


Information Security

Protecting your data in the new age

presented by David Tucker

People are **NOT** always honest.

Scenario



Attack

Eavesdropping (a.k.a. Packet Sniffing)

Defense


Encryption

Note

There are **2 types** of encryption.

Treat **ALL** people as untrusted.

Scenario



Attack

Eavesdropping (a.k.a. Packet Sniffing)


Defense

Symmetric Encryption

Note

The **shared** private key must be kept **secret**.

Scenario



Attack

Eavesdropping (a.k.a. Packet Sniffing)

Defense


Asymmetric Encryption

Note

This is used in **TLS** (HTTPS) and **SSL** (deprecated).
There are other ways to **digitally sign** a message.

Guessing is **always** an option.

Scenario



Attack Brute Force (a.k.a. Exhaustive Key Search)

Defense


Long Keys, Key Stretching

Note

Time and computational power
are the only obstacles to this attack.

Require **time** for authentication.

Scenario



Attack Brute Force (a.k.a. Exhaustive Key Search)

Defense


Key Stretching

Note

Alice barely notices a **time difference** when her key is stretched since she only needs to try **1 key**.

Strong attacks are **precise**.

Example: Ocean's Eleven



Bob ←

→ Mallory




Alice



A good attacker will **hide** the attack.

Scenario



Attack

Defense

Note


Man in the Middle (MiM)

2-Factor Authentication

Digital Signatures

Mallory must **intercept** at the circled regions.

Scenario



Attack

Man in the Middle (MiM)

Defense

2-Factor Authentication
Digital Signatures

Note

This is why good SSL certificates cost money.

Sollicitous MiM traps are **everywhere**.

Scenario



Attack

Phishing

Defense


Careful Attention, Digital Signatures

Note

This is a prominent method of **identity theft**.
Transmissions in the rectangle **may** be encrypted.

Phishing attacks are **exact** replicas.



Example: Bank of America



Links often arrive in **spam** e-mail.

Alice

authentic



faked

Mallory

Assuming you are not deceived into providing your key...

The easiest way to provide maximal security is to use **strong keys**.

That means...

- ➡ hard to predict (**random**)
- ➡ among many possibilities (**long**).

Note Random is **NOT** the same as **pseudo-random**.

One-time Pads are **unbreakable**.

“Breaking a cipher simply means finding a weakness in the cipher that can be exploited with a complexity less than brute force.”

~Bruce Schneier

That means...

- ➡ truly **random** (observed)
- ➡ as **long** as the message
- ➡ completely **secret** and only used **once**



Since OTPs are not always feasible...

We must find a **balance** between
secure and **memorable** keys.

That means...

- ➡ Do **NOT** use **dictionary** words.
- ➡ Use multiple character **sets** (e.g. a, A, 1, !).
- ➡ Use **passphrases** instead of **passwords**.
- ➡ Change keys often.

the (arguably) best way to generate memorable keys

Ingredients

- true random number generator (<https://www.random.org/integers/>)
- well-populated word list or dictionary (<http://wordlist.sourceforge.net/>)
- a text editor with line numbers



Algorithm

1. Set the maximum number of the generator to the number of words in your list or dictionary.
2. Make sure the generator is **NOT** checking for uniqueness of generated numbers.
3. Generate ≥ 3 random numbers (depending on how often the key will be changed).
4. Open the word list or dictionary in the text editor.
5. Go to the line indicated by each random number and concatenate each corresponding word to create a passphrase.

Example

correct horse battery staple

XKCD

<p> □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ UNCOMMON (NON-GIBBERISH) BASE WORD </p> <p> ORDER UNKNOWN </p> <p> Tr0ub4dor &3 </p> <p> CAPS? COMMON SUBSTITUTIONS NUMERAL PUNCTUATION </p> <p> (YOU CAN ADD A FEW MORE BITS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE FACT THAT THIS IS ONLY ONE OF A FEW COMMON FORMATS.) </p>	<p>~28 BITS OF ENTROPY</p> <p> $2^{28} = 3 \text{ DAYS AT } 1000 \text{ GUESSES/SEC}$ </p> <p> (PLAUSIBLE ATTACK ON A WEAK REMOTE WEB SERVICE. YES, CRACKING A STOLEN HASH IS FASTER, BUT IT'S NOT WHAT THE AVERAGE USER SHOULD WORRY ABOUT.) </p> <p> DIFFICULTY TO GUESS: EASY </p>	<p> WAS IT TROMBONE? NO, TROUBADOR. AND ONE OF THE 0s WAS A ZERO? AND THERE WAS SOME SYMBOL... </p>  <p> DIFFICULTY TO REMEMBER: HARD </p>
<p>correct horse battery staple</p> <p> FOUR RANDOM COMMON WORDS </p>	<p>~44 BITS OF ENTROPY</p> <p> $2^{44} = 550 \text{ YEARS AT } 1000 \text{ GUESSES/SEC}$ </p> <p> DIFFICULTY TO GUESS: HARD </p>	<p> THAT'S A BATTERY STAPLE. </p>  <p> DIFFICULTY TO REMEMBER: YOU'VE ALREADY MEMORIZED IT </p>
<p> THROUGH 20 YEARS OF EFFORT, WE'VE SUCCESSFULLY TRAINED EVERYONE TO USE PASSWORDS THAT ARE HARD FOR HUMANS TO REMEMBER, BUT EASY FOR COMPUTERS TO GUESS. </p>		

