

The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in Russia's Post-Catastrophe Resource Management Strategy

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Abstract

This study investigates the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Russia's resource management strategy following the 2025 catastrophe and the emergence of dungeons. Drawing upon interviews with government officials and SOE managers, the authors analyze how these enterprises have been mobilized to control and exploit the anomalous resources found within Russian dungeons. The findings suggest that SOEs have played a crucial role in securing the state's monopoly over these resources, often at the expense of private sector participation and competition. The paper discusses the implications of this state-centric approach for Russia's economic development and its relations with other countries in the post-catastrophe world.

1 Introduction

The 2025 catastrophe marked a turning point in human history, as the sudden appearance of dungeons across the globe unleashed a wave of chaos and destruction. These dungeons, which vary in size, complexity, and the threats they contain, have become the focus of intense exploration and exploitation efforts by governments, private organizations, and the small proportion of the population that has developed extraordinary abilities (Mikhailov and Ivanova, 2026; Petrov and Sidorova, 2027). In Russia, the government has taken a state-centric approach to managing the resources found within these

dungeons, relying heavily on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to secure control over these valuable assets (Ivanov and Kuznetsov, 2026).

SOEs have long played a significant role in the Russian economy, with the state maintaining a dominant presence in strategic sectors such as energy, defense, and infrastructure (Goldman, 2008; Sprenger, 2010). The emergence of dungeons and the discovery of anomalous resources within them has presented both challenges and opportunities for the Russian government, as it seeks to harness these resources for economic and geopolitical gain (Smirnov and Popova, 2026). This study aims to shed light on the specific roles that SOEs have played in Russia’s post-catastrophe resource management strategy and the implications of this state-centric approach for the country’s economic development and international relations.

2 Literature Review

The literature on the economic and political consequences of the 2025 catastrophe and the emergence of dungeons is still in its early stages, given the relatively short time that has elapsed since these events. However, several studies have begun to explore the various strategies that countries have adopted to manage the anomalous resources found within dungeons and the implications of these strategies for economic growth, social stability, and international relations.

Chen and Wang (2026) provide an overview of the different approaches that countries have taken to dungeon resource management, ranging from state-led models to more market-oriented systems. They argue that the choice of approach is influenced by factors such as the country’s political system, economic structure, and cultural values. In a similar vein, Nakamura and Kim (2027) examine the resource management strategies of Japan and South Korea, highlighting the role of public-private partnerships and the influence of historical legacies on these strategies.

Focusing specifically on Russia, Popov (2026) analyzes the country’s state-centric approach to dungeon resource management, arguing that it reflects a broader pattern of state control over strategic sectors of the economy. He suggests that this approach may have short-term benefits in terms of securing access to valuable resources but could hinder long-term economic growth by stifling private sector innovation and competition. Similarly, Kuznetsova and Volkov (2027) examines the role of Russian SOEs in the energy sector, highlighting their efforts to monopolize access to anomalous resources and the challenges this poses for domestic and foreign private companies.

Other studies have explored the geopolitical implications of dungeon resource management strategies. Wang and Liu (2026) argues that China’s approach, which combines state control with targeted foreign investment, has enabled the country to expand its influence in resource-rich regions and secure access to valuable materials. Singh and Rahman (2027) examines the resource management strategies of India and Pakistan, highlighting the potential for conflict and cooperation in the exploitation of dungeon resources along their shared border.

Overall, the literature suggests that the emergence of dungeons and the anomalous resources they contain has had significant economic and political consequences, with countries adopting different strategies to manage these resources based on their specific circumstances and objectives. Russia’s state-centric approach, which relies heavily on SOEs, reflects a broader pattern of state control over strategic sectors of the economy and has important implications for the country’s economic development and international relations. This study aims to contribute to this growing body of literature by providing a more in-depth analysis of the role of Russian SOEs in post-catastrophe resource management and the consequences of this approach.

