.104 (0.789)	-1.488** (0.589)	-1.358** (0.653)	-1.603** (0.635)	-1.589** (0.614)	
Foreign * Post Reform	-1.961*** (0.630)	-2.061*** (0.662)	-1.808*** (0.654)	-1.806*** (0.654)	-1.817*** (0.658)	-1.814*** (0.656)	-1.793*** (0.649)
Female UR		0.131* (0.068)	0.072 (0.055)	0.070 (0.060)	0.078 (0.061)	0.067 (0.067)	0.065 (0.075)
Female PR			0.238* (0.137)	0.239* (0.138)	0.233* (0.133)	0.225 (0.147)	0.247* (0.144)
Foreign Male UR				0.036 (0.035)	0.047 (0.041)	0.048 (0.040)	0.051 (0.041)
Spanish Male UR				-0.068 (0.111)	0.003 (0.229)	0.010 (0.117)	0.057 (0.188)
Foreign Male PR					0.120*** (0.000)	0.119*** (0.000)	0.095** (0.044)
Spanish Male PR					0.283 (0.188)	0.287 (0.189)	0.148 (0.517)
Female Population over 18 y.o.						0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Region FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Reg Linear Trend						✓	✓
Observations	408	408	408	408	408	408	408
R ²	0.793	0.802	0.822	0.822	0.826	0.827	0.837
Mean Dep. Variable	14.498	14.498	14.498	14.498	14.498	14.498	14.498

A reduction by 12,4%

Very stable across
specifications

	Applicants		Perc. Reports with Applications	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign Women	11.373*** (0.000)	5.616* (2.857)	-1.719 (1.304)	-3.259 (2.159)
Post Reform	-0.998* (0.512)	-1.603** (0.635)	-2.349* (1.225)	-4.394** (1.881)
Foreign * Post Reform	-1.961*** (0.630)	-1.817*** (0.658)	0.934 (1.275)	0.966 (1.308)
Region FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls		✓		✓
Observations	408	408	408	408
R ²	0.793	0.826	0.629	0.640
Mean Dep. Variable	14.498	14.498	26.809	26.809

Source: Quarterly Judicial Reports, years 2011-2013.

Notes: This table reports the impact of the reform on the number of applications for protection orders every 10,000 women (Columns 1 and 2) and the percentage of IPV reports that apply for protection orders (Columns 3 and 4). The reform took place after the third quarter of 2012. Columns 1 and 3 only control for regional and quarter-year fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4 also control for the women's unemployment rate, women's participation rate, foreign and Spanish men's unemployment and participation rates, and the population of women over 18 years old. All standard errors are clustered at the regional level, and wild-bootstrap is performed.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

	Regions Enforced More			Regions Enforced Less		
	Reports	Applications	% Appl. Orders	Reports	Applications	% Appl. Orders
Foreign Women	26.524*** (0.000)	2.651* (1.585)	-4.179 (2.964)	53.351*** (0.000)	18.378*** (0.000)	3.813 (8.302)
Post Reform	2.788 (2.376)	-0.959 (0.696)	-4.220** (2.020)	-6.547 (4.349)	-2.576*** (0.820)	-4.232 (4.141)
Foreign * Post Reform	-8.653** (3.803)	-2.093*** (0.668)	2.097 (1.581)	-5.097 (4.725)	-1.187 (0.809)	-0.040 (0.732)
Region FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Reg Linear Trend						
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	216	216	216	192	192	192
R ²	0.912	0.880	0.664	0.911	0.841	0.658
Mean Dep. Variable	51.899	13.090	27.553	60.358	14.774	25.972

Source: Quarterly Judicial Reports, years 2011-2013.

Notes: This table reports the impact of the reform on the number of IPV reports per 10,000 women (Columns 1 and 4), the number of applications for protection orders every 10,000 women (Columns 2 and 5), and the percentage of IPV reports that apply for protection orders (Columns 3 and 6). The reform took place after the third quarter of 2012. Columns 1, 2, and 3 report the reform's effect on the different outcomes for regions where the reform enforcement was stronger, while columns 4, 5, and 6 estimate it for regions that enforced the reform less. All specifications control for regional and quarter-year fixed effects, women's unemployment rate, women's participation rate, foreign and Spanish men's unemployment and participation rates, and the population of women over 18 years old. All standard errors are clustered at the regional level, and wild-bootstrap is performed.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

