



SFB/Transregio 266

# ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSPARENCY

## Research on Corporate Transparency Element 8: Rationales for Regulation

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## Motivating question

Why is corporate reporting regulated?

## Intuitive Answer

Because it addresses information externalities, helps contracting and to realize economies of scale

Or because this happens to be the outcome of the political bargaining process

- Financial externalities: Information that helps to assess the value of firm  $A$  will be informative about the value of firm  $B$  whenever the firm values of  $A$  and  $B$  can be expected to be correlated
- Real externalities: Information about, for example,
  - production capacities,
  - cost structures or
  - (realized) demand for productsof firm  $A$  can inform decisions of firm  $B$  and other market participants
- These externalities are normally not entering the disclosure decision of firm  $A$  but related disclosures might be welfare enhancing
- But: This is not always the case: Redistribution effects and even welfare decreasing externalities are also possible

- Information can help mitigate adverse selection issues in contracting
- Example: A simple managerial compensation contract with a risk-neutral principal (investor) and a risk-averse agent (manager) with unobservable effort
  - if a reporting regime making managerial effort observable would be available this would allow achieving first best risk sharing (all risk being carried by the investor)
  - voluntary reporting not feasible as soon as effort signal is used in contracts (miss-aligned incentives and cheap talk)
  - Cheating does not pay off to manager but will happen in equilibrium
  - Regulatory commitment to truthful reporting increases welfare

- Economies of scale arise when multiple firms use the same reporting system
- They are also understood as positive network externalities
- Coordination on common set of standards increases comparability and reduces information processing cost

But...

- ... direct disclosure costs exist and might not be marginal
- Real information externalities can induce wealth transfer and politically costly distribution effects
- Some contractual arrangements (e.g., insurance contracts and risk sharing) critically depend on information asymmetry
- Mandatory information can crowd out private information production

So...

- A need for regulated transparency is likely but not obvious
- Trade-off between public and private contracting
- Details matter (alternative information sources, disclosure channels, information frictions, contractual arrangements)
- Observed heterogeneity in regulation (cross-country, public vs. private firms)
- Political economy of transparency regulation is an interesting field to study!