3 Methodology

To investigate the role of state-owned enterprises in Russia’s post-catastrophe resource management strategy, we employed a qualitative research design based on semi-structured interviews with key informants. This approach allowed us to gather rich, detailed data on the experiences, perspectives, and decision-making processes of individuals directly involved in or knowledgeable about the topic (Bryman, 2016).

3.1 Sample Selection

We used purposive sampling to identify and recruit participants for the study. This non-probability sampling technique involves selecting participants based on their relevance to the research question and their ability to provide valuable insights (Patton, 2002). We sought to include a diverse range of participants, including government officials, SOE managers, private sector representatives, and academic experts, to capture a broad range of perspectives on the topic.

To identify potential participants, we relied on a combination of publicly available information, such as government documents and media reports, and personal contacts within relevant organizations. We also used snowball

sampling, asking participants to recommend other individuals who might be willing to participate in the study (Noy, 2008).

In total, we conducted interviews with 25 participants, including:

- 8 government officials from relevant ministries and agencies, such as the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment and the Ministry of Economic Development
- 10 managers and executives from major Russian SOEs involved in dungeon resource exploitation, such as Rosneft, Gazprom, and Rosatom
- 4 representatives from private sector companies operating in related industries
- 3 academic experts on Russian economic policy and resource management

3.2 Data Collection

Interviews were conducted between September 2026 and January 2027, either in-person or via secure video conferencing platforms, depending on the participants' location and preference. Each interview lasted between 60 and 90 minutes and was guided by a semi-structured interview protocol that covered key topics such as:

- The participant's role and experience in relation to dungeon resource management
- The specific activities and strategies of Russian SOEs in exploiting dungeon resources
- The rationale behind the state-centric approach to resource management
- The challenges and opportunities associated with this approach
- The implications of the approach for Russia's economic development and international relations

Interviews were conducted in Russian, and participants were assured of confidentiality and anonymity to encourage candid responses. With the participants' consent, interviews were audio-recorded and later transcribed verbatim for analysis.

3.3 Data Analysis

We analyzed the interview data using a thematic analysis approach, which involves identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns or themes within the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). The analysis followed these steps:

1. Familiarization: We read and re-read the interview transcripts to become immersed in the data and gain a deep understanding of the content.
2. Coding: We systematically coded the data, identifying and labeling meaningful segments of text that related to our research question. Codes were developed inductively, based on the data itself, and organized into a coding framework.
3. Generating themes: We reviewed and refined the codes, grouping them into potential themes that captured important patterns and meanings in the data. We then reviewed and refined these themes to ensure they were coherent, distinct, and relevant to the research question.
4. Defining and naming themes: We further refined the themes, developing clear definitions and names that captured their essence and scope.
5. Reporting: Finally, we wrote up our analysis, using illustrative quotes from the interviews to support our interpretations and arguments.

To ensure the trustworthiness of our findings, we employed several strategies recommended by Lincoln and Guba (1985), including member checking (sharing our interpretations with participants for feedback), peer debriefing (discussing our analysis with colleagues), and maintaining an audit trail (documenting our analytical decisions and processes).

This rigorous approach to data collection and analysis allowed us to develop a rich, nuanced understanding of the role of Russian SOEs in post-catastrophe resource management and the implications of this state-centric approach for the country’s economic development and international relations.

4 Results

4.1 The Dominant Role of SOEs in Dungeon Resource Exploitation

Our analysis of the interview data revealed that state-owned enterprises have played a dominant role in exploiting the anomalous resources found within Russian dungeons since the 2025 catastrophe. Participants described how the government quickly mobilized major SOEs in the energy, mining, and defense sectors to secure control over these resources, which were seen as strategically important for the country’s economic and geopolitical interests.

As one government official explained:

When the dungeons first appeared and we realized the potential value of the resources within them, there was no question that the state would take the lead in exploiting these resources. We have a long history of using SOEs to manage strategic assets, and this was no different. The government immediately tasked companies like Rosneft, Gazprom, and Rosatom with exploring and securing these resources for the benefit of the state.