Why is this way best?

Say Bob uses a 10,000 word dictionary and a true random number generator to derive a passphrase of 4 concatenated words. Let's also assume Mallory (who knows how Bob's key was created) wants to break this key and has the ability to guess 2,000 keys per second.

How long (at most) will it take Mallory to brute force Bob's passphrase?

Odds of a correct guess:

$$\frac{1}{10^4} \cdot \frac{1}{10^4} \cdot \frac{1}{10^4} \cdot \frac{1}{10^4} = \frac{1}{10^{16}}$$

Time to get the correct key:


$$\left(\frac{10^{16} \text{ guesses}}{1}\right) \left(\frac{1 \text{ second}}{2,000 \text{ guesses}}\right) = 5(10^{12}) \text{ seconds} \\ \approx 158440 \text{ years}$$

Bottom line:

Most dictionaries have far more than 10,000 words, and most attackers will not know your word list or even your key generation algorithm!

Encryption is only **half** of the story.

Scenario



Attack

Tampering (substitution)


Defense

Hashing, Digital Signatures

Note Tampering with **ciphertext** is generally less useful.

Hashing maintains **integrity**.

Scenario



Attack

Tampering (substitution)

Defense


Hashing, Digital Signatures

Note

The seal is (ideally) always **unique** to the message.
Alice will either notice a **missing** or **incorrect** seal.

encryption v. hashing

Encryption uses a 2-way function.



Hashing uses a 1-way function.



Since the data remains in the digest...

Hashes are often used for
comparison.

Applications include...

- ➡ Message Integrity
- ➡ Digital Signatures
- ➡ Key Storage
- ➡ Authentication

Do **NOT** store plaintext passwords.

Scenario



Attack

Theft

Defense

Hashing (preventative)

Note

It is actually that **easy**.

Hashing is **vital** to key storage.

Scenario



Attack

Theft

Defense

Hashing (preventative)

Note Trent does **NOT** know the **plaintext** keys anymore.

Comparing is **faster** than hashing.

Scenario



Attack

Rainbow Tables

Defense

Hashing and **Salting** (preventative)

Note

This is a form of **brute force**.

Salting **separates** the colors.

Scenario



Attack

Rainbow Tables

Defense

Hashing and **Salting** (preventative)

Note

Recall the **Key Stretching** technique.

Example

passphrase

l33tKey

salt

fo2Jhy5B



RIPEMD-160



50fd15000a8893e3bca42618d413903f76c4f4

9741807f5928b84df59e905194f1c67ac28028e1

stored hash

9741807f5928b84df59e905194f1c67ac28028e1

Match! Correct key authenticated.

Bottom Line

An attacker can know the salt!

Knowledge is power.

- ➡ *Applied Cryptography* by Bruce Schneier
- ➡ <http://www.passwordmeter.com/>
- ➡ <http://crackstation.net/hashing-security.htm>

Recap.

✦ 2-way Ciphers (Encryption)

- ✦ Symmetric
- ✦ Asymmetric
 - ✦ TLS (HTTPS)
 - ✦ Digital Signatures
- ✦ Attacks & Defenses
 - ✦ Brute Force & Key Stretching
 - ✦ MiM & 2-factor Authentication
 - ✦ Phishing & Clues

✦ Strong Keys

- ✦ One-time Pads
 - ✦ Cipher Breakability
- ✦ Password Guidelines
- ✦ Secure Passphrases
 - ✦ Generation
 - ✦ Analysis

✦ Protocols

- ✦ Key Exchange
- ✦ Time Stamping
- ✦ Authentication
- ✦ Attacks & Defenses

✦ 1-way Ciphers (Hashing)

- ✦ Applications
 - ✦ Message Integrity
 - ✦ Key Storage
 - ✦ Digital Signatures
- ✦ Attacks & Defenses
 - ✦ Rainbow Tables & Salting

✦ More

- ✦ *Applied Cryptography*
Bruce Schneier