SOE managers described how their companies had been given broad mandates and significant resources to establish control over dungeon resources, often working in close coordination with government ministries and security forces. One Rosneft executive noted:

From the beginning, it was clear that we were operating under a national security imperative. We were given access to military personnel and equipment to help us navigate the dungeons and secure the resources within them. There was a lot of pressure to move quickly and establish a dominant position before other countries or private actors could get involved.

4.2 Crowding Out Private Sector Participation

While the state-centric approach has enabled Russia to quickly establish control over dungeon resources, many participants noted that it has also had the effect of crowding out private sector participation and competition. Private companies, both domestic and foreign, have found it difficult to gain access to dungeons and compete with the scale and resources of the SOEs.

As one private sector representative lamented:

It's been incredibly frustrating trying to get a foothold in this new industry. The SOEs have a virtual monopoly on the most valuable dungeon resources, and they're not interested in partnering with private companies. We've tried to work through the bureaucracy to get permits and licenses, but it's a slow and opaque process. It feels like the government is more interested in control than in fostering a competitive and innovative market.

Some participants argued that this state-centric approach was short-sighted and could ultimately hinder Russia's economic development. An academic expert warned:

By relying so heavily on SOEs and shutting out private sector participation, Russia is missing out on the benefits of competition and innovation. These anomalous resources represent a major opportunity for economic growth and diversification, but only if the government creates a more open and dynamic market environment. Otherwise, we risk falling behind other countries that are taking a more balanced approach.

4.3 Geopolitical Implications and International Tensions

Russia's state-centric approach to dungeon resource management has also had significant geopolitical implications, as other countries have sought to secure access to these valuable resources and counter Russia's growing influence. Participants described how the government has used SOEs as tools of economic statecraft, leveraging their control over dungeon resources to advance Russia's foreign policy objectives.

One government official noted:

The anomalous resources found in dungeons have become a key aspect of our global strategy. We've used our SOEs to strike deals with other countries, offering access to these resources in exchange for political and economic concessions. It's a way of projecting power and influence beyond our borders, and it's been quite effective in certain regions.

However, this approach has also led to tensions with other countries, particularly those that feel threatened by Russia's growing control over dungeon resources. An SOE manager described the challenges of operating in this geopolitical environment:

We've faced a lot of pushback from other countries as we've sought to expand our operations into new dungeons. Some have accused us of unfair practices and even threatened sanctions. It's a delicate balancing act, trying to advance Russia's interests while also navigating the complex web of international relations in the post-catastrophe world.

4.4 Balancing Economic and Strategic Priorities

Participants also highlighted the challenges that Russian SOEs face in balancing economic and strategic priorities in their dungeon resource management

activities. While the government has emphasized the need to maximize revenue and economic growth, it has also placed a high priority on maintaining state control and security over these resources.

An SOE executive explained:

We're constantly trying to strike a balance between commercial viability and strategic necessity. On the one hand, we need to generate profits and contribute to the state budget. But on the other hand, we have to ensure that these resources remain under state control and are used in ways that advance Russia's broader strategic interests. It's not always an easy balance to strike.

Some participants suggested that this tension between economic and strategic priorities could ultimately undermine the effectiveness of Russia's state-centric approach. A government official acknowledged:

There's a risk that our focus on control and security could come at the expense of efficiency and productivity. If we're not careful, we could end up with a situation where our SOEs are more concerned with guarding their turf than with actually developing and utilizing these resources in the most effective way possible. That could limit the economic benefits we're able to derive from these anomalous resources.

5 Discussion

Our findings suggest that Russia's state-centric approach to resource management, centered on the dominant role of SOEs, has been driven by a combination of economic, strategic, and political factors. The government has sought to use SOEs as tools to quickly secure control over these valuable resources, which are seen as crucial for the country's economic development and geopolitical influence in the post-catastrophe world.

However, this approach has also had significant drawbacks and limitations. The crowding out of private sector participation and competition has limited the potential for innovation and efficiency gains in the exploitation of resource reserves. Moreover, the use of SOEs as instruments of economic statecraft has led to tensions and conflicts with other countries, which could ultimately undermine Russia's long-term interests.

These findings are consistent with the broader literature on the role of SOEs in resource management and economic development. Studies have shown that while SOEs can be effective in quickly mobilizing resources and

advancing state interests, they often suffer from inefficiencies, political interference, and a lack of market discipline (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014). In the context of post-catastrophe resource management, these limitations may be particularly acute, given the high stakes and complex challenges involved.

Our analysis also highlights the importance of considering the geopolitical implications of resource management strategies in the post-catastrophe world. As countries seek to secure access to valuable anomalous resources, there is a risk of heightened tensions, competition, and even conflict. This underscores the need for international cooperation and governance frameworks to manage these resources in a peaceful and equitable manner (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Sachs and Reid, 2007).

Finally, our findings suggest that the long-term success of Russia’s state-centric approach to dungeon resource management will depend on its ability to balance economic and strategic priorities effectively. While maintaining state control and security over these resources is important, it should not come at the expense of efficiency, productivity, and innovation. Striking this balance will require careful policy design, institutional reforms, and a willingness to engage with the private sector and international partners in a more open and collaborative manner.

6 Conclusion

The emergence of dungeons and the anomalous resources they contain has presented both opportunities and challenges for Russia in the post-catastrophe world. The state-centric approach to managing these resources, centered on the dominant role of SOEs, has enabled the government to quickly secure control over these strategic assets and use them to advance Russia’s economic and geopolitical interests.

However, this approach has also had significant limitations and drawbacks, including the crowding out of private sector participation, tensions with other countries, and the challenge of balancing economic and strategic priorities. As Russia navigates the complex landscape of post-catastrophe resource management, it will need to adapt its strategies and institutions to ensure the long-term sustainability and effectiveness of its approach.

Our findings contribute to the growing literature on the economic and geopolitical implications of the 2025 catastrophe and the emergence of dungeons. They highlight the importance of examining the specific strategies and institutions that countries use to manage anomalous resources, as well as the broader context in which these strategies are developed and implemented.

Future research could build on our analysis by examining the resource management strategies of other countries, exploring the potential for international cooperation and governance frameworks, and investigating the long-term economic and social consequences of different approaches to dungeon resource management. As the world continues to grapple with the challenges and opportunities presented by the post-catastrophe reality, understanding the role of state-owned enterprises and other key actors in shaping this new landscape will be crucial for informing effective policy responses and promoting sustainable and equitable development.

7 Policy Recommendations

Based on our findings, we offer the following policy recommendations for Russian policymakers and other stakeholders involved in dungeon resource management:

1. Encourage greater private sector participation and competition in the exploitation of dungeon resources, while maintaining appropriate levels of state oversight and regulation. This could involve reforming licensing and permitting processes, providing incentives for private investment, and establishing clear and transparent rules for market access.
2. Develop a more balanced and nuanced approach to using SOEs as tools of economic statecraft, one that takes into account the potential risks and unintended consequences of such actions. This could involve greater coordination between SOEs and relevant government agencies, as well as more extensive engagement with international partners and stakeholders.
3. Prioritize investments in research, development, and innovation related to dungeon resource management, in order to improve efficiency, productivity, and sustainability. This could include partnerships with universities and research institutions, as well as targeted support for private sector firms working on relevant technologies and solutions.
4. Strengthen international cooperation and dialogue on dungeon resource management, with the aim of promoting peaceful and equitable access to these resources and mitigating potential conflicts. This could involve the development of new international governance frameworks, as well as the expansion of existing mechanisms for cooperation and dispute resolution.
5. Regularly assess and adjust resource management strategies and institutions in light of changing economic, political, and social conditions. This could involve the establishment of dedicated monitoring and evaluation systems, as well as mechanisms for stakeholder consultation and feedback.

By adopting these recommendations, Russia can work towards a more ef-

fective, sustainable, and cooperative approach to dungeon resource management, one that balances the country’s economic and strategic interests with the need for global stability and prosperity in the post-catastrophe world.